AUSTRIANS PROMOTE JOINT STATEMENT OF CONCERN AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 001095

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2023
TAGS: MNUC KNNP AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRIANS PROMOTE JOINT STATEMENT OF CONCERN AT
IAEA INDIA SAFEGUARDS VOTE

REF: VIENNA 1058

Classified By: A/DCM Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Pushed by long-standing principle and short-term
political calculations, Austria, with Norwegian support, is
seeking support from "like-minded" states to agree to a
statement of concerns about the terms of the IAEA Safeguards
Agreement to be approved August 1. The Austrians do not
believe this endangers consensus, but Ambassador and A/DCM
have stressed that we see such a statement as
counterproductive in the IAEA discussion and a likely further
burden on subsequent approval of an exception in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). End Summary.

Statement of Concerns
--------------


2. (U) The statement, drafted by the Austrian MFA's
Disarmament Department, offers a general welcome for an IAEA
Safeguards Agreement with India, but notes three specific
concerns about the text: 1) The lack of a definition of what
"corrective measures" India might take in the event of a
disruption of foreign fuel supplies; 2) The possibility that
linking the safeguards to other agreements might mean that
they are not applicable in perpetuity; and 3) The link of
entry-into-force with a later Indian decision and the lack of
inclusion of a list of facilities that will be covered. The
statement ends by saying that signatory countries are not
breaking consensus on the Safeguards Agreement, but noting
that the decision in the IAEA does not prejudge the
subsequent decision to be taken in the NSG.


3. (C) According to information from the U.S. Mission to
UNVIE and the French Embassy, the Norwegian Mission hosted a
meeting on July 31 for a number of potential signatories,
including Sweden, Finland, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Denmark,
New Zealand, and Spain. MFA IAEA Unit Chief Andreas Launer
(protect) confirmed that there was reportedly no final
decision by any particular state to associate itself with the
statement. He was working on a revised draft to be reviewed
at a meeting of the "like-minded" early August 1. Launder
was confident that 10-15 states would eventually associate
themselves with it, adding that he expected even more
critical national statements from other BoG members.

Embassy Action
--------------


4. (C) In response to information about the statement,
Ambassador spoke in the late morning with MFA State Secretary
Hans Winkler. He stressed that such a statement by several
nations could burden the atmosphere of the discussions,
possibly undermining consensus or provoking a call for a vote
if made before the Agreement was adopted. He asked the
Austrians to work with the Norwegians to drop the project.
Winkler promised nothing, but did acknowledge that the timing
of the statement could have an effect. He noted as well
that, as he had explained to U/S Burns on July 17, Austria
had greater concerns about the NSG process and would expect a
serious discussion of the terms of an NSG exception.


5. (C) In a brief follow-on conversation with the Ambassador,
Winkler reported that Austria did not believe the statement
would block consensus and he described the statement as "the
price we have to pay for going along "with the Agreement.
Winkler noted that the GoA was under particular pressure from
the Green Party to reject the deal.


6. (C) In conversation with Unit Chief Launer, A/DCM noted
that Winkler had made no mention to A/DCM Burns of a group
statement. Launer said the idea had emerged during
consultations among states with similar concerns and he said
that the GoA was committed to the project, in part because of
domestic political considerations. Launer though somewhere
between 10 and 15 states would join in supporting the final
statement.


7. (C) A/DCM also spoke with French Embassy DCM van Rossum,
who, with his Ambassador, had met with FonMin Plassnik's
Acting Chef de Cabinet in the morning. Van Rossum said that
the Austrians had definitively rejected joining a joint EU
statement of support for the Agreement. He cited two
reasons: a principled objection to the idea that there should
be an EU consensus on nuclear matters; and their concerns
about the India deal itself. The Austrians ad also told the
French they had Irish support for this position. Van Rossum

said that, given this attitude, he considered the possible EU
statement a dead letter. Van Rossum was also pessimistic
about the possibility of turning off the "like-minded"
statement. They did not se it as a grave threat to reaching
agreement by consensus, but were concerned about the impact
on the NSG debate.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) As in their handling of the cluster weapons issue, the
Austrians appear impervious to U.S. arguments. We take at
face value their claims that for both reasons of principle
and domestic politics they are committed to the statement.
(There has been much speculation that the conservatives (who
run the Foreign Ministry) would like to form a coalition with
the Greens after the 9/28 elections.) The damage they can do
in the IAEA appears limited; this is not the case in the NSG.
The USG will need a well-developed strategy for dealing with
the Austrians and "like-minded" in that forum. While little
would be gained by further high level interventions in the
IAEA debate (Embassy understands that U/S Burns has also
discussed the issue with State Secretary Winkler),senior
official and even cabinet-level intervention may prove
necessary in the run-up to the NSG debate.


Girard-diCarlo