LAO OFFICIAL ANTICIPATES RAPID RESETTLEMENT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000360

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC)
BANGKOK FOR POL (SUTTON)
BANGKOK FOR REF (SCHERER)
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018
TAGS: CASC FR LA PGOV PHUM PREF PREL TH
SUBJECT: LAO OFFICIAL ANTICIPATES RAPID RESETTLEMENT OF
RECENTLY RETURNED HMONG

REF: VIENTIANE 00225

Classified By: Ambassador Ravic Huso for Reasons
1.5 (B) and (D)




1. (C) Summary: The senior Lao official responsible for
Hmong resettlement told the Ambassador that the 837 Hmong
returned from Thailand on June 22 had proper shelter and food
available at their temporary processing site and would begin
returning to their villages next week. He claimed that the
Thai had notified the Lao on June 20 to expect approximately
600 returnees. The additional 200 plus were last-minute
volunteers added to the return convoy from among the
participants in the protest march. The official said he had
been told by the Thai to expect another group of 600 to be
returned after June 30. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, acting on behalf of several
"like-minded" Embassies and UN organizations, met on June 25
with MFA Director General Yong Chanthalangsy, the senior Lao
official charged with coordinating the resettlement of Hmong
returnees from Thailand. The primary purposes of the meeting
were to get the Lao version of events leading to the June 22
repatriation of 837 Hmong from the Huay Nam Khao camp in
Thailand, and to press the Lao government to allow
independent access to the returnees.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked DG Yong whether the returns were
anticipated or whether they were the unanticipated result of
the Hmong protest march from the camp that had been blocked
by Thai authorities. Yong said that he had been informed by
the Thai on June 20 to expect about 600 returnees. That
number, he said, swelled by about 200 as a direct result of
the protest march. According to Yong, the Thai officials had
ordered the marchers to either return to the camp or board
the buses that were staging to take the group of 600 back to
Laos. When one of the Hmong leaders, Pa Moua, decided to
board one of the buses, his example led many others to
follow, Yong said. As a result, only the first 600 arrived
in Laos with any significant personal belongings; the
last-minute 200 returnees had little besides what they were
wearing.


4. (C) As has been the case with previous returnees, the 837
were brought to the town of Paksane (northeast of Vientiane
in Bolikhamsai Province) for processing in anticipation of
their return to their villages or home towns. DG Yong said
most were being housed temporarily in a secondary school and
that there was more than adequate food, water, and financial
resources to care for them. He said that the initial
screening had been done to determine their places of origin,
and that perhaps as early as this weekend the government
would start arranging their transportation home. The goal,
he said, was to clear the Paksane facility by June 30. Soon
after, the Thai were expected to return another group of 600.
Yong thought that only a half-dozen families would need to
be resettled in one of the new villages established for
returnees because they were either destitute or had been
slash-and-burn farmers. All the others, he claimed, had
families and villages to which they could return and be
provided with food and shelter as they resumed their lives in
Laos.


5. (C) The Ambassador strongly urged Yong to allow the
international community access to the returnees both at
Paksane and following their resettlement within Laos. He
stressed that the lack of transparency and independent
monitoring of the returnees was a serious concern to the U.S.
and other countries. Yong, who has become increasingly
willing to speak frankly, said he understood the U.S.
position as did others in the Foreign Ministry. However, he
said, he reported directly to two Deputy Prime Ministers:
the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister. Yong said
that he had a difficult task of convincing the Defense
Minister -- and others in the Politburo who were of the
generation that fought the war -- of the utility and need for
any kind of transparency. These officials were used to
secrecy and took the view that the Hmong issue was strictly
internal and, as a sovereign country, Laos had no reason to
bow to international pressure. Yong argued that the decision
by the Politburo several years ago to shift responsibility
for the Hmong issues from the military to the civilians had
already resulted in remarkable progress. He cited the recent

VIENTIANE 00000360 002 OF 002


surrenders of former insurgents, including a group of 54 last
month, as evidence the new "clemency" policy was successful.
He also claimed that current policies regarding Hmong
returnees are working: specifically, resettling returnees in
their home villages; allowing them to keep their cell phones;
inviting the local and Thai press to cover returns; and
posting photos and interviews on the internet. As a
consequence, he continued, more and more Hmong in Thailand
are becoming convinced that it is in fact safe to return and
preferable to staying in the camps.


6. (C) The Ambassador urged Yong to consider additional,
bolder steps his government could take to demonstrate to the
international community that the returnees were safe and not
subject to retribution or persecution. Ideally, this would
involve monitoring by a credible, independent organization.
However, other steps would help, for example, inviting the
press (RFA, VOA, ABC, RFI, Al-Jazeera) to visit Paksane and
report on conditions, or allowing diplomats or UN or NGO
officials to do the same. The Ambassador added that he had
been asked by other Embassies to inform the Lao of their
interest in providing both short-and long-term resettlement
assistance to the returnees. Yong replied that he would try
to find opportunities to convince the Politburo to allow
media access but thought that it would be "difficult" to
persuade the leadership to allow diplomats to visit,
"especially the U.S. Ambassador." He also said that he would
try to sell the concept of resettlement assistance to the
Foreign Minister. An assistance program could, he suggested,
possibly include some form of "end use" checks that would not
constitute formal monitoring -- a concept that the Lao
rejected. He also stated that he would publicize the names
of the latest returnees and their destinations (as he had
done with smaller groups) and bring at least the local press
back to Paksane to cover the status and condition of the
returnees.


7. (C) Comment: DG Yong firmly believes that his policies
will lead to the voluntary return of almost all of the Hmong
currently at Huay Nam Khao by the end of the year. The
Ambassador tried to persuade him that this was not the case.
The only clear path to this objective has to include two
elements currently missing: a reliable screening process in
Thailand to identify those with a reasonable fear of
persecution and a transparent, credible means for the
international community to verify the welfare of returnees.
The Ambassador will continue to carry this message to other
senior Lao officals, in coordination with like-minded
Ambassadors. However, the Lao remain adamant that they will
not agree to a truly independent monitoring program.
Consequently, the challenge will be to identify mechanisms
and actions that may fall short of this ideal but still
provide the international community with some assurances that
the basic human rights and welfare of returnees are, in fact,
being respected by the Lao government.
HUSO