MANHASSET III: ALGERIAN READOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: MANHASSET III: ALGERIAN READOUT


Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D).


1. (C) Summary: In a January 10 meeting, the Algerian
delegation to Manhasset III told NEA/DAS Gordon Gray and
NEA/I Chris Ross that the Moroccans had arrived with and had
maintained a negative attitude, that positions of both sides
had hardened and yet Personal Envoy van Walsum, asserting his
authority for the first time, had managed to force the
parties to engage at length, if not in substance, on issues
such as confidence-building measures, the shape of municipal
government in the Western Sahara and the nature of
self-determination. Moreover, van Walsum had obtained
agreement on the time and place for the fourth round: March
11-13 at Manhasset; and had secured concurrence from the
parties for his first visit to the region since the beginning
of negotiations, tentatively scheduled for early February.
The Algerians do not expect much of an interim report from
van Walsum at the end of January but will expect both a
substantive report and some sign of progress by the April
MINURSO mandate renewal. Algeria continues to insist that it
wants closer relations with Morocco and that the current
frost in the relationship dates back to Morocco's unexplained
and rude cancellation of the Algerian Prime Minister's visit
to Rabat -- a visit Bouteflika had personally arranged with
Mohammed VI. Algeria continues to maintain it does not
insist on an independent Sahrawi state -- only the exercise
of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) NEA/DAS Gordon Gray and NEA/I Chris Ross met January
10 with Algerian Foreign Affairs Secretary Ramtane Lamamra,
former Algerian UN PermRep and current Presidential Adviser
Abdallah Baali and Algerian PermRep Yousef Yousfi at the
Algerian Mission to the UN to receive their readout of the
January 7-9 Manhasset III negotiations.


3. (SBU) Lamamra, who headed the delegation, began his
readout by noting that five months -- far too long a period
-- had passed since Manhasset II and many events that
impacted the negotiations had occurred in the interim. The
elections in Morocco and the subsequent elevation of the
Moroccan junior Foreign Minister (Taib Fassi Fihri) to be
Foreign Minister and the 12th Congress of the Polisario Front
and subsequent articulation of policy resulting from that
meeting were two such key events. In the interim the UN
General Assembly and the UN Security Council had both adopted
consensual resolutions on Western Sahara, though the process
for the Security Council resolution had been somewhat
difficult and the Polisario and Algeria had worried that the
Security Council might attempt to predetermine the outcome of
negotiations. In the end, however, UNSCR 1783 looked very
much like UNSCR 1754 and the third round was able to proceed.


4. (SBU) Lamamra said that Manhasset II had ended with
Algeria feeling that there had been little substantive
discussion and that something had to be done. In Manhasset
III, Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum tried to address that
problem by asserting his authority, setting the agenda and
attempting to promote substantive dialogue by posing
questions. Lamamra reported that van Walsum had proposed
three subjects for discussion: confidence-building measures
(CBMs),thematics, and the implementation of Security Council
resolutions. On CBMs, Lamamra said, Morocco had been
extremely negative and had taken the position that the only
CBM would be to allow refugees to return from Tindouf to the
territories by creating a large opening in the berm through
which refugees could pass. For its part, the Polisario had
insisted on a discussion of human rights in the territories
where, it asserted, oppression had reached intolerable
levels. Lamamra said that van Walsum had indicated that
human rights would be on the agenda of the next set of
negotiations. On thematics, Lamamra said, there had been
some discussion of "municipal government," but none on
"justice" or "resources." Again, van Walsum had suggested
that the next round would include discussions of those two
issues. On "implementation," Lamamra said, very little was
said. Only the Polisario said anything -- that it was ready
to accept autonomy provided it were one of the several
options from which the people of Western Sahara were given
the opportunity to choose, i.e., given the opportunity to
exercise the right of self-determination.


5. (SBU) Lamamra said that the parties have agreed to date
and venue for the next round of talks: March 11-13 at
Manhasset. Lamamra also said that van Walsum plans to travel
to the region (Rabat, Tindouf, Algiers and Nouakchott in that
sequence) in the second week of February. Finally, Lamamra

said that Algeria did not and would not expect much of an
interim report from van Walsum at the end of January, but
that by the April MINURSO renewal, van Walsum will need to
provide a substantive report that demonstrates some progress.

