Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK976
2008-10-27 21:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: GENERAL COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONS POSTPONED

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UNGA RS UP 
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUCNDT #0976/01 3012100
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 272100Z OCT 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5184
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000976 

SIPDIS

-- ORIGINALLY SENT AS USUN NEW YORK 973 -- DTG 271947Z --

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNGA RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: GENERAL COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONS POSTPONED
AMIDST PROCEDURAL WRANGLING

REF: STATE 112510

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000976

SIPDIS

-- ORIGINALLY SENT AS USUN NEW YORK 973 -- DTG 271947Z --

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNGA RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: GENERAL COMMITTEE CONSULTATIONS POSTPONED
AMIDST PROCEDURAL WRANGLING

REF: STATE 112510

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff for reasons 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) Summary and Action Request. (See paras 1 and 10). Per
Reftel instructions, Ambassador Wolff encouraged the
Ukrainian Mission to defer a request to inscribe an agenda
item for the 63rd General Assembly commemorating the Great
Famine of 1932-1933 ("Holodomor"),when it became clear that
Ukraine did not have the votes necessary to prevail in the
General Committee on October 23. Russia resisted Ukrainian
attempts to have the item removed from the General
Committee's agenda. Amidst procedural wrangling and an
informal U.S. filibuster, the President of the General
Assembly delayed the beginning of the committee meeting for
more than two hours while seeking a compromise. After
forceful Russian attempts to start the meeting in order to
call a vote, the President abruptly postponed the session.
We assess that Ukraine will continue to face strong
resistance to inscribing this agenda item. We will encourage
Ukraine to use the temporary reprieve to develop a climb-down
strategy for their request for an agenda item and to consider
an alternative way to commemorate the famine. We recommend
that the same message be delivered at senior levels in Kyiv.
End Summary and Action Request.

UKRAINE BACKS AWAY FROM GENERAL COMMITTEE VOTE
-------------- -


2. (C) Per Reftel instructions, Ambassador Wolff coordinated
with Ambassador Sergeyev and visiting Deputy Foreign Minister
Yuri Kostenko in advance of the scheduled October 23 General
Committee (GC) meeting. Wolff encouraged the Ukrainians to
delay scheduled consideration of a request to inscribe an
agenda item for the plenary, "Commemoration of the 75th
Anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine
(Holodomor)", until Ukraine was certain that it would win a
vote to inscribe the item. Wolff assured the Ukrainians that
the U.S. would speak in favor of inscription, would call for
a vote if requested by the Ukrainians, and would vote in
favor of inscription. However, he also told Kostenko and

Sergeyev that USUN's own soundings indicated Ukraine did not
have the support, particularly from all European members of
the GC, necessary to prevail in a vote on inscription. Wolff
suggested that Ukraine notify the President of the General
Assembly (PGA),as chair of the GC, prior to the meeting that
Ukraine wanted to defer consideration of the item pending
consultations with interested parties, and to ask the PGA to
announce the request for deferral during the meeting. Wolff
also spoke to the PGA and his senior staff to ensure they
would be receptive to this approach.


3. (C) After considering options and consulting with Kyiv,
Ukraine decided to seek a deferment of the item in the GC.
Ukraine asked Egypt and the U.K., as GC members, to seek the
delay on their behalf, citing ongoing consultations aimed at
resolving the differences that had prevented the GC from
taking action on the item during its September 17 meeting.
During the PGA's consultations with the U.K., Egypt and
Ukraine, which took place in his private office, he appeared
sympathetic to the request to delay consideration of the
agenda item. At that point, Russian Ambassador Vitaly
Churkin-- the main opponent of inscribing the Holodomor
agenda item-- joined the consultations.


4. (C) According to U.K. DPR Karen Pierce, when Churkin
entered the discussion the Ukrainian PR was deferential,
offered Churkin his seat in the PGA's office, and briefed
Churkin in Russian on the state of their discussions. Churkin
reportedly made dismissive remarks to the Ukrainians and
others in response, and refused to accept a deferment. He
said he was fed up with continually deferring consideration
of the item, that this was an issue between the Russians and
Ukrainians, and that the Ukrainians knew full well Holodomor
was not a genocide. Churkin insisted that the issue be voted
upon. He offered to defer the item only if it would not be
considered again during the 63rd General Assembly. The U.K.
and Egypt Ambassadors both pushed back, but Sergeyev undercut
their position by saying that Ukraine was prepared to face a
vote and that Ukraine had sought a delay only because others
had asked them to do so.

