UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 63RD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 001192

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2025
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 63RD
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

REF: USUN 1193 07

Classified By: Minister-Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis for reasons 1.4 (
D)


1. (U) Gerald Scott is again serving as Senior Advisor for
Africa at USUN during the regular session of the General
Assembly. These are his personal reflections on African
participation as the regular session draws to a close. (Note
that while in the UN context the African Group includes the
states of the North African littoral, usage of the term in
this cable reflects Ambassador Scott's portfolio which deals
only with the delegations of the AU members falling within
the purview of State's Bureau of African Affairs.)

SUMMARY

2.(SBU) This General Assesmbly has been less charged than
usual. There were no major battles over Security Council
seats or contested elections to important bodies in which we
had a candidate. The AF Missions have retained their
reputation for group solidarity, but it is perhaps slightly
less pronounced than formerly. While support for our
country-specific human rights resolutions was a bit weaker,
we gained slightly in the anti-Israeli votes and in other
issues of importance to the U.S.

THE GENERAL DEBATE


3. (U) The GA begins with a General Debate, addresses mostly
by Chiefs of State and Heads of Government setting out an
over-all view of the challenges that face the world. This
year the themes most often voiced were the global financial
problem, the food and energy crises, and the need to meet the
Millennium Development Goals. Africans joined others in
calling for UN reform, particularly Security Council reform,
which in the African context means a reiteration of the
Ezulwini Consensus calling for two permanent UNSC seats with
veto, and five non-permanent seats (though some admitted in
private that this is a formula open to negotiation).Some
speakers praised the US: Comoros, Cameroon (as a witness of
the Greentree Agreements dealing with the resolution of the
dispute with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula),Zambia (for
AIDS relief),Togo, Botswana.


4. (U) Some speakers criticized the US by name. Re our
Cuban policy: Lesotho, Angola, Sao Tome and Namibia
(mentioned in 5 of the last 6 General Debates). Zimbabwe's
President Mugabe vehemently attacked the US and UK
"themselves international perpetrators of genocide, acts of
aggression and mass destruction. The masses of innocent men,
women and children who have perished by their thousands in
Iraq surely demand retribution and vengeance. Who shall heed
their cry? Surely those who invaded Iraq under false
pretences and on the strength of contrived lies and in
blatant violation of the Charter and international law must
be made liable for them!" The Foreign Minister of Eritrea
devoted his speech almost entirely to the Eritrea-Ethiopia
boundary dispute and other points of conflict in the Horn of
Africa. It was perhaps the most anti-American speech of the
General Debate. "These multi-faceted problems are, of
course, rooted in multiple causes. At the same time, it
cannot be denied that many of them have been exacerbated, if
not instigated, by the misguided and domineering policies of
the US Government. Indeed, the fingerprints of the sole
super-power are discernible in most of the conflict
situations that are raging in many parts of our globe with
the deleterious economic, financial and humanitarian
ramifications that they invariably entail." And re Somalia:
"a pre-emptive invasion by Ethiopia under the instigation of
the United States to produce the largest humanitarian tragedy
that dwarfs other contemporary crises in Africa."


5. (SBU) I note that the usages of diplomacy, especially in
the UN context, weigh so heavily against direct public
criticism of a friendly government, that I believe we ought
to note and take exception to any speech in which we are the
only government singled out for objection.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS


6. (SBU) New Security Council members were elected by the
General Assembly in October. Uganda, which had the
endorsement of its regional group, was elected with 181 votes

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to replace South Africa in January. Burkina Faso remains on
the Council for another year. Togo and Nigeria are both
expected to vie for the Burkina Faso seat in the next General
Assembly. Countries on the Council gain a certain weight
because of their presence there. Uganda will, therefore,
play a somewhat greater role in Africa Group matters; South
Africa perhaps a bit less. Uganda will certainly receive
much more high-level US Mission attention than is now the
case.