Atmospherics
--------------


6. (C) Lamamra said that although the New Year usually brings
with it hope, the Moroccans came to Manhasset with
reservations and hostility: they were very reserved with the
Algerian delegation and outright hostile to the Polisario
delegation. Lamamra noted that the Algerians and the
Moroccans sat at the same table only once and that the
Moroccans and the Polisario never dined together during
Manhasset III. Ambassador Baali added that he was
particularly surprised at the attitude of the CORCAS
representative at the negotiations. He said that the CORCAS
representative did not even say "Good Morning," to the
members of the Algerian delegation whom he knew well.
Moreover, Morocco had used very harsh language with the
Polisario in its opening and closing statements and, for the
first time, had used very strong language with the Algerians.
For instance, Morocco had referred to Algeria as "the other
party," and had said that "Algeria is hanging with the same
past views." Morocco had also referred to Algeria as "those
who really control the fate of the people of Western Sahara."
Baali said that the Moroccan closing statement had been
provocative, but that for the sake of the negotiations,
Algeria had decided not to respond Lamamra speculated that
the lack of cordiality might have been purposeful -- that the
Moroccans were possibly providing material for acrimonious
media exchanges. Van Walsum, Lamamra said, had begun the
meeting by pointing out that the delegations had tended to
speak too much to the media, creating both a negative
atmosphere and trying to create a sense of fait accompli.


7. (C) Lamamra said that at Manhasset III, Moroccan Security
Chief Mansouri had spoken for the first time at length and,
while not accusing the Polisario of terrorism, had suggested
that some people in the camps may be involved with terrorist
groups. The Polisario had responded that coordination of
activities to combat terrorism with Mauritania and Algeria
was key and that they were ready to cooperate with Morocco
and MINURSO. Lamamra said that the Moroccans had never
raised terrorism as an issue in the negotiations before and
that the occurrence would have to be reported to Algiers
immediately, adding that if the Moroccans really were serious
about terrorism, they should be open to the "joint patrols"
CBM that MINURSO has been pushing for the past year.


8. (C) Ambassador Baali said that that van Walsum had made a
strong attempt to assert his authority. But because he had
not provided an agenda prior to the talks, he found it
difficult to get the parties to engage. But, Baali said, van
Walsum seemed pleased with the outcome of the talks. Van
Walsum had told Algeria that both sides had hardened their
positions but that he had learned a great deal and that the
exchanges had been "rich." Van Walsum was very pleased that
the parties had spent five hours on the Tuesday session
arguing, if making little progress. Baali said that the
personality of the Personal Envoy was an important issue and
the fact that van Walsum had decided to assume his
responsibilities was very important. The fact that van
Walsum was already talking about a fifth round of talks was
an indication of his new determination to resolve the
impasse. In this light, Baali said, van Walsum's proposed
visit to the region could be very positive if the parties are
prepared to discuss substance. Baali cautioned that van
Walsum would need to bring ideas for discussion as the views
of the parties are well known.

Algeria & Morocco, An Independent Sahrawi State, U.S. Role
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Replying to Gray's invitation to comment on the
Algerian-Moroccan relationship, Baali replied that there was
no real improvement -- that the only real cooperation was on
terrorism and security issues -- and that no breakthrough was
expected any time soon. King Mohammed VII had phoned
President Bouteflika following the recent bombing, but that
was the extent of it. Lamamra added that an issue standing
in the way of better relations was the Moroccan cancellation
-- without any subsequent formal notification -- of the
Algerian Prime Minister's scheduled 2005 visit to Rabat. The
visit had been personally negotiated between Bouteflika and
Mohammed VII and its cancellation in such a way was what
Baali termed "a slap at Algeria." Lamamra insisted that
Algeria was sincere in its desire to improve relations with
Morocco, a fact substantiated by the appointment of an
ambassador to Rabat who was clearly on the record supporting
close relations with Morocco.


10. (C) Replying to the Gray's concern about the long-term
viability of an independent Sahrawi state, Baali and Lamamra
noted that the Western Sahara was blessed with many natural
resources at the disposal of a relatively small population
and that problems of security and the like could be dealt
with in the framework of an interdependent Western Saharan
state established in a creative fashion. Baali reminded that
Algeria, since its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) in March 1976, has not insisted on
independence -- only on the exercise of self-determination.
It had extended recognition -- and Bouteflika had been
Foreign Minister at the time -- valid only until the people
of Western Sahara were able to exercise their right of
self-determination and to determine its future.


11. (C) Baali said that Algeria's U.S. friends must
understand that the Moroccan view (autonomy) is a non-starter
and that given the geo-political position of Western Sahara
in African politics, autonomy is dangerous and would be
destabilizing. At a minimum, South Africa and Nigeria would
oppose it. Baali concluded with the comment that even before
Baker, the U.S was the country on which Algeria relied to
preserve balance on the Security Council in the Western
Sahara impasse, and Algeria now needed the U.S. to return to
its position as honest broker.

KHALILZAD