SUDAN: UN EXPERTS DOCUMENT SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000915

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN: UN EXPERTS DOCUMENT SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS

Classified By: Amb. Rosemary DiCarlo, for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. This is an action request -- please see paras 2 and 15.


2. SUMMARY: The Sudan Panel of Experts (POE),a UN-mandated
group charged with monitoring implementation of Sudan-related
UN sanctions, has issued a report documenting extensive
violations in Sudan. The report criticizes Khartoum for
violating the limited arms embargo on Darfur, using white
aircraft painted to resemble UN/humanitarian aircraft,
conducting offensive overflights in Darfur and not
implementing the Security Council-mandated targeted sanctions
(asset freeze/travel ban). The report traces the origin of
arms/ammunition used by rebel movements and documents
violations of international humanitarian law by both rebel
and Sudanese forces. The POE report recommends an expansion
of the arms embargo, greater Sudanese compliance with the
imposed measures, an expanded role for international missions
to monitor the embargo and increased resources for the POE to
continue its work. The Sudan Sanctions Committee will
discuss these recommendations in the near future. USUN
requests guidance on how to respond to the report and its
recommendations. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On October 1, Security Council members received a
confidential draft of the final report of the Sudan Panel of
Experts (POE),the team responsible for monitoring current
sanctions measures in place against Sudan. (NOTE: Composed
of five UN contractors, the POE had a 12-month mandate from
the Council to assist the Sudan Sanctions Committee in
revising the targeted asset freeze, travel ban and Darfur
arms embargo. This is the fourth Panel report since the
Security Council established the group in UNSCR 1591 (2005).
END NOTE.) This well-sourced, 85-page report contains a
number of allegations and recommendations that will likely
affect the policy discussion on Darfur.

POE: KHARTOUM VIOLATING ARMS EMBARGO, OBSTRUCTING WORK
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The POE report focuses heavily on the Government of
Sudan (GOS) and its violations of the Darfur arms embargo and
crimes against international humanitarian law. (NOTE: UNSCR
1591 bans the transfer of arms to the territory of Darfur.
This ban also applies to the GOS, which is required to seek
prior approval from the Security Council's Sudan Sanctions
Committee prior to any arms transfer to Darfur. END NOTE.)
The report notes that the GOS has never sought prior approval
from the Sudan Sanctions Committee for any such arms
transfers, and then cites extensive evidence of the weaponry
the GOS has transferred to Darfur in contravention of the
embargo. The POE also documented GOS obstruction of its own
work, including restrictions on the POE's access to airports,
flight logs, military and other government personnel.


5. (C) The POE report also investigated reports of offensive
military overflights in Darfur, which the Security Council in
UNSCR 1591 demanded cease. Based on expert analysis of
shrapnel, unexploded ordnance, attack vectors and witness
statements, the report assesses that "offensive military
overflights continue with impunity." When presented with
this evidence, GOS officials claimed to the POE that the
Sudanese Armed Forces had never conducted bombings in Darfur
and that the rebel movements had apparently produced fake
bomb sites in order to discredit the government.

WHITE, UNMARKED AIRCRAFT: A PRESCIENT WARNING?
-------------- -


6. (C) The POE report provides evidence, including photos, of
the ongoing use of white aircraft in Darfur by the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF). Some types of these helicopters, the
report observes, are almost identical to white helicopters in
use by the United Nations. The POE report claims that "the
use of these (SAF) helicopters has resulted in the targeting
of UN aircraft by armed groups opposed to the Government of
Sudan." The experts provided firsthand confirmation of this:
on August 11, 2008, rebels from the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) fired on a white UN helicopter carrying POE
members. Subsequent communications with JEM revealed that
the rebels mistook the UN aircraft for a GOS white
helicopter. The POE experts warned "it may only be a matter
of time before this purposed inability to distinguish between
UN and (SAF) helicopters results in more deadly consequences
for UN staff and humanitarian options. (NOTE: This might

have already happened: on September 29, a UN helicopter
crashed close to a refugee camp; the crash occurred, however,
after the POE finalized its report. The UN is currently
investigating the crash to determine whether the helicopter
was shot down. END NOTE.)


