UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: U.S. ISOLATED ON NEW NAMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000809

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: U.S. ISOLATED ON NEW NAMES

REF: A. STATE 94825

B. STATE 61842

C. USUN 486

D. PARIS 1671

E. PARIS 1104

F. PARIS 1036

G. PARIS 1005

H. BEIJING 2201

Classified By: Alternate Permanent Representative Amb. Rosemary
DiCarlo for reasons: 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: USUN convened a P3 meeting on September 4 to
discuss the U.S. proposal to submit to the Sudan Sanctions
Committee four new names for targeted sanctions. France
remains opposed to the entire U.S. approach, believing that
new sanctions would undermine ongoing dialogue processes and
undermine the accomplishment of other goals in Sudan and the
region. The UK, originally supportive of our approach, said
that due to recent developments London's position is now more
similar to that of Paris. France's Deputy PermRep to the UN
reiterated to Amb. DiCarlo France's opposition, but allowed
that France could support new sanctions if they occurred
within the framework of ongoing UN/AU mediation efforts.
USUN recommends holding off temporarily on proposing these
names until we are able to move forward with firm P3 support;
France's suggestion to integrate the threat of sanctions into
current mediation efforts could help broaden support for new
sanctions in the Council. END SUMMARY.

FRANCE STILL REJECTS U.S. APPROACH; UK TEPID
--------------


2. (C) Per ref A, USUN convened on September 4 a P3 meeting
to discuss the U.S. proposal to submit four new names to the
Sudan Sanctions Committee for targeted sanctions (asset
freeze / travel ban). USUN emphasized that recent violence,
notably government attacks on villages and the rebel advance
on Omdurman last May, demanded a response from the
international community, and that our balanced list included
both government and anti-government malefactors for whom we
had evidence that they met the criteria for sanctions under
UNSCR 1591.


3. (C) Clement LeClerc, the Sudan expert at France's UN
mission, explained that France still opposes moving forward
with these four names now. According to LeClerc, Paris
believes new sanctions would derail ongoing mediation and
dialogue efforts underway involving Chad, Sudan and the
various rebel movements. Noting the current divisions in the
Security Council, LeClerc asserted that it would be highly
problematic to move forward without P3 unity. LeClerc
reiterated France's longstanding position that imposing
sanctions on one of the individuals -- Dauossa Deby, the
half-brother of Chad's president -- could end Chad's
cooperation with international missions, particularly the
EUFOR follow-on force. LeClerc added that France had no
information that Deby had engaged in bad behavior in recent
months, but would welcome receiving any such information that
the United States may possess.


4. (C) LeClerc also raised the possibility that "Sudan's
friends" might use the Sudan Sanctions Committee's procedures
to ensure that the Committee only approves sanctioning the
anti-government rebel, Khalil Ibrahim, while rejecting the
other three names. (NOTE: This is theoretically possible.
The Committee approves or rejects names individually, not on
a slate -- therefore, Libya and/or China could theoretically
place holds on all the names except Ibrahim. END NOTE). If
this were done, LeClerc insisted, the Government of Sudan
would win a propaganda victory and be let off the hook.


5. (C) LeClerc asked whether Washington had considered Paris'
proposal to sanction Chadian rebels. USUN responded (per ref
A guidance) that the United States would be willing to work
with the French to designate some (one or two) of these
Chadian rebels if that ensured French support for the
inclusion of Daoussa Deby in our proposal of four names now.


6. (C) UKUN mission expert Sofka Brown noted that London
originally supported the U.S. approach and had formally
approved listing the four new individuals in May. Yet since
then, she explained, new mediation processes had been
launched and there have been other new developments, notably
the prospect of new International Criminal Court (ICC)

USUN NEW Y 00000809 002 OF 002


indictments. As a result, she said, the UK now has "a
similar approach to France" and would have to rethink the
issue before agreeing to move forward now. Brown added that
the timing of this proposal -- with the ICC issue looming and
just before the UN General Assembly ministerial week -- was
poor.

FRENCH DPR: MAYBE IN DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo subsequently raised ref A points
with French DPR Jean-Pierre Lacroix on September 5. Lacroix
confirmed that France believed it was premature to consider
sanctions in Darfur, especially since the international
community's main leverage now lie in the ICC discussion. He
reiterated France's position that sanctioning President
Deby's half-brother would harm Chad's cooperation with the
international missions and added that Chadian rebels would
use it to weaken Deby internally.


8. (C) According to Lacroix, Paris belives that sanctions
would only be effective in the context of the negotiating
efforts of Djibril Bassole, the UN/AU Chief Mediator to
Darfur. He added that new sanctions should only be used in
support of the political processes now underway in Sudan
(i.e., between the government and Darfur rebels groups) and
Chad (i.e., between President Deby and Chadian rebel groups).


RECOMMENDED WAY FORWARD
--------------


9. (C) In light France's position (reiterated in ref C, D,
E, F, G),the UK's lack of enthusiasm and China's
near-certain opposition (ref H),USUN recommends holding off
temporarily on this initiative until we are able to move
forward with firm P3 support. If we propose new names for
sanctions without P3 support, we run a high risk of public
failure that would undermine accomplishing our other goals in
Sudan and antagonize our allies. USUN also recommends
against bypassing the Sudan Sanctions Committee and forcing a
Council vote on our proposed names -- this course of action
would worsen an already tense atmosphere in the Council and
have unpredictable consequences, such as the likelihood
Council members would insist on inserting unacceptable ICC
language in an any sanctions resolution.


10. (C) USUN notes that French officials (ref D) have
previously left open the possibility that they could support
new sanctions in the coming weeks and months if these
individuals' bad behavior continues. France's suggestion
that further rounds of targeted sanctions be tied to
Bassole's mediation efforts (presumably as a "stick" to
threaten against those who do not cooperate) may be worth
exploring. This kind of integrated approach would likely
broaden support in the Council for new targeted sanctions.
Khalilzad