Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK1198
2008-12-23 19:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

Tags:  PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUCNDT #1198/01 3581927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231927Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5583
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3471
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001198 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB
SUBJECT: UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

REF: 2007 USUN 1218

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
FOR REASON 1.4 (B&D)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB
SUBJECT: UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

REF: 2007 USUN 1218

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
FOR REASON 1.4 (B&D)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION


1. (U) This cable was prepared by Robert J. Smolik who
served as Senior Area Advisor for Western European Affairs to
the 63rd United Nations General Assembly.


2. (C) During the fall session of the 63rd UNGA, EU and
European Free Trade Association states generally aligned with
U.S. objectives. They put their weight behind human rights
resolutions and buttressed us on most other first, second and
third committee work. Notably, the EU and allies quieted
their call for the U.S. to engage at the UN Human Rights
Council. However, the EU moralistically and even
provocatively countered U.S. preferences on death penalty and
religious intolerance/freedom of expression, and sexual
orientation issues.


3. (C) One way to avoid needlessly exposing such
transatlantic divisions (especially to the G-77) is to begin
early, energetic, and detailed UNGA 64 consultations with the
EU troika. Pre-consultation on key issues (before the EU
establishes its common position) would save hours of
damage-limitation negotiation in New York. More positively,
it would allow us to work proactively with the EU to show
transatlantic leadership at the UN.


4. (C) In an effort to build bridges to the G-77,
Switzerland played a successful, efficient role as floor
manager for a U.S.-inspired resolution on "Legal Empowerment
of the Poor". Among the larger EU players, Spain most often
contested U.S. interests. For example, Spain prevented
(probably for domestic political reasons) a stronger EU
showing against the Kosovo ICJ referral, and complicated the
UN's Interfaith Dialogue (which Spain sees as infringing on
its Alliance of Civilizations). Our relationship with Madrid
on UN issues deserves sustained attention, not least because
of Spain's mutliplier role in Latin America.


5. (SBU) France's EU presidency during UNGA 63 assured a
fully-staffed and efficient European team of interlocutors;
Sweden will need to step up to play a similar role next year.

The Czech Republic's EU presidency in the first half of 2009
gives us a strong ally on human rights issues.


6. (C) This is another argument to engage the EU troika
early to prepare as much of a common strategy as possible for
UNGA 64. In the end, the EU may be so attached to its role
as "moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77,
that U.S.-EU common positions on all issues may not be
possible before UNGA 64. The bottom line is that the EU
generally provides our core support within WEOG, as we often
face overwhelming opposition from the G-77. So for us to
maintain and grow our influence during UNGA 64, one key is to
engage the EU proactively and in detail. END SUMMARY

FRANCE'S STRONG EU PRESIDENCY COORDINATION; NEED TO INFLUENCE
CZECH EU PRESIDENCY


7. (SBU) As expected, throughout the fall UNGA 63, the
French Mission was organized and energetic in representing
common EU positions. They worked with us to lobby African,
Asian, Caribbean and Latin American delegations, effectively
allocating tasks, sometimes in surprising extra-EU ways
(Norway influenced Burundi's human rights votes). But at
times, France also allowed EU partners to work against our
interests. (EU PRs often turned this argument around, saying
that U.S. positions of principle are on certain issues
inimical to EU common positions).


8. (C) For example, EU gave Sweden latitude to insert a
capital punishment clause (unacceptable to us) into a UN/COE
resolution. This wasted hours of negotiation and generated
pointless bad feeling, particularly since the clause was
finally unceremoniously dropped. France also allowed the EU
resolution on religious intolerance to cross our known red
lines on freedom of expression, giving Egypt and Pakistan
among the G-77 the chance to spotlight transatlantic
differences. Determined negotiation allowed us to protect
our constitutional freedom of speech requirements, and
eventually to co-sponsor the resolution. Even though DRL had
made our position clear to the EU several months before, the
positive outcome in third committee required many hours of
work in New York and even last-minute intervention at
political director level in capitals.


9. (SBU) One way to save negotiation time and avoid bad
perceptions is to engage the EU troika forcefully and early,

USUN NEW Y 00001198 002 OF 003


before the EU agrees on a common position. Sweden will be in
the EU presidency during the critical fall months of UNGA 64,
Our best moment to influence the EU's UNGA 64 performance
will be during the Czech presidency in the first half of

2009. The Czech PR is eager to coordinate with us, on third
committee issues in particular, pointing out that the Czech
Republic criticizes human rights abuses wherever they occur
(including in Cuba.) Ambassador Martin Palous has personal
experience with human rights, as a dissident during the
Soviet period.

WORKING WITH EUROPEANS TO BUILD BRIDGES TO G-77 AND AVOID
ISOLATION


10. (C) In an effort to build bridges to the G-77, the U.S.
Mission conceived a resolution based on the acclaimed work of
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto ("Legal Empowerment of
the Poor and Eradication of Poverty"). His widely-praised
proposals favor, inter alia, granting property rights to the
poor so that they can borrow to build small businesses. Our
concept with this proposal was to get beyond instinctive G-77
suspicion of U.S. proposals. We asked Switzerland (and
Guatemala) to floor manage the resolution, which they did
brilliantly. In achieving consensus, the resolution
countered typical exchanges in second committee, where there
is usually a deep divide between WEOG and the G-77.
Switzerland intends to work with partners to pursue this
resolution, implementing its provisions in a report that
deals with practical problems of legal structures and
economic development.