HUMAN RIGHTS TEXTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY


7. (C) Every year we co-sponsor country-specific resolutions
criticizing human rights violations in a small number of
countries, this year only three of them: DPRK, Burma and
Iran. Four years ago we co-sponsored a resolution on Sudan,
and five years ago on Sudan and Zimbabwe, but there were no
African targets this year to excite the opposition of the
members of the AU to our efforts. Even so, the effort was,as
always,a difficult one for most African delegations. The
ususal arguments were deployed: now that we have a "reformed"
Human Rights Council in Geneva, that is the proper venue for
such resolutions; the selection of target countries is
"political," since other equally or worse violators escape
such censure. Behind these arguments are the realities of
the influence of the OIC and Arab group: Missions know that
if they offend against those interests, their hope for
support when they have an issue or a candidate for a UN
position will be much reduced. Finally, as more than one
Ambassador has admitted to me over the years, Africans know
that in many cases they are "one coup away" from serious
human rights charges against the governments they represent.


8. (SBU) More difficult than the passage of the texts
themselves is the defeating of motions to adjourn debate, so
called "no-action motions," which are a procedural move to
sweep the draft text off the agenda. Here, the argument is
perhaps not that the country in question is not deserving of
censure, but that for various reasons, this is not the time
and the place -- the argument in favor of Geneva as the sole
venue is especially deployed in this case. We have
historically been able to get our country-specific
resolutions adopted if we can get past the no-action motion.

9.(U) As of the writing of this cable, the Third Committee
human rights texts have not come before Plenary. However the
votes in Third Committee are as follows:

Democratic Republic of Korea: There was no motion to
adjourn debate. The resolution passed 95(US)-24-62. The AF
vote was 10-5-27 and six absent. This is slightly worse than
last year's Plenary vote of 11-4-27-6. Those voting YES with
the US: Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ghana, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Togo, Tanzania. Those voting NO were
Guinea, Namibia (which announced that it meant to abstain),
Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe. Those abstaining were Angola,
Benin. B. Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Congo, Cote
d'Ivoire, Eq. Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, G. Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, S. Africa, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia. The remaining 6 AF countries did not vote.

Burma: There was a motion to adjourn debate which failed:
54-90(US)-34. The AF vote was 12-6-20-10, notably better
than last year in Plenary, which was 17-6-16-9. Those voting
YES against the US position: Angola, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Cote
d'Ivoire, Namibia, S.Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe. Those voting NO with the US: Botswana,
Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo, Liberia, Mauritius. Those
abstaining: Benin, B. Faso, Cameroon, E.Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, G. Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Tanzania. The remaining 10 AF countries did not vote.

The Burma resolution passed 89(US)-29-63. The AF vote was
5-6-31-6. This is a little worse than last year: 7-2-22-17.
Those voting YES with the US position: Botswana, Burundi,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Togo. Those voting NO: Cote d'Ivoire,
Namibia, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabawe (However, Namibia
and Niger announced after the vote that they had meant to
abstain.) Those abstaining: Angola, Benin, B. Faso,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Eq. Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, G. Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,

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Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, S.Africa, Swaziland, Uganda,
Tanzania, Zambia. The remaining 6 AF countries did not vote.

Iran: The Resolution on the "Situation of Human Rights in
the Islamic Republic of Iran" is considered by us to be the
most important issue in this year's GA. We argued for the
resolution, not only on the grounds of Iran's human rights
record, but also on the grounds of the general strategic
situation in which the vote is taking place: to give Iran a
victory this year after an equivalent resolution has been
passed by the GA for 21 years (with a few exceptions, every
year since 1985) would provide a government thwarting the
international community on Nuclear and other issues a
domestic argument that would be clearly damaging to our
efforts to bring them to a more responsible position. The
motion to adjourn debate failed 71-81(US)-28. This was a
satisfying margin: last year in Third Committee the motion
failed by the narrowest of votes: 78-79-24. The AF vote in
Third Committee this year was 24-4-14-6, perhaps very
slightly worse than the equavalent vote last year in Plenary
of 27-6-9-6. Those voting YES against the US position:
Angola, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea,

G. Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali Mauritania, Namibia, Sao Tome,
Senegal, Somalia, S.Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe. Those voting NO with the US: Botswana,
Burundi, Cape Verde, Liberia. Those abstaining: Benin,
B.Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Eq. Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda,Tanzania. The remaining 6 did not vote.