7. (C) When confronted on the matter, GOS officials told the
POE that while these helicopters were indeed white, they
carried no UN markings. The POE observed, however, that the
helicopters carry no distinguishing marks other than a tail
number and they carry neither civilian registration nor a
painted Sudanese flag. The POE report assesses that "The GOS
has provided no satisfactory explanation as to this apparent
penchant for ensuring that their white helicopters remain
completely bare of elements identifying them as military
aircraft."

TARGETED SANCTIONS GENERALLY UNIMPLEMENTED
--------------


8. (C) The POE determined that the GOS had not implemented
the targeted sanctions measures (asset freeze and travel ban)
imposed by the Council against four individuals in 2006. To
the contrary, two designated individuals are currently
employed by the GOS: Musa Hilal is a senior government
adviser and Gaffar Mohmed Elhassan is a serving in the SAF in
Khartoum.


9. (C) The POE reported that Sudan's neighbors (Chad, Libya,
Egypt) claimed to have taken some actions to implement the
targeted sanctions, although no assets have been frozen and
the porous nature of some borders (especially Chad-Sudan) has
complicated enforcement of the travel ban.

TRACKING REBEL ARMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
-------------- --


10. (C) The POE analyzed in depth the arms and ammunition
used by rebel groups, in particularly JEM. The POE found JEM
in possession of arms that at one time formed part of the
legitimately held stockpiles of Sudan's neighbors (in
particular Chad); the JEM also held arms and related materiel
from Sudanese stockpiles that were acquired on the
battlefield or through other internal sources.


11. (C) Rebel weapons and related materiel, the POE report
determines, came from states such as China, Russia, Serbia,
Bulgaria and the United States. The U.S.-origin goods were
rifle cartridges that the POE, with U.S. assistance,
determined were provided by U.S. manufacturers through a
Foreign Military Sales program to Chad between 1983 and 1987.
The POE complained that many countries -- China was
mentioned repeatedly -- did not answer requests for more
information on the origin of these arms.


12. (C) In addition to studying arms flows, the POE report
shines light on human rights violations committed by both
rebel groups and the GOS. The report provides extensive
information about the use of children in armed conflict,
including allegations that JEM recruited children who were
part of the May 2008 attack on Omdurman. On the GOS side,
the POE report sketches out mistreatment of detainees,
toleration of sexual and gender based violence and attacks on
displaced persons camps.

POE RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


13. (C) In line with its mandate, the POE made numerous
recommendations for follow-up action. Key recommendations
include:

-- The Darfur arms embargo should be expanded to cover the
entire territory of Sudan, as well as Chad and parts of
northern Central African Republic;

-- Sudan should comply with its obligations under UNSCR 1591,
namely by removing military assets in Darfur that are in
violation of the arms embargo, cease painting its aircraft in
ways that resemble UN/humanitarian aircraft, cooperate more
fully with the POE, and implement the asset freeze/travel ban.

-- UNAMID, MINURCAT, EUFOR and UNMIS should do more to
analyze violations of the arms embargo, including the
establishment of dedicated embargo monitoring cells and

mainstreaming these monitoring functions into their work;

-- The Security Council should provide additional resources
to the POE to enable the panel to better carry out its
mandate.

NEXT STEPS
--------------


14. (C) The POE will brief the Security Council's Sudan
Sanctions Committee on October 10 about the report's
principal conclusions. Italian PermRep Terzi, chair of the
Sanctions Committee, would like to have a fuller discussion
of the POE's recommendations the following week. Council
members, however, have the right to request that the POE
report be translated into all the UN's official languages.
If this request is made, the Committee may have to wait four
weeks or so until the translations are completed.


15. (C) ACTION REQUEST: USUN requests guidance on how to
respond to the POE's report in the Sanctions Committee, in
particular the U.S. position on the principal recommendations
summarized in para 13.


16. (C) The full POE report (a 9 MB pdf file) has been
mailed to IO/PSC. Please email Lorraine Konzet
(konzetl@state.gov) at the USUN Sanctions Unit to request
additional copies.
Wolff