11. (SBU) Switzerland, as a non-threatening good citizen of
the UN, opened the way for similar initiatives, perhaps to be
proposed in the future by an EU member state. Along these
same lines, USUN made a special effort this UNGA to avoid
needless isolation on certain issues. We worked successfully
with France and the UK in the first committee to this effect.
On the series of Palestine resolutions, we were less
successful, since several EU states who had moderated their
positions on similar votes at the Human Rights Council in
Geneva, reverted to an EU consensus abstention.


12. (SBU) On the positive side, whereas during UNGA 62
European PRs never failed to criticize us for disengaging
from the HRC, at UNGA 63 they no longer mentioned Geneva, but
worked effectively with us on human rights in the third
committee. As during UNGA 62, the EU worked closely with the
U.S. and Canada to push through human rights resolutions
condemning Burma, DPRK and Iran. France/EU presidency
effectively shouldered their responsibilities to share
lobbying of G-77 members where they enjoy special influence.
(They even asked Norway to use its predominant position in
Burundi to lobby there.) Along with France and the UK, who
traditionally lobby francophone and Commonwealth nations,
Spain at our request, tried to influence GRULAC Latins, with
some success.

INTERFAITH DIALOGUE AND RESOLUTIONS ON RELIGION -
WORKING WITH SPAIN AND THE VATICAN


13. (C) The Spanish Mission to the UN is extremely
effective, both within the EU caucus (where they prevented a
"free vote" on the ICJ Kosovo referral, achieving a
disappointing block EU abstention) and working with Latin
America (where we asked their PR to lobby for human rights
votes against Burma, DPRK and Iran). The current PR, Juan
Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo, also served in the 1990s as Spain's
Ambassador to the UN and was Legal Adviser at his Foreign
Ministry; he is tenacious.


14. (SBU) On the various UNGA 63 outcomes regarding
religion, particularly during the Saudi-sponsored Interfaith
Dialogue, Spain took a skeptical position, probably because
they feared cross purposes with their own initiative, the
Alliance of Civilizations. The "preparatory" meeting in
Madrid left both the Spanish Government and the Vatican
displeased with the Saudi closing declaration. However,
thanks to hard work in Madrid and at the Holy See, the
outcome document from the Interfaith Dialogue pleased all
parties.


15. (C) On the Kosovo ICJ referral, Spain was the major EU
state most opposing our position. Its intransigence
prevented those EU members doubtful about the referral from
voting a national position, and forced an EU abstention on
the issue. Also, on a wide variety of issues that matter to
us and the EU, from human rights to various religious issues
to reproductive rights, the Vatican UN Observer played a
quiet but influential role. The Holy See is worth
cultivating on many issues likely to arise at UNGA 64. Others
worth cultivating are tiny Europeans, like Liechtenstein and
San Marino, whose long-serving and active Ambassadors at the

USUN NEW Y 00001198 003 OF 003


UN give them influence disproportionate to their populations.
Although they do not sit in EU coordinating meetings at the
UN, they meet regularly with EU counterparts, both informally
and in regularly scheduled format with the EU-27.


16. (SBU) Another EU initiative, a statement on sexual
orientation/gender identity, was also adopted. The EU
procedure in preparing their text was revealing. France/EU
presidency approached likely supporters and shared their
draft; others, likely to oppose, such as the Vatican, were
held at arms length. We received the text fairly late in the
process, after the French said some 55 co-signers were
committed. This experience highlights the need for early,
preemptive consultations with the troika before future UNGAs.
Although a statement is not as formal a UN outcome as is a
resolution, the text of the EU statement can and probably
will be used as the basis for a future resolution.


17. (SBU) UN budget and resource issues are also still
under negotiation in fourth committee. The EU representative
is playing behind the scenes, not revealing his hand, but
will reportedly argue for some budget stringency. This would
be an improvement over the EU's open-handed, even
unprincipled approach on budget issues during UNGA 62.
However, in the heat of negotiations, the EU has sometimes
failed to acknowledge our points of principle on PBI (program
of budget increase),thus straining relations. The Hungarian
PR chair of fourth committee is being even-handed.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION


18. (C) We need to work more proactively with the EU on our
UNGA 64 agenda. We should recognize that EU interests at
UNGA 64 may diverge in specific areas from U.S. objectives,
even if we engage in early and detailed consultations with
the troika. In substantive, strategic terms this will likely
be the case for such issues as capital punishment and freedom
of expression versus religious intolerance. In tactical
terms, even on issues that should unite us, including many
arms limitation and economic development matters, the EU may
still choose to play "go between" with the G-77. The
troika's consultations with the G-77 are institutionalized,
which builds in a dynamic of accommodation. This tactical
challenge is still another argument for us to engage the EU
troika early to prepare as much of a common strategy as
possible for UNGA 64.


19. (C) In the end, the EU may so relish its role as
"moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77, that
pre-UNGA common transatlantic positions on all isues may not
be possible. In the category of "preempting an excuse,"
early consultations with the troika can at least minimize
situations where the EU Presidency argues that its UN text
was so exhaustively negotiated at 27 that they cannot reopen
it. The French Ambassador's remarks to hundreds of
colleagues at France's end of presidency reception were
provocative: "In the past at the UN, the EU was seen as 'the
nice guy'. Now we want to be something more." Several EU PRs
interpret this to mean that in future the EU will more
forcefully defend its red lines.


20. (C) The bottom line is that the EU generally provides
our core support within WEOG, as we often face overwhelming
opposition from the G-77. So better UN outcomes can result
from engaging the troika early and in detail on UNGA 64. The
upcoming Czech presidency will give us that opportunity.

Khalilzad