SOMALIA: DPKO BRIEFING NARROWS OPTIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000791

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR MOPS KPKO UNSC SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DPKO BRIEFING NARROWS OPTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL FORCE

REF: A. USUN 668

B. USUN 689

Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad, for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 13.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In Security Council consultations on
Somalia on August 26, the U.S. push for accelerated planning
for a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) by rehatting AMISOM
units was supported by Italy and African members but
explicitly rejected by the UK and France. Other members of
the Council delivered forward-leaning statements on
international engagement but several of them favored
deployment of a multinational force (MNF) as described by the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). USUN requests
Department policy guidance in deciding on a path forward in
the Security Council. End Summary.


3. (SBU) In response to a U.S. request for a briefing on the
status of Secretariat contingency planning for an
international force to eventually replace both Ethiopian
troops and AMISOM in Somalia, three senior UN officials
briefed the Security Council on August 26: A/SYG Edmond
Mulet, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and DPKO Chief of Staff Colonel Ian
Sinclair (UK).

SRSG's "heartfelt plea" for peacekeepers
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4. (SBU) Ould-Abdallah briefed on the August 19 signing of
the Djibouti Agreement between the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the opposition Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Ould-Abdallah argued that
security in Somalia was "no worse than Afghanistan or Iraq"
and suggested that writers in the Somali blogosphere
purposefully exaggerate reports of violence to serve clan or
political interests. Although he insisted that Somalia's
rogue elements amounted to no more than 3,000 youths,
Ould-Abdallah somewhat inconsistently appealed to the "P5
plus" to share intelligence on the situation in Somalia
because "we don't know what's happening." He urged members
to consider the Djibouti Agreement's request for an
international stabilization force as "a heartfelt plea" from
the Somali people and advocated quick deployment of an
international force to allow UNPOS, the UN country team and
some foreign embassies to relocate to Somalia.

DPKO pushes a MNF...
--------------


5. (SBU) DPKO's Col. Sinclair delivered a exhaustive briefing
offering a sharply different view of the situation in Somalia
than that held by the DPA's Ould-Abdallah. He told Council
members that the security environment was extremely unstable
and getting worse. He outlined the threats an international
force would face and said that while some non-signatory
groups could potentially be recruited into the political
process, the more militarily capable among them would not
negotiate, particularly Al-Shabaab.


6. (SBU) Reminding Council members of the military axiom to
"plan for the worst," Sinclair reiterated DPKO's view that a
"full-spectrum" MNF led by a capable lead nation was the only
international force that could help secure Somalia under
current conditions. Sinclair proposed that the MNF focus on
a limited mission: monitoring Ethiopia's withdrawal;
providing security for air, sea and supply routes and
providing limited security for peace process venues in
Mogadishu. He stressed that any troops deployed to such a
mission must be logistically self-sustaining, well-equipped
and well-trained in urban counter-insurgency. Insufficiently
trained troops might react inappropriately to provocations,
he said, which would endanger civilian lives and ultimately
the credibility of the force. Sinclair stressed that the
capabilities of the troops were more important than their
numbers, but estimated that at least two brigades (approx.
8,000 troops) would be needed for a Mogadishu-only operation.
This would not include eventual reinforcements or the
maritime component to the operation -- which he emphasized
would be key, as the force might initially need to be based
at sea.


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...and says a PKO won't fly
--------------


7. (SBU) Taking over from Col. Sinclair, DPKO A/SYG Mulet
described how his department had considered and eliminated
options for an "AMISOM-plus" operation or immediate
deployment of a UNPKO:

AMISOM-plus: Mulet said that AMISOM is not a sound basis
for an operation because it was not designed as a
peacekeeping force: it is immobile. Moreover, it is under
constant attack and concerned largely with defending itself.
He told the Council that deployment of additional troops with
similar capabilities would not expand AMISOM's effectiveness
or influence on the ground. He said that the larger force
would inevitably remain on base, unable to complete its task,
and might use inappropriate force if attacked. While
acknowledging the "temptation" to approve a less capable
force, Mullet warned that such a decision could cause a
setback to peace efforts or even prompt their failure.

UNPKO: Mulet said that immediate deployment of a PKO was
not proposed because the situation in Somalia goes beyond
what DPKO can provide. As an example, he cited UNAMID, which
has proved ineffective despite a far more permissive security
environment. He added that the UN's traditional system of
contractor-based logistics would not be tenable in Somalia.
Not only was there a lack of commercially available supplies,
but any available contractors who could offer transportation
would be linked to a clan or faction, and engaging them would
encourage resentment and doubts about the UN's impartiality.
Finally, he said that a MNF would be preferable to a PKO, as
military actions taken by a PKO force would inevitably
interfere with the UN's mediation efforts between the parties.

