Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USUNNEWYORK1131
2008-12-04 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS:

Tags:  SO XW UNSC PGOV PRO ETTC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUCNDT #1131/01 3391513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041513Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1822
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 1542
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 0106
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0735
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0010
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5463
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001131 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: SO XW UNSC PGOV PRO ETTC
SUBJECT: UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS:

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ELLEN GERMAIN, FOR REASONS
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001131

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: SO XW UNSC PGOV PRO ETTC
SUBJECT: UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS:

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ELLEN GERMAIN, FOR REASONS 1.
4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) This is an action request -- please see para 10.


2. (C) Summary: The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia
has just released its latest confidential report on the
implementation of the general arms embargo which includes a
number of key findings likely to influence the policy debate
on Somalia. The MG concluded that nearly every armed force,
group or militia in Somalia, as well their financiers, active
supporters, and foreign donors, are guilty of arms embargo
violations. It alleged that the governments of Ethiopia and
Eritrea, and commercial entities in Yemen, have provided
political, financial and/or military support to armed Somali
groups, which constitutes arms embargo violations. The MG
documented how external contributions to build TFG security
forces, capacity have provided an important loophole through
which arms, equipment and military skills are diverted to the
open market or to armed opposition groups. This report also
includes detailed information about Somali armed groups that
will help the Somalia Sanctions Committee find appropriate
targets for designating individuals and entities under the
new targeted sanctions regime. The Sanctions Committee will
meet with the MG in the coming weeks to discuss its findings
further. USUN requests guidance on how to respond to this
report. (END SUMMARY)


3. (C) The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia has just
released its latest confidential report on the implementation
of the general arms embargo which includes a number of key
findings regarding the security situation in Somalia and the
principal violators of the existing arms embargo. (NOTE: The
Monitoring Group is a team of UN contractors charged
primarily with investigating and documenting violations of
the comprehensive arms embargo that the Security Council
first imposed in 1992. END NOTE). The MG reported that most
serviceable weapons and ammunition have been diverted to
Somalia since the 1992 implementation of the arms embargo,
and therefore almost all of them represent embargo
violations. Every armed force, group, or militia in Somalia,
their financiers, active supporters, and (in some cases)

foreign donors, the MG asserted, are guilty of arms embargo
violations. The MG concluded that armed forces on all sides
are characterized by weak command and control, informal
hierarchies, situational loyalties, frequent schisms and
shifting alliances. Nevertheless, the report identified some
key leaders who exercise sufficient authority to be held
accountable for the actions of their forces.


4. (C) The MG reported that the pattern of arms embargo
violations has remained constant over the mandate period, and
appears broadly consistent with the previous report's
findings. It asserted that the relatively low volume of arms
transfers to Somalia reflects a number of factors: that the
conflict is of relatively low intensity; that it is
characterized by irregular warfare waged with small infantry
formations; and the already high density of weapons in
circulation. An important new feature of the security
environment in Somalia, the MG noted, is the dramatic
expansion of armed criminal groups, including maritime
militias engaged in piracy and armed robbery at sea. It
assessed that genuine economic hardship and a sense of
grievance against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime
resources not only inspire many pirates, but also serve to
legitimize their activities in the eyes of their communities.
The report proposed that some leading figures in piracy
syndicates are responsible for arms embargo violations and
should be considered for the new targeted sanctions measures
imposed by UNSCR 1844, passed by the Security Council on
November 20. The MG explained that UNSCR 1844 introduces the
prospect of genuine accountability for violators, but the
arms embargo exemptions also provide an opportunity for
Somalia's international partners to demonstrate a norm of
compliance through adherence to these procedures.


5. (C) The MG documented how external contributions to build
the capacity of the TFG security forces have provided an
important loophole through which arms, equipment and military
skills are diverted to the open market or to armed opposition
groups. As much as 80 per cent of the international
investment in building the TFG security forces has been
diverted to purposes other than those for which it was
intended, explained the MG. Such facts, it argued, should be
taken into account by governments planning training programs,

and underscore the need for the Sanctions Committee to be
notified in advance of any planned security sector support.
The MG also explained that the practice of "self-exemption"
from this requirement by providers of security sector support
has been problematic.


6. (C) The MG asserted that the financing of embargo
violations continues to reflect the absence of functioning
government institutions or effective regulation of economic
activity. The report notes a steady decline in the fiscal
oversight and capabilities of the TFG, whereas armed
opposition groups have expanded the areas under their
control, acquiring possession of strategic economic assets
and access to substantial revenue flows. As the TFG loses
authority and cohesion, the MG observed, its leaders are
squandering resources while its military assets are degraded
and sold. Armed opposition groups, on the other hand,
continue to mobilize resources quite effectively, while
augmenting their military capability ) often with arms and
equipment acquired from the TFG.


7. (C) The MG's report concluded that the arms embargo has
been violated principally by two types of actors: (1) actors
who committed substantive violations for which no exemption
could be obtained, and (2) non-abiding partners, who provided
support to the Somali security sector, whose activities might
have been eligible for an exemption if notified to the
Sanctions Committee. In the first group, the MG pointed a
finger at Eritrea, which provides training, arms, and
financial support to armed opposition groups in contravention
of the arms embargo; Ethiopia, which has a military presence
in Somalia and supplies weapons to Puntland authorities and
other allied militias; and the Canadian-based Africa Oil
Corp., which has not notified the Sanctions Committee of the
recruitment of armed security guards or the hiring of foreign
armed guards and trainers. The second group includes
Ethiopia, which has trained 17,000 Somali security personnel
and provided arms to the TFG military and police without
notifying the Sanctions Committee or receiving an exemption;
Yemen, which demonstrated serious shortcomings in
implementing measures to enforce the embargo; and the UNDP,
which recruits and manages Somali armed security personnel
and trains the Somali police.


8. (C) During the current mandate, the MG said it witnessed
the continuing erosion of the TFG's cohesion, the
fragmentation of armed opposition groups and a dramatic
escalation in the activities of armed criminal groups,
including terrorism and piracy. Unless there is further
progress toward a durable ceasefire, a credible political
process and restoration of effective institution of
governance, such trends are likely to continue. However,
failure to enforce the arms embargo will gravely undermine
the prospects for progress on any and all of these fronts.


9. (C) The MG's recommendations focused on the developments
of transparent systems for the registration, management, and
disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosive stockpiles in
accordance with international practices. The MG also
highlighted the importance of tracing arms in Somali
territory, establishing more precise guidelines for the
notification of support to Somali security sector
institutions, and authorizing international naval forces in
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to seize any weapons
encountered in the course of their operations and to actively
interdict arms trafficking.


10. (C) ACTION REQUEST -- The Somalia Sanctions Committee
will meet on December 11 with members of the MG. USUN
requests guidance on how to respond to the MG's report. This
meeting will provide the Committee with an opportunity to
request clarification and to make suggestions for issues the
MG should focus on after its mandate is renewed.
Wolff