THE CLOCK RUNS OUT
--------------

5. (C) The PGA, clearly interested in finding common ground,
continued consulting with the Secretariat staff and other
members in his office, even after the Russians had made clear
they would insist on a vote. These consultations further

USUN NEW Y 00000976 002 OF 002


delayed the start of the GC, which had already been delayed
for an hour. During this time, Ambassador Wolff again met
with the PGA in order to buy time, and explained that the
U.S. had persuaded Ukraine to find a face-saving way to
withdraw the agenda item from consideration. Wolff encouraged
the PGA to find a way out for Ukraine.


6. (C) During the continuing delay in the start of the
meeting, Ukraine asked the U.S., U.K. and others to preempt a
vote on the agenda item by making a procedural motion calling
for another temporary deferral of the item. Several
delegations, including the U.S. and Russia, debated with the
Secretariat the rules that would allow for a deferral of the
item prior to a vote. The PGA appeared in the meeting room
during these discussions, and continued consulting with
members of the GC and secretariat staff. After the PGA
appeared, Russian Ambassador Churkin approached the rostrum
and demanded that the PGA start the meeting. The U.S.
continued to seek a consensus among GC members for a
compromise that would give Ukraine time to reconsider its
decision to bring the agenda item to a vote.


7. (U) As the time allocated for the meeting began to run
out before it had even begun, the U.S. and other countries
sought an informal consensus to address the other items on
the GC agenda that were not controversial. This infuriated
Churkin who again approached the rostrum and demanded that
the meeting begin. The Russian outburst appeared to anger the
PGA, and shortly afterward, his staff informed the assembled
committee that the entire meeting would be postponed for
another date.

COMMENT
--------------

8. (C) With the assistance of the PGA, and over strong
Russian objections, we were able help Ukraine avoid a defeat
in the General Committee by obtaining a de facto deferral of
the agenda item. Ukraine will not likely win a future vote
in the General Committee-- and possibly not in the GA plenary
either-- and should be encouraged in the strongest terms to
use this temporary reprieve to find a face-saving way to find
an alternative to the Holodomor resolution. We have made
this point to Sergeyev, and believe he understands that
chances of getting a resolution passed are slim. He is
already considering other ways for the UN to mark the 75th
anniversary of the Holodomor-- including a non-controversial
minimalist resolution, a joint statement to be circulated in
the General Assembly (as had been done in 2003 for the 70th
anniversary),a public event, or some other option. However,
Sergeyev has also told us that this issue is being driven
from Kyiv, and he is reluctant not to push ahead with the
issue when his instructions haven't changed.


9. (C) Despite Churkin's repeated protests, he could not get
the PGA to start the meeting and vote the issue. Churkin has
likely reached the conclusion that the U.S., and to some
extent, the U.K., were behind the procedural wrangling (in
effect, a 2.5 hour filibuster). When Churkin approached the
rostrum for the second time in the meeting room, one of the
points he made to the PGA was that it was U.K. and U.S.
lawyers who were arguing procedural points with the
Secretariat staff while the Ukrainians were sitting in the
back of the room watching. Churkin will ensure he is not
caught in this kind of situation again. The next time the GC
meets, he will be able to insist on a vote.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------

10. (C) Despite the absence of a winning strategy, we
understand that Kyiv may still be considering whether to
force a losing vote in the General Committee in order to
bring the issue to the plenary. Such a vote could be called
when the General Committee presents the report of its
recommendation not to inscribe the agenda item. This course
of action could set Ukraine up for an embarrassing loss not
only in the General Committee, but possibly in the plenary as
well. Ukraine would likely want to enlist our assistance in
this effort. Since the decision making on this issue is
driven from Kyiv, we recommend a frank discussion in the
capital with the Ukrainians on their poor chances for
success. This discussion should emphasize that we have
bought Ukraine time to develop a climb-down strategy for
their attempts to inscribe an agenda item-- not time to take
another run at inscription. End Comment.
Khalilzad