Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK835
2008-09-18 17:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

GEORGIA/RUSSIA: RUSSIA OFFERS UNOMIG EXTENSION FOR

Tags:  PREL GG RS 
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VZCZCXRO6097
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0835/01 2621751
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181751Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4959
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000835 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/RUSSIA: RUSSIA OFFERS UNOMIG EXTENSION FOR
ARRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000835

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/RUSSIA: RUSSIA OFFERS UNOMIG EXTENSION FOR
ARRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. Russian Ambassador Churkin
has raised the possibility that Russia would allow a
technical extension of the UNOMIG mandate without insisting
on a change of name or on the participation by Abkhaz de
facto authorities in a Council session-- provided that the
Security Council does not invite Georgia to participate in a
session to renew the mandate, and if the United States grants
visas to the defacto authorities of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia for an Arria-format meeting prior to October 15.
Permanent Members France and the U.K., along with Germany,
appear ready to accept the Russian compromise of an Arria
meeting as a way to ensure international involvement in
Abkhazia for the short-term, and to avoid a protracted
negotiation in New York on the eve of the political dialogue
in Geneva. Germany has circulated to the P-3 a draft
minimalist technical rollover UNSCR for comment. The
Georgian PermRep has told us he is in favor of holding the
hard line against an Arria style meeting and Abkhaz
participation in a formal Council meeting, even at the risk
of losing the UNOMIG mandate. Our assessment is that by
blocking an Arria format appearance, we risk losing UNOMIG's
foothold in Abkhazia and we risk losing support from others
in the Council against participation of Abkhaz and South
Ossetian authorities in a formal Council session. Action
request: We request Department guidance on the Russian
proposed compromise and on the German draft resolution. End
Summary.


Russia Floats a Compromise: Arria for UNOMIG
--------------
2.(C) On the sidelines of a meeting of a General Assembly
Open Ended Working Group meeting on September 15, Russian
Ambassador Churkin raised the issue of UNOMIG with Ambassador
Khalilzad. Churkin told Khalilzad that the Russian
government could support allowing an extension of the United
Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) under its current mandate
and name. Russia would not insist on having a representative
of Abkhazia speak at the Council meeting if the Security
Council were to agree that Georgia would also not be allowed
to appear. Churkin allowed that this would be a purely
technical rollover of the mandate for four months (he
mentioned mid-February) that would get us past the

discussions to be held Geneva in mid-October as part of the
Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement of September 8. Churkin confirmed
to Ambassador Khalilzad he understood the U.S. would not
support any change to the name, UNOMIG, and that substantive
issues, such as the size or competencies of the UNOMIG
mandate would not be part of the discussion. Russia would
want the United States to allow representatives of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia to attend an Arria-format meeting in the
United States on October 7, as an alternative to their
appearance at a formal Council session. Ambassador Khalilzad
said he would pass the proposal on to Washington.

Europeans Eager for UNOMIG Extension
--------------
3.(C) At a subsequent meeting of German, French, U.K., and
U.S. Ambassadors on September 16, German Ambassador Matussek
told Ambassador DiCarlo he had had a similar conversation
with Churkin. The Russian told Matussek he could accept
having no representatives of the de facto Abkhaz authorities
at a UNSC session to extend UNOMIG, if there were no speeches
at the meeting and if no representatives of other governments
(i.e., Georgia) were permitted to attend. Without going into
specifics, U.K. Ambassador Sawers said he had gotten the same
impression from his conversations with Churkin.

4.(C) French Ambassador Ripert emphasized that France wanted
a rollover of the current mandate for as long as possible, so
as not to distract from the EU-led discussions in Geneva.
France sees the Geneva process as the fulfillment of point
six of the cease-fire agreement brokered by French President
Sarkozy. France would not want to engage in a discussion in
New York of the modalities of changes to the UN mandate in
Georgia that would distract from the Geneva process. Germany
and the U.K. also looked favorably on Churkin's proposal,
because it could leave open the introduction of EU monitors
into Abkhazia through UNOMIG at a later date. The continued
involvement of the UN in Georgia could also be used to raise
the issue of Russia's occupation of Georgia at a later date.
The German Ambassador circulated a "notional" Resolution that
he said Germany could introduce in the Council in its role as
the coordinator of the Friends. Germany extended the period
of the rollover to six months with the assumption Russia will
ask for four. See paragraph 7 for text of draft UNSCR.

