Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK173
2008-02-22 22:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

P-3 PUSHES DPKO TO FIELD A MORE ROBUST UNMIK

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNMIKI YI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 222215Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3794
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000173 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIKI YI
SUBJECT: P-3 PUSHES DPKO TO FIELD A MORE ROBUST UNMIK

REF: USUN 163

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000173

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIKI YI
SUBJECT: P-3 PUSHES DPKO TO FIELD A MORE ROBUST UNMIK

REF: USUN 163

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY. P-3 deputy permanent representatives told
U/SYG Guehenno on February 22 that UNMIK and KFOR need to
robustly deter violence and Serbian efforts to establish de
facto partition of Kosovo during the transition period. DPKO
agreed to bar Serbian minister Samardzic from entering
Kosovo, but maintained that UNMIK's status neutrality and the
practicalities of policing a very porous border required a
careful balancing of coercion and restraint. SYG Ban asked
Ambassador Khalilzad to have the USG try to persuade Kosovo
Prime Minister Thaci to respect UNMIK's role under resolution
1244 during the transition. See Action Request in paragraph

6. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a February 22 meeting, U.S., UK, and French Deputy
PermReps pushed UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
(DPKO) Jean-Marie Guehenno and DPKO Europe Division chief
David Harland to encourage UNMIK to react more robustly to
Serbian provocations. Ambassador Wolff said UNMIK authority
needs to be asserted and defended against Serbian challenges
during the transition period, that UNMIK assertiveness is
perfectly consistent with UNMIK neutrality, and that UNMIK
firmness in anticipation of violence is essential to the
avoidance of both soft and hard partition.


3. (C) UKUN DPR Karen Pierce told Guehenno and Harland
frankly that "UNMIK should have default instructions to err
on the side of robustness," adding that "the danger of not
acting robustly is far greater than the danger of wounding
Serb sensitivities." She urged DPKO to coordinate more
closely with KFOR to make use of KFOR's more plenary powers
of detention, as for example had often been done to prevent
ethnic Albanian radicals from inciting violence by crossing
into Kosovo from Macedonia. French DPR Jean-Pierre Lacroix
qualified his remarks as similar in kind if not degree to
those of the U.S. and UK. He said France "supports a robust
response but is also sensitive to perceptions on the ground
and a need to maintain UNMIK-Serbia communication."


4. (C) U/SYG Guehenno replied that DPKO had advised UNMIK, in

the aftermath of the February 21 violence in Belgrade, to
stop people at the border who seemed at all suspicious. The
practical problem, he said, is that troublemakers coming
south from Serbia can easily circumvent the border gates on
foot or even in vehicles because there are many trails and
unpaved roads criss-crossing the border/administrative
boundary line. Harland said UNMIK's 200 border police can't
possibly close the border and even the dedication of all
3,500 available KFOR troops in the area could not completely
close it. Recognizing that troublemakers were on hand,
Guehenno said, UNMIK and KFOR quickly broke up today's
demonstration in Mitrovica.


5. (C) Guehenno appealed for P-3 understanding of the UN's
delicate effort to remain status neutral, which he said
required UNMIK/KFOR to maintain a border/administrative
boundary line but to avoid being too coercive for fear of
creating harder positions among all parties. He said he was
gratified that all Security Council members, during the
February 18 public session, had rallied around resolution
1244 as the enduring manifestation of Kosovo authorities. He
reported that SRSG Rucker was taken aback on February 21 when
Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci announced to him that
"1244 is now only for KFOR." Coming on the heels of a public
statement attributed to Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin
Kuci that the government of Kosovo will henceforth decide who
visits Kosovo, Guehenno said the UN could use P-3 help in
persuading the Thaci government "not to overplay its hand."
He wants Thaci to appreciate that a measure of ambiguity
regarding division of authority is in the best interest of
all concerned.


6. (C) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon later called
Ambassador Khalilzad to add a personal request that Thaci be
reminded to respect the transition period during which UNMIK
remains in charge in Kosovo. Ambassador Khalilzad assured
the SYG that the U.S. would convey this message to Thaci.
Post requests that Department do so through USOP.


7. (C) Pressing Guehenno on Kosovo-Serbia border operations,
Ambassador Wolff suggested that UNMIK should quickly
re-establish customs collections at gates 1 and 31 and should
not allow Serbian ministerial-level visits for the time
being. Guehenno replied that customs operations would be
returned to normal within a few days. On the travel of
ministers, he insisted UNMIK should also avoid overplaying
its own hand by cracking down on travel. He would prefer the
partition drama play itself out in Belgrade, as radicals
overreacted, rather than Mitrovica.

USUN NEW Y 00000173 002 OF 002




8. (C) Ambassador Wolff then focused on Minister for Kosovo
Slobodan Samardzic by reading some of his recent press
comments (the border attacks were "legitimate" and "in
accordance" with Belgrade policy; Belgrade would not allow
northern Kosovo customs points to form part of a state
border) and asking whether Samardzic would be banned from
Kosovo. Guehenno replied that DPKO was consulting with the
UN office in Belgrade. (NOTE. Harland later told DepPolCouns
that the consultation would result in a UN demarche to
Samardzic in which he would be informed that he would not be
considered for travel to Kosovo until he publicly retracted
these incendiary comments.)
KHALILZAD