The vote on the draft resolution: 70(US)-51-60. The AF vote
was 2-14-26-6. This was about the same as last year in
Plenary: 3-13-25-7. Those voting YES with the US: Botswana,
Liberia. Those voting NO: Comoros, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea,
G.Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Somalia,
S.Africa, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe. Those abstaining: Angola,
Benin, B. Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad,
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eq. Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia. The
remaining 6 AF delegations did not vote.

10.(SBU) Comment: These resolutions and the no action motions
will appear before Plenary shortly and a few of these votes
will change as Iran and some Islamic states press, and we and
the Europeans press on the other side. Almost everyone
understands that these are important votes: "why otherwise
would a country work so hard to defeat the resolution" as one
delegate remarked here. I am not sure that we will do better
in the AF group than last year, but there is a chance of
improving our score, and in any case, the results, both this
year and last, show that when the radicals argue for
observance of an "African consensus" against country-specific
human rights resolutions, we have the voting sheets to
demonstrate that no such consensus exists -- at least, so
long as no African state is the subject of such a resolution.

11.(SBU) Meanwhile, as can be discerned, Botswana, Burundi
and Liberia have been consistent supporters of the US
position in these votes. Cape Verde voted with us on both no
action motions, and Congo and Mauritius voted with us on one
of them. We got most support on the DPRK, less on Burma, and
least on Iran. Effective pressure against these resolutions
varies, depending in great part on the Islamic presence, and
countries need to be judged individually according to their
situation. The magnetic pull of the radical tradition
motivating, e.g., South Africa, also plays its role.


12. (C) And sometimes an absence is itself significant (e.g.,
the DRC, which last year voted for the Iran and Burma no
action motions, deliberately did not participate this year --
a way of denying support to the no action motion without
giving the radicals clear grounds to accuse the DRC Mission
here of betrayal).

ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS


13. (U) There is annually a plethora of anti-Israeli
resolutions which pass the General Assembly by overwhelming
margins. Three of these are sufficiently egregious to
require a special effort,and we get some support in our
opposition, if only in the form of abstentions. The three
are:
-- The Resolution on the Committee on the exercise of

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the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People (a committee
with 22 members: Senegal chairman; Guinea, Madagascar, Mali,
Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa members),
-- The Resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights
of the Secretariat, and
-- The Resolution on the Work of the Special Committee
to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights
of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories (a three-member committee of which Senegal is a
member).



14. (U) The first two of these were adopted in Plenary in
November, the Committee on the exercise, etc. by a vote of
107-8(US)-57 (the AF vote: 34-0-1-13 (last year 37-0-2-9))
and the Division for Palestinian Rights, etc. by a vote of
106-8(US)-57 (the AF vote: 33-0-1-14 (last year also
37-0-2-9)). All AF delegations voted for the resolutions,
except for Cameroon which abstained, and Burundi, Chad, DRC,
Eq. Guinea, Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Sao
Tome, Seychelles, S. Leone and Tanzania which were absent.
Somalia voted for the first of these two and was absent in
the vote for the second.

15.(U) The Resolution on the Work of the Special Committee
passed in December by a vote of 94-8(US)-73 (the AF vote was
30-0-6-12 (last year 31-0-5-12)). This resolution attracted
considerably less support from AF delegations. In addition
to Cameroon, other abstainers were Botswana, Burundi,Cote
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Liberia. (Botswana, from Yes last
year; Burundi and Liberia new this year; DRC and Eq. Guinea
fell away.) Absent were B. Faso (from Yes last year),Cape
Verde, Chad, DRC, Eq. Guinea, Gambia, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Seychelles, S. Leone, and Somalia.

