AUSTRIA: SECURITY SUPPORT FOR 2009 AFGHAN ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 001893

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM (COPE) AND SCA/A (SINGH)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA: SECURITY SUPPORT FOR 2009 AFGHAN ELECTIONS

REF: STATE 131480

Classified by: DCM Scott F. Kilner for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DCM, Econ/Pol Counselor, DATT and
Polchief discussed reftel demarche with GOA officials across
the government, as well as with the German Ambassador to
Austria during a series of meetings December 17 to 23.
Austrian officials said the MFA and Defense Ministry would
review the question of supporting the Afghan elections, but
would be hard pressed to find the resources if Austria, as
expected, continues its Chad mission. An MFA contact
confided that outside political pressure would be needed to
convince the GOA to send personnel to Afghanistan, and
suggested that high-level USG officials contact their GOA
counterparts. The German Ambassador, after consulting with
Berlin, said the German government had no plans to request
Austrian support in RC-North, as during the last Afghan
elections. Given Austrian integration with German forces
during the 2005 Afghan elections, Embassy believes the GOA is
most likely to be swayed by encouragement from the German
government in early 2009. We suggest that Washington
consider approaching the Germans about engaging more actively
with Austrian counterparts. End Summary.

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Chancellor's Office
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2. (C) The DCM discussed the Afghan elections December 17
with Bernhard Wrabetz, Diplomatic Advisor to Chancellor
Faymann. DCM stressed that the U.S. had valued and
appreciated the support Austria provided for the Afghan
elections in 2005, when the GOA deployed 100 personnel. We
understood that the Austrian military was stretched thin,
particularly due to the Chad mission. Nevertheless, the U.S.
hoped the GOA could support a temporary mission to provide
security during the 2009 Afghan elections. DCM stressed the
importance of a successful election, and emphasized that
Austria could make a meaningful contribution in a number of
ways. The GOA might, for example, provide medical support,
or personnel for information operations, he said.


3. (C) Wrabetz averred that any internal GOA process of
approving an Afghanistan mission would be long and arduous.
He noted that it took four months to win approval of the Chad
mission. The Austrian public is deeply skeptical of
deployments to dangerous missions, and Austria's newly
installed government would have to manage criticism from the
opposition parties, he said.

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Foreign Ministry
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4. (U) In a first meeting with the MFA's new Political
Director, Stefan Lehne, on December 19, DCM discussed our
demarche at length. Lehne replied that the GOA understood
the importance of the elections. He said the MFA and Defense
Ministry would meet shortly to discuss the possibility of
providing support. At the same time, the GOA was close to
approving a continuation of its Chad deployment after the UN
takes that mission over from the EU. An extension of the
Chad mission would limit Austria's options for Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the GOA would look for ways to support the
Afghan elections, Lehne said.


5. (C) PolChief followed up on December 23 with Bruno Bilek,
MFA Deputy Director for East Asia and the Pacific. Bilek
said that the date of the Afghan elections and the nature of
the proposed Austrian deployment would be key factors in
determining whether the GOA could contribute. A later
election date would allow more time for Austria to prepare.
Bilek averred that the MFA favored an Afghanistan deployment,
particularly in light of Austria's status as a non-permanent
UNSC member. However, it would be up to the military to
identify the manpower. The Austrian military only sends
volunteers on overseas missions, so officials would have to
identify -- within a stretched force -- an appropriate number
of willing personnel with the training required for the
mission, he said. Moreover, the Defense Ministry and the MFA
would need to determine where the funding for a mission would
come from, he said. Bilek also acknowledged that the new
government feared the possible political consequences of
deploying personnel on a dangerous mission. He suggested
that high-level USG officials raise the issue with their GOA
counterparts. "We in the civil service can't do this on our
own," he said. "We need political pressure."

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Defense Ministry
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6. (C) Major General Pucher, Defense Ministry Director for
Security Policy, told the DATT December 18 that he has long
argued for greater Austrian support for the Afghanistan
mission. Pucher said the Austrian military has prepared for
Defense Minister Darabos a range of options for providing
support in Afghanistan, but until decisions are made on the
future of the missions in Chad and the Balkans, it will not
be possible to determine
whether Austria has the manpower and funding to spare for
Afghanistan.

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German Embassy
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7. (C) Ambassador Girard-diCarlo on December 19 told German
Ambassador Westdickenberg that we had been instructed to ask
the GOA to provide security support for the Afghan elections.
He told Westdickenberg that we believed the Austrians might
be more willing to deploy personnel to Afghanistan if they
could co-locate them with German forces, as they have done in
the past. Westdickenberg said he had not yet received
instructions, but would consult with Berlin. On December 22,
Westdickenberg reported back to the Ambassador that Berlin
had not raised the subject of security support for Afghan
elections with the Austrian government and had no plans to
demarche the GOA on this issue. Ambassador Girard-diCarlo
believes the Germans may not yet see this as timely.

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Comment
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8. (C) It is an objective fact that, with peacekeeping
commitments in the Balkans, the Golan Heights and now Chad,
Austria's very limited military capabilities are strained.
Nevertheless, we believe that Austrian niche capabilities
could make a meaningful contribution to Afghan election
security and that significant parts of the military and
foreign policy establishment are favorably inclined.
However, whether the new government can muster the courage at
the political level to support even a limited Afghan
engagement is very much open to question. In this context,
Embassy believes that Germany is the ISAF member best placed
to make the case to Austria. Embassy therefore recommends
that Washington seriously consider approaching the German
government about actively soliciting Austrian support.
GIRARD-DICARLO