Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USOSCE60
2008-03-07 13:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

Tags:  PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0060/01 0671309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071309Z MAR 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5581
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0458
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1018
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0958
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000060 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN,
SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR DOWLEY
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
MEETING: POLITE BUT DULL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000060

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN,
SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR DOWLEY
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: OSCE 2008 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
MEETING: POLITE BUT DULL


1. (SBU) Summary: The 2008 Annual Implementation Assessment
Meeting (AIAM) on March 4-5 was not contentious, delegations
restricting themselves to broad recommendations that were
intended for further concrete development in the Forum for
Security Cooperation. Russia did not spend much time
berating participating States for the lack of progress in
adopting its various CSBM proposals, and refrained from
lengthy discussion of them. Many of the topics discussed
were aired at previous AIAMs, including the inspection "quota
race," improving the rate of defense planning and budget
submissions, and reporting significant military activities.
There was no attempt to negotiate proposals in the AIAM,
although Germany drew much support when it referred to its
"quota race" Food-for-Thought paper. Discussion of improved
implementation was desultory and brief. In the closing
minutes, Germany, Turkey, Italy, France and others opposed
linking the impasse over CFE to work on the Vienna Document
1999 and other CSBMs. End summary.

WORKING SESSION 1

Annual Exchange of Military Information
--------------


2. (SBU) The coordinator (Donagh, Ireland) asked if
presentations by participating States (pS) at the FSC
Security Dialogue on their submissions to the Annual Exchange
of Military Information (AEMI) would enhance transparency


3. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) said that while the AEMI enhances
transparency the quality of submissions differ. France
(Fournier) asked why there were so few responses to paragraph
10.3 on "surplus" forces. Switzerland (Chaudhuri) commended
the training provided on the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) to
participating States (pS),noting the recent workshop in
Kyrgyzstan. Finland (Olin) hoped a recent decision on
electronic filing (FSC.DEC/17/07) would enhance transparency.
(Note: Finland was the original sponsor. End note.)
Finland commended the high rate of returns, but recommended

improvement in the quality of the information submitted.

Defense Planning
--------------


4. (SBU) The coordinator noted there were four returns fewer
in 2007 than the year before. There were five nil reports
and 32 pS had consistently provided information over the last
five years.


5. (SBU) France (Fournier) asked the Conflict Prevention
Center (CPC) whether budget calendars accounted for late or
missing submissions of defense planning information. The CPC
(Werth) said the data was ambiguous on this question. Russia
(Uskov) called for support of its earlier proposal to create
a single September 30 deadline for submission of annual
defense planning and budget information
(FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.2). The single deadline, Russia claimed,
would make it easier for the CPC to track responses and would
improve the information exchange.


6. (SBU) Finland saw nothing that would prevent pS from
submitting defense planning and budget information at the
same time and could support the Russian proposal of a single
deadline. Finland said the problem was not the calendar but
a lack of national will to provide the information. Sweden

USOSCE 00000060 002 OF 008


offered support for any proposal, including Russia's, which
would increase the number of returns and enhance compliance.
Ireland (Hynes) recalled that compliance was better when
there was a deadline. Canada (Higgins) supported the status
quo, adding that the accuracy of the information provided was
more important than the timing of the submission and
transparency was more important than the convenience of the
CPC. Canada doubted a single deadline would enhance
compliance. Italy (Amadei) and the UK (Osment) supported
Canada. (Note: Only Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan do
not provide the required information on a continuing basis.
End note.)


7. (SBU) Russia and Switzerland tentatively supported the
coordinator's suggestion of a workshop on defense planning.

Risk Reduction
--------------


8. (SBU) The coordinator noted that VD99 Chapter III risk
reduction mechanisms were not invoked over the last year and
asked why. He noted the CPC director (Salber) briefed the
range of OSCE risk reduction mechanisms available to pS last
November (Note: This was in the aftermath of the FSC Security
Dialogue discussion of the August 2007 Russian missile
incident in Georgia. End note.)


9. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) said the lack of use was not a
question of lack of need for these mechanisms but lack of
will to invoke them. There was also some confusion among pS
because of the complexity and number of these mechanisms.
Greece recommended updating and streamlining the mechanism to
correspond with current conditions. Perhaps this effort
could begin in the FSC with a discussion of the CPC paper on
risk reduction mechanisms that was circulated in late 2007
(SEC.GAL/216/07).


