Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK833
2008-09-18 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD AND P-3 MEET WITH THE

Tags:  PREL RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUCNDT #0833/01 2621448
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O 181448Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4956
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 0262
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0230
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 1208
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000833 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD AND P-3 MEET WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000833

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL RS GG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD AND P-3 MEET WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY. Permanent Representatives of the U.S., U.K.,
and France urged Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to send a
comprehensive humanitarian and human rights fact finding
mission to Georgia and to sign a UN-NATO Declaration on
cooperation. On Georgia, Ban said he had approved a mission
that would depart on September 16 for Moscow, but that the
Russian Federation had not granted visas to the two team
members who were to examine human rights issues. A UN. human
rights official subsequently received a visa to join the
team. Ban agreed to consider a follow-on mission if the
current mission was unsuccessful in getting sufficient access
to South Ossetia. Ban was optimistic that Russia would agree
to a 3-4 month extension of the current UNOMIG mandate. He
also thought the UN should have a role in the political
discussions that will take place in Geneva in mid-October. On
the UN-NATO Declaration, Ban told Ambassador Khalilzad
privately he would sign the Declaration, but preferred to do
it without fanfare. Ban said he would coordinate plans with
the NATO SYG. Ban previewed some appointments, and discussed
arrangements for a Burma Ministerial. END SUMMARY.

Georgia
--------------
2.(C) The P-3 pressed Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to
quickly send a comprehensive humanitarian and human rights
fact-finding mission to Georgia, including South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, in order to assess needs and look into allegations
of human rights abuses. Ban said a UN mission was leaving
for Georgia on September 16. Ban agreed with the P-3 that
the UN mission should include a human rights component. He
said he had included two representatives from the office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in a list of team
members that had been sent to Moscow. Russia had not yet
approved the visas for the two individuals who would be
involved in the human rights fact-finding aspect of the
mission. Ban also said the scope of the mission had
originally been more ambitious, and would have included
political issues, but was cut back after SRSG-designate
Verbekes's meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.
Note. U/SYG for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes told
Ambassador Wolff subsequently that Russia ultimately issued a

visa for a human rights officer. End Note.

3.(C) The P-3 warned Ban that by allowing Russia to dictate
the terms of the mission, Russia could then portray the
mission as a joint UN-Russia humanitarian venture.
Ambassador Khalilzad noted that the UN should not be
negotiating with Russia over the composition of staffing for
the Secretary-General's mission. The French PermRep raised
the possibility of a trip by the SYG's Special Envoy for
Genocide, Francis Deng. Ban agreed it was his prerogative to
decide who would be in the mission, and that it should not be
a joint mission with the Russians. He said he would consider
a possible role for Deng, but made no commitments.

4.(C) Ban said he had also spoken to French Foreign Minister
Kouchner about the UN role in the political discussions that
will take place in Geneva in mid-October. Ban and Kouchner
agreed that the UN, and in particular the UNOMIG mission,
should play a role, along with the EU and OSCE. Ban
understood that the French were proposing a two-room formula
for the meeting; one with the Georgian government, and one
with representatives of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia
de-facto authorities. Ban believed a 3-month technical
rollover of the current UNOMIG mission, due to expire on
October 15, would be the best solution to give time for the
Geneva process to get underway. Ban was not sure if the
Russian Federation would be in favor of an extension, but
SRSG-designate Verbeke was optimistic that the Russians would
want to show flexibility. Ban raised the possibility that the
P-5 breakfast on September 26 should focus on Georgia, as it
would be an opportunity to confirm the building blocks for
the political dialogue.

NATO-UN Declaration
--------------
5.(C) The P-3 urged Ban to move ahead with signing a Draft
Declaration on UN-NATO Cooperation during the General Debate,
as had been earlier agreed between the NATO and UN
Secretaries-General. The Ambassadors raised concerns that
NATO had been informed by the Department of Political Affairs
that Ban had decided to delay signing the document. Ban
answered that he was concerned about the risks to UN
peacekeeping missions by the implied obligation to provide
mutual assistance in extremis. He also mentioned the report
of Lahkdar Brahimi issued in 2007 in response to the car

USUN NEW Y 00000833 002 OF 002


bombing of the UN mission in Algiers, which concluded that
the UN is increasingly perceived as being partial to U.S. and
European interests. Additionally, Ban said UNDP in
Afghanistan is concerned that the local population does not
distinguish between UN assistance workers and international
peacekeepers; UNDP workers were therefore at risk. The P-3
Ambassadors pointed out that attacks against UN personnel
were not the result of our written understandings on
cooperation. Ambassador Khalilzad asked Ban to clarify
whether he was implying by the delay in signing that he is
not entirely committed to or intends to renegotiate the
document. Ban said he was committed to the Declaration, but
he had been advised to approach it cautiously.

6.(C) In a separate, follow-on meeting with Ambassador
Khalilzad, Ban said he would sign the Declaration, but he
preferred to do it without fanfare. Ban said he would call
NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to discuss it. Ambassador
Khalilzad suggested the General Debate might be a good time
to avoid the fanfare, as there would be other issues and
events competing for media attention.

Burma and New Appointments
--------------
7.(U) On Burma, SYG Ban said he would like to hold a
ministerial meeting on September 27, believing that September
29 would be too late, because many ministers would have
departed by then.

8.(U) Ban also told the Ambassadors he would appoint Srgjan
Kerim as a Special Envoy on Climate Change along with the
former Chilean President Lagos. Ban plans to announce the
appointments on Friday, September 19.
Khalilzad