Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08VIENNA268
2008-02-26 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

AUSTRALIA GROUP: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE

Tags:  PARM PREL ETTC CBW IR RS AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVI #0268 0571336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261336Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9545
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2227
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000268 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CB AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CBW IR RS AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE
PROMOTING PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY INFO EXCHANGE AND
EXPERTS ENFORCEMENT MEETINGS

REF: STATE 16112

Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Dean Yap for reasons 1.4
(b),(d),and (h)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CB AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CBW IR RS AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE
PROMOTING PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY INFO EXCHANGE AND
EXPERTS ENFORCEMENT MEETINGS

REF: STATE 16112

Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Dean Yap for reasons 1.4
(b),(d),and (h)


1. (C) EconUnit Chief delivered reftel points on February 25
to Helmut Krehlik, Head of the Ministry of Economics' Import
and Export Control Division. Krehlik agreed to take an
active part in both the discussion on Russia's export control
regime and on Iranian efforts to procure technology and
equipment that could support a biological weapons program.


Russia's CBW Regime Adequate, But Other Problems Exist
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Krehlik said, that through his frequent participation
on EU-Russian cooperation projects, he had acquired a good
knowledge of Russia's strengths and weaknesses in the export
control field. Krehlik (please protect) claimed that, in his
opinion, Russia's export controls for chemical and biological
weapons were adequate, but that the GoR had serious
organizational problems in other areas of export control.
For instance, Krehlik pointed out that there is no master
control list, rather authorities must work from six different
control lists. Moreover, Krehlik maintained that there are
approximately 20 Russian governmental bodies that share
competency and approval authority for export license
applications.


3. (C) Krehlik added that even if one believed Russia's
regime was sufficient to allow it to join the Australia Group
(AG),there were important political questions to consider.
According to Krehlik, EU-Russian cooperation on export
controls had never breached the topic of corruption, which
undoubtedly remained a concern in Russia. Also, the Russians
had not played a particularly constructive role in other arms
and export control organizations, including Wassenaar and the
Missile Technology Control Regime. Krehlik cautioned that
Russian membership in the AG may replicate many of the
problems we have experienced in these organizations.


Iran: A Better View of Exports Thanks to UN Sanctions
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Krehlik said he would be willing to share information
with the Plenary on Iranian trade patterns. Since the
imposition of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, Austrian customs had
begun checking virtually all exports to Iran. Freight
forwarders have also become extremely cautious about shipping
to Iran, as Annex 1 and Annex 2 of EU Regulation 1423
prohibits deliveries, as well as exports of listed goods to
Iran. Krehlik maintained that Austrian authorities therefore
have a very good overview of what is being exported to Iran
from Austria. However, Krehlik noted that, since the
implementation of the UNSCRs, the GoA had stopped only "a
handful" of shipments that were destined for critical
end-users. Krehlik speculated that Iran had shifted its
trading patterns away from Europe to countries, e.g., China
and Turkey, with less rigorous implementation of the UN
sanctions.
Kilner