10. (SBU) Russia, referring to its earlier CSBM proposals for
requiring notification of transit and deployment of military
forces through the OSCE area (FSC.DEL/20/07, FSC.DEL/21/07),
said it wanted to introduce more measures that would enhance
transparency and security. Although there had been little
engagement on these proposals by pS, Russia remained hopeful
they could be discussed in 2008.


11. (SBU) Finland noted that its concept paper for the 2008
Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) included discussion
of an OSCE "toolbox" of risk reduction mechanisms
(CIO.GAL/27/08).


12. (SBU) Belarus declared support for its joint proposal
with Russia for an information exchange on rapid reaction
forces (FSC.DEL/545/06) and recommended a special working
group meeting to discuss it.

Significant Military Activities
--------------


13. (SBU) Russia said that the same pS from year to year
reported sub-threshold significant military activities. The
only notification under this provision in 2007 was Swiss
training. However, there were significant activities during
the last year, particularly those involving rapid reaction
forces. Russia had proposed in 2005 to make such reporting
mandatory but there was no consensus. Russia had more

USOSCE 00000060 003 OF 008


recently made another proposal on reporting significant
military activities and called for discussion of it
(FSC.DEL/455/07/Rev.2/Corr.1). Russia also noted that VD99
paragraph 44.1 required notifications of land exercises held
with air or naval components.


14. (SBU) Sweden declared that it had provided notification
of six activities in 2007. Sweden explained that
"significant" activities need not include large numbers of
military personnel.


15. (SBU) Switzerland said it had earlier notified that over
9,000 soldiers would provide support to civil authorities
during the UEFA football games in June.


16. (SBU) Finland said it supported mandatory reporting of
significant military activities, but wondered whether
provision of information on sub-threshold activities enhanced
transparency.

Air Base and Military Facilities Visits
--------------


17. (SBU) The coordinator (Gare, United Kingdom) noted a new
five-year period began in 2007 that might explain the four
visits to air bases or military facilities in 2007 compared
to 18 in 2006. She asked if more pS would participate in the
visits if technical or financial support were provided.


18. (SBU) The UK (Osment) suggested developing a Best
Practice Guide for conducting air base and military facility
visits. Germany said it could participate in the drafting of
a guide, but warned that the effort would not excuse
continued efforts by pS to fulfill their obligations in this
area. The UK also announced a combined airfield/military
facility visit for May 12-16 involving a visit to RAF Marham,
a Tornado GR-4 base, and the Royal School of Artillery at
Larkhill, where the British light gun and Mastiff armored
personnel carrier would be displayed. The UK POC is Lt Col
Philip Osment, tel 44 207 218 3562 email philip.osment574(at
symbol)mod.uk.


19. (SBU) Switzerland suggested less experienced pS could be
invited to observe the planning and implementation of these
visits.

Evaluations and Inspections
--------------


20. (SBU) The coordinator noted 88 inspection were requested
in 2007 and 84 were conducted, with four refusals, of which
three were unexplained.


21. (SBU) Ireland (Hynes) asked if EU membership status had
an impact on the conduct of inspections and evaluations.
(Note: Ireland was alluding to possible restraints on
intra-EU inspections. End note.)


22. (SBU) Armenia (Yedigarian) noted it had received three
inspections in 2007, and had already in 2008 hosted two
inspections from Greece and Turkey. Armenia hosted an air
base visit in 2007, its second, and asserted it was the only
South Caucasus pS to host an air base visit, calling on the
others to follow its example. Armenia noted the value of VD
99 in the South Caucasus, where security concerns and threat

USOSCE 00000060 004 OF 008


perceptions were higher than in other parts of the OSCE area.


23. (SBU) Germany (Eichorn) called for a remedy to the annual
VD99 inspection "quota race", and referred to its proposal
for reorganizing the inspection year into three periods
during which only a portion of the annual quota would be
available (FSC.DEL/51/08). This would, at the very least,
avoid the need to conduct many inspections in the winter
months when military activities were less frequent and
climatic conditions made inspections more difficult. The
proposal would not, Germany asserted, require reopening VD99.
(Note: On the margins of the meeting, Germany emphasized to
USDel that it was open to other proposals to address the
problem of the quota race and stressed it would welcome U.S.
edits to the text. End note.)


24. (SBU) Greece supported the German proