RUSSIAN FM LAVROV OPEN TO MD CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001060

SIPDIS

EUR FOR FRIED, GARBER
EUR/CE FOR PIERANGELO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG PL
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FM LAVROV OPEN TO MD CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES WITH POLES

Classified By: DCM QUANRUD. REASON: 1.4 (D)


1. (C) The fact alone that FM Lavrov followed through on a
planned visit to Warsaw September 11 spoke volumes about
Russia's and Poland's ability to talk to each other despite
major differences over Missile Defense (MD) and the Caucasus.
The respectful atmospherics were as important as the visit's
key deliverable, a commitment to pursue MD
confidence-building measures at the deputy minister level.
FM Sikorski's deft handling of the visit gives Sikorski a hat
trick of recent diplomatic coups: his leadership during the
Georgia crisis and in MD talks with the U.S. was also widely
praised in Poland.


2. (C) Polish media described Sikorski and Tusk as tough
but reasonable interlocutors for Lavrov. Sikorski publicly
noted that he had told Lavrov that Russian generals should
not make threatening statements aimed at Poland over MD. PM
Tusk's Chief of Staff said Tusk had criticized Russian
actions in Georgia and strongly supported that country's
territorial integrity and sovereignty during his meeting with
Lavrov. But the Poles balanced this toughness with an
openness to Russian concerns. Sikorski said Polish
predictability and transparency would reassure Moscow on MD,
and acknowledged that his talks with Lavrov gave him a better
understanding of Russian views, even on Georgia. Lavrov
acknowledged that the posting of the U.S.-Polish MD agreement
on the web was a good faith effort at transparency. Sikorski
also joined Lavrov in opening and praising a bilateral
Citizens Dialogue Forum.


3. (C) Commentators here detected a positive shift in
Russian rhetoric. Former FM Rotfeld said that Russia no
longer treats Poland as part of its sphere of influence, and
that the MD issue need not obstruct a normal bilateral
relationship. Lavrov seemed understanding concerning Polish
participation in MD, while suggesting the Poles may be pawns
of aggressive U.S. military strategy. One blemish on the
atmospherics was a Gazeta Wyborcza article suggesting that
Lavrov's op-ed in the same newspaper offered an ugly quid pro
quo: Russia would accept MD and treat Poland like the
long-time EU members in return for Poland ceasing its support
for Georgia and respecting Russia's influence in the near
abroad. In reality, Lavrov's piece seemed only a standard
defense of Russian actions. However, Adam Rotfeld told
reporters of previous Lavrov hints that bilateral
understanding was possible if Poland accepted Russia's
age-old interests in certain regions.


4. (C) The successful handling of the Lavrov visit gives
the GoP a leg up in domestic political battles as well.
Lavrov's apparent unwillingness to meet with President
Kaczynski reinforces international impressions that Kaczynski
is too reflexively anti-Russian to get a seat at the table on
key occasions.

ASHE