DPKO's offers MNF roadmap, wants broader political process
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) Mulet warned members against "half-measures" and
said that "the Security Council cannot afford any missteps
that could be costly for Somalia and the UN." He told the
Council that the political process should be as broad as
possible because excluding groups from negotiations would
guarantee that those groups would attack any international
force. Mulet said that the benchmarks in the Djibouti
Agreement, including a cease-fire between the TFG and ARS,
removal of checkpoints, and establishment of a joint TFG-ARS
force, should be implemented before any international force
could deploy. Once these conditions were met, Mulet proposed
a three-phase approach for moving toward a MNF deployment.
First, the UNSC would request the SYG to approach potential
TCCs. The SYG would then respond within 30-60 days with
recommendations. Finally, the UNSC and General Assembly
would explore a funding mechanism for the MNF, following the
precedent of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

Council reaction: U.S. and Africa back movement toward PKO
-------------- --------------


9. (SBU) Amb. DiCarlo, speaking first, stressed the need to
support the Djibouti Agreement with rapid deployment of a
PKO. She advised the Secretariat that DPKO should focus on
PKO contingency planning rather than using the proposal for a
MNF as a reason not to prepare for a PKO. She was supported
by South Africa's PermRep, who blasted the Secretariat for
delivering a divided (DPKO/DPA) briefing and sarcastically
asked why the Security Council wasn't warned about sending
AMISOM into a "death trap" if the situation on the ground was
as grave as DPKO claimed. Italy said that AMISOM should be
"raised to a level to facilitate UN rehatting."


10. Other members issued forward-leaning statements that left
the door open to a PKO without specifying modalities.
Burkina Faso advocated quick deployment of an international
stabilization force and said that in-depth consideration
should not be a reason for losing time. Libya said that the
international community should increase logistical and other
support to AMISOM and should not impose draconian conditions
before considering deployment of an international force.
China said that conditions for a UNPKO did not exist but said
that the UN should work hard to create such conditions
through AMISOM's full deployment: "if the AU can do it, the
UN can do it."


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UK, France favor MNF; Russia, Belgium skeptical
-------------- --


11. (SBU) The UK and France agreed with DPKO's assessment
that a capable MNF was the only realistic option for Somalia.
The UK PermRep explicitly stated that AMISOM could not form
the basis for a PKO and argued that UNAMID was not an example
the UNSC should repeat. He agreed with the SRSG that Somalia
was no worse than Iraq or Afghanistan but pointed out that in
those countries, the international community has deployed
strong MNFs. The French DPR said he supported AMISOM's full
deployment but that it lacked the needed capabilities for a
stabilization force. France was open to a PKO at a much
later stage, but in the meantime encouraged the Secretariat
and the AU to work together on a MNF. Russia said that any
operation would need to wait for a more stable peace in
Somalia, including a more inclusive political dialogue.
Russian DPR Dolgov said that Russia would not exclude any
particular option, but agreed with DPKO that any such force
must be "maximally equipped" and added "let's be honest - the
numbers will be very, very high." Belgium said that the
Security Council's credibility was at stake, and that members
needed to be "careful and responsible" in their actions.

Other members want action, but many defer to DPKO
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) Costa Rica said that a "consensus for action"
existed on the Council, and urged members to stop requesting
reports and take action toward a MNF as suggested by DPKO
rather than "shooting the messenger." Panama said that the
time had come for "well-considered action," and urged members
to heed DPKO's concerns. Indonesia praised DPKO's briefing
as extensive and valuable, while advocating quick deployment
of an international force. Croatia noted the worsening
security situation and said that it was open to various
proposals on peacekeeping, but that the UNSC should work to
strengthen AMISOM in the meantime. Vietnam said the UNSC
should act in a decisive manner to bring peace to Somalia.

Action Request:
--------------


13. (C) A consensus for some type of action does exist on the
Security Council, but the Council remains divided on how to
proceed. Skeptical members (UK, France, Russia and Belgium)
believe that their doubts have been confirmed and several
states that may have been willing to consider quick movement
toward a PKO will now defer to DPKO's forceful and detailed
arguments that only a MNF is realistic. As we move forward
on this issue, USUN sees two policy options and requests
Department guidance on how to proceed:

A - Push harder: In order to achieve the objective of a
PKO for Somalia, the U.S. could table our own proposal for
PKO deployment, either through strengthening AMISOM in order
facilitate the operation's rehatting or by deploying a
standalone operation. At present, our advocacy is at odds
with what the UN and other P5 members are saying, and it is
unlikely that further requests for planning from DPKO will
produce results consistent with the Department's objectives.
Strong USG arguments backed by sound military planning will
help us win Council support by convincing DPKO and skeptical
members that a PKO is reasonable, achievable and capable of
making a positive impact on the ground in Somalia. This
option will require substantial Washington engagement on
military planning in order to ensure that our analysis is
sufficiently detailed to rebut the concerns raised by DPKO.

B - Change course: Taking into account the views of DPKO
and many Council members, the U.S. could retool and engage
the Secretariat and Council members on a MNF along the lines
of the action plan proposed by DPKO and described in
paragraph 8 above. This option is the most likely basis for
Council consensus on an international force for Somalia.
While DPKO is prepared to undertake TCC outreach and military
planning alongside a lead nation, this approach may require
high-level U.S. engagement in Cairo, Riyadh, Abuja and other
capitals in order to generate forces and ensure funding and
training for a potential MNF.

Failing either of the above, we will continue to espouse a
PKO but with little likelihood of achieving our goal, and the
situation in Somalia will continue to founder. End action

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request.

Khalilzad