Georgians Against Arria-Format Meeting
--------------

USUN NEW Y 00000835 002 OF 002


5.(C) In a separate meeting on September 16 with Ambassador
DiCarlo, Georgian PermRep Alasania, who had earlier told us
he supported an Arria-style meeting in October in order to
bolster opposition to participation in a formal Council
meeting, said Georgia had changed its thinking. After
assessing that it still had the votes in the Council to block
participation in a formal meeting, the Georgians now want the
U.S. to prevent the Arria meeting by denying visas and
continuing to oppose Abkhaz participation in the Council
meeting on UNOMIG. Alasania is prepared to revisit the Arria
format meeting in January, but believes that the concession
to Russia should not be granted in advance of the mid-October
Geneva meeting and completion of the Russian withdrawal. He
believes Costa Rica will remain a reliable seventh vote,
along with the U.S. and the five EU countries, to block any
attempt by Russia to force a procedural vote on the
appearance of the de facto S. Ossetia and Abkhazia
authorities at a formal Council session. (Note: Russia would
require 9 votes in order to force the Council to agree to
hear a non-Member. Since the Council consists of 15 members,
7 votes are needed to block procedural moves. There is no
veto on procedural questions. End Note.)

6.(C) Alasania said that Tbilisi was not concerned about a
Russian veto of UNOMIG since UNOMIG played a minor role in
Abkhazia. Ambassador DiCarlo warned that while we now had 7
votes to block the Abkhaz/South Ossetia participation in a
formal Council session, those votes might waver if Russia
tries to block UNOMIG. She referred to strong European
support to keep UNOMIG in place for several months as a
foothold for later European or international presence in the
separatist areas.

Comment and Action Request
--------------
7.(C) We will have to weigh our options carefully-- including
our interest in continuing UNOMIG-- as we try to thwart
Russian efforts to legitimize Abkhaz and South Ossetian de
facto authorities by participation in UN meetings, while at
the same time seeking a technical rollover of UNOMIG by
October 15. We believe that today we have seven votes to
block participation of the de facto leaders in a formal
session of the Council (U.S., European members of the
Council, and Costa Rica). We are less certain than Alasania
that these votes will hold until after the Geneva session.

8.(C) If we refuse to pursue the deal proposed by Churkin
(Arria meeting with Abkhaz and South Ossetians on Oct 7, no
Abkhaz presence in a formal Council session when UNOMIG is
adopted, and a technical rollover),we can expect that
Churkin will attempt to hold the UNOMIG rollover hostage to
Abkhaz participation in the Council. While Georgia is
prepared to lose this mission, our European partners appear
to set a priority for UNOMIG's continuation and for a quiet
rollover. Abkhaz desires to have UNOMIG continue will also
weigh on Council members and the UN Secretariat. We can
easily see European resolve weakening and support growing for
a trade: Russian acquiescence for a UNMOG rollover for
Abkhaz participation. At this point, the idea of an Arria
meeting would likely be moot.

9.(C) If we refuse to grant visas for the Arria session for
October 7, we risk either losing the UNOMIG mandate or
finding a Council that would support participation of the
Abkhaz authorities in a formal session of the Council. USUN
will continue to discuss this issue with European members of
the Council to ascertain their firmness to opposition to
Abkhaz and South Ossetian participation in UN meetings. We
request Department guidance on the Russian proposal and the
German initiated UNSCR.

German Draft UNSCR on UNOMIG
--------------

10. (SBU) Begin Text:

The Security Council,

PP1 Recalling all of its relevant resolutions including
resolution 1808 of 15 April 2007 (S/RES/1808);

PP2 Welcoming the reports of the Secretary-General on the
activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
of 23 July 2008 (S/2008/480) and X October 2008 (S/2008/XXX):


1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period
terminating on 15 April 2009;


2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

End Text.
Khalilzad