POLISH MFA'S RUSSIA EXPERT SEES CHANGE IN RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000108

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ETRD KDEM PL RS
SUBJECT: POLISH MFA'S RUSSIA EXPERT SEES CHANGE IN RUSSIAN
TONE ON MD AS MERELY TACTICAL

REF: WARSAW 02395

Classified By: Polcouns Mary T. Curtin 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA's newly-appointed Eastern Policy
Director, Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, described the atmosphere
during FM Radek Sikorski's recent visit to Russia as warm,
but doubted it reflected any fundamental change in Russian
outlooks. He said the Russians now say publicly that they
acknowledge they do not have any veto power over MD, but
Poles see the new language as just a new tactic. He said
energy issues will top Prime Minister Tusk's agenda when he
meets Putin on February 8, and that agreement in the EU on
energy security remain at issue in Poland's decision on
lifting its veto on the EU negotiating mandate with Russia.
Bratkiewicz expressed private doubts about the honesty of
Georgia's elections, but confirmed official support for
Georgia. He affirmed that policy-making on Belarus,
including support for projects such as BELSAT, had returned
to the MFA under the new government. END SUMMARY.

Poles Wary of Moscow's New "Warmth"


2. (C) After accompanying Foreign Minister Sikorski to
Moscow on January 21, MFA's newly-appointed Eastern Policy
Director, Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz (a former director of Policy
Planning and of the Iraq Task Force who had been shunted
aside under the Kaczynski government),briefed PolCouns and
Poloff on the visit and the state of play in Polish-Russian
relations. He described the mood of the Sikorski-Lavrov
meetings as "friendly, like in the Communist era," making
clear that the Poles saw the change in mood as a tactical one
on the Russian's part. They had no illusions that Russians
had fundamentally changed their outlook despite what
Bratkiewicz reported as the Russians' emphasis on "Slavic
brotherhood." (Note: Bratkiewicz's colleague, Robert
Kupiecki, Director of Security Policy, emphasized to DCM
January 25 in a separate conversation that private
discussions during the meeting were franker than the public
mood and emphasized that Poland still takes seriously
Russia's threats with regard to MD. End Note) On Missile
Defense, the Russians stated publicly that they are not
asserting any "veto" rights over Poland's decision-making on
MD, in contrast to Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak's threats
during his visit to Warsaw earlier in the month.
Bratkiewicz speculated that Russian FM Lavrov's statement was
simply posturing, because he now understood the impossibility
of derailing U.S.-Polish Missile Defense talks. (Note:
Kupiecki said Lavrov's statement "has no meaning. Their
strategy is unchanged.") He also speculated that the
Russians in some ways respect and trust FM Sikorski because
he has been consistently anti-Russian his whole life, unlike
post-communist foreign ministers, whom they viewed in some
ways as "traitors."

Preview of the PM's Moscow Agenda - Energy Security


3. (C) Bratkiewicz outlined the prospects for PM Tusk's
upcoming visit to Moscow on February 8. He said energy
security would top the agenda. Poland still opposed the
planned Nordstream pipeline, and would propose that the
pipeline be built overland, crossing Poland. He dismissed
both the Russian and Germany justifications for building it
under the Baltic, saying the motivations were purely
political, or even cultural. "They like to struggle with the
sea," he noted. He said that decisions on a project of this
size could only be made by Putin, and that Tusk would raise
it with him. (Note: The press reported January 17 that FM
Sikorski publicly described Poland's proposal for an overland
route for the pipeline in response to a Russian proposal that
it would construct the Yamal II pipeline if Poland purchases
12 BCM of gas annually. End Note). He also said that the
decision to lift Poland's veto of the EU-Russia agreement
negotiating mandate depended not just on the lifting of the
meat ban (which has been accomplished),but also on agreement
within the EU that energy security would be part of the
EU-Russia negotiations. Poland wanted agreement on a
requirement that energy extraction companies be separate from
suppliers, something Poland wanted as a way to control
Gazprom and other Russian energy giants, but that some EU
countries opposed because it would impact their own energy
companies. Bratkiewicz thought that, although Russia had
backed down on the meat ban once it realized the EU would
stand behind its new members on the issue, Russia would still
look to divide EU members and try to play them off against
each other. Bratkiewicz made no mention of MD as part of
the Tusk-Putin agenda.

Belarus, Balkans and Georgia


4. (C) On Belarus, Bratkiewicz explained that in contrast

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with the previous government, the current PM had returned all
issues connected with Belarus to the MFA, including
decision-making on European Radio Belarus (ERB) and Belarus
Satellite Television (BELSAT),which would now be handled by
the Development Cooperation Department headed by Jerzy
Pomianowski. He said the issues would no longer, as under
the Kaczynski government, be treated as an extension of
domestic politics. He expressed interest in the upcoming
visit of EUR/ACE Assistance Coordinator Tom Adams.
Bratkiewicz emphasized that Belarus' independence from
Moscow, along with democracy, was important for Poland, and
that it was wary that Moscow might try to assert control over
Belarus in the guise of support for democracy. He described
the plight of many decent Belarusan intellectuals and
professionals, including some diplomatic colleagues, who felt
isolated by their government's actions and the international
response.


5. (C) With regard to Kosovo and a Coordinated Declaration of
Independence (CDI),Bratkiewicz waffled between go-slow and
go-slower. He cautioned that Russia didn't have a sincere
interest in Serbia's territorial integrity, but would use
Kosovo as a pretext to advance independence for Abkhazia.
As if to justify his lukewarm stance on CDI, Bratkiewicz
explained, "Poles don't pay much attention to the southern
Balkans." Post has seen the same mood when delivering
demarches on Serbia to the Polish MFA. PM Tusk himself
showed some of this last December when he commented that
Poland didn't need to be out in front calling for Kosovar
independence. While Kosovo policy does not fall under
Bratkiewicz's purview, his outlook is reflective of a
cautious overall Polish approach.


6. (C) Bratkiewicz expressed what he described as his
personal suspicion that fraud had interfered with Georgia's
recent presidential elections. According to him, Saakashvili
lacked support in the rural areas where his supporters may
have intervened to insure victory. He noted that Georgia's
democracy had not yet matured like Poland's. In Poland, even
the power-hungry Kaczynski's wouldn't tamper with elections.
Nonetheless, Bratkiewicz reiterated that Poland would
continue to strongly support Georgia, including its efforts
to build stronger institutions and to affirm its full
independence from Russia.
ASHE