16.(SBU) Since our goal is to reduce the votes in favor of
these resolutions, the slight reduction in AF votes for the
texts is a sign of some progress.


COMBATING DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS

17.(U) The Organization of the Islamic Conference sponsored a
resolution on "Combating defamation of religions" which has
been around in one form or another since at least 1999. It
passed last year with 108 votes in favor and 51 (US) opposed.
The resolution has historically been focussed on defamation
of Islam. This year the OIC in negotiations broadened the
focus somewhat, but we and others continue to have
difficulties, in part on free speech grounds since the
concept has provided the excuse in some countries for
imprisonment and even worse abuses against individuals who
have distributed "blaphemous" material or made comments
"insulting religion." There were also legal questions, since
in our view people have rights but religions do not.

18.(U) This year the vote in Third Committee was
85-50(US)-42. This represents a significant decline in
support, not least among African delegations: the AF vote
last year was 37-0-8; this year in Third Committee the AF
vote was 25-0-15. AF delegations which abstained in Third
Committee were Angola, Benin, Botswana, B. Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Eq. Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia. Unfortunately,
Nigeria went from an abstention last year to a YES this year.
We continue to press the issue with selected AF delegations
as the Plenary vote nears.

COMPLIANCE WITH NON-PROLIFERATI0N ...AGREEMENTS AND
COMMITMENTS

19.(U) Triannually, the US sponsors a resolution in First
(Disarmament) Committee on "Compliance with
non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements
and commitments." The resolution passes overwhelmingly, this
year in Plenary with a vote of 158(US)-0-18. AF voted 38-0-2
and 8 marked absent. The two abstainers were Sudan and
Zimbabwe.

20.(SBU) To add further weight to this resolution, we sought
more co-sponsors. Thre were no AF co-sponsors in 2005. This
year we gained four: Benin, Congo, Madagascar and Malawi.I
had hoped for a somewhat larger number. The resolution was
not controversial and it was an easy way to please the US,

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but four is better than none.

COMMENT

21.(SBU) The Africa Group at the UN is one of the five
regional groups which are the organizing blocs of much of UN
and General Assembly work. The Africa Group consists of the
states covered in the Africa Bureau, plus the five states of
the North African litoral. One result is that the positions
of the Africa Group here are conditioned to no small degree
by the views of these major players, Egypt especially. There
is also the radical heritage of the anti-colonial struggle,
especially felt by such as South Africa and Namibia. There
is the natural interest of the poor to benefit from the
resources of the rich (which puts us at odds on budget
issues, especially.) Finally, there is the tendency of the
small and weak to hang together; the Africa Group has a
reputation for solidarity. I believe that gradually these
influences are dissipating, and the call to group solidarity
less convincing -- at least when what are perceived as
African interests are not directly threatened. So when we
remember our diplomatic manners and the limits of the
possible, we can often gain our objectives (or, more often,
block those of our adversaries). But it takes one-on-one
engagement in New York and in capitals. And the 48 AF
constituants represent a formidable bloc, 25 percent of the
membership.

22.(C) We have currently positioned ourselves less formally
as critics of the UN. This is important, since for African
countries the UN represents a natural ally -- and the GA
forum in which they can assert their importance and control
at least some of the decisions. While this admitedly is not
always (or even often) to our advantage, it is important that
we respect the pieties and voice our support of the
institution when we can. And in doing so, I find
considerable support and understanding among most of the
Missions here, even if they are not able to provide votes on
all the issues important to us.

23.(C) This year there was some slight improvement in AF on
the anti-Israeli votes and in support of other US objectives
(e.g., combating defamation of religions and the compliance
resolution in First Committee). Unfortunately, there was at
this point a bit of a falling back in dealing with the human
rights texts. Still, we have, perhaps, made a little
progress this year with the AF members. With continued
focussed engagement, I believe we can make a bit more. All in
all, and like many international conditions and institutions,
the UNGA is not a problem to be "solved," but a situation to
be managed. And African members and their diplomats are an
inevitable (and often helpful) element in such management.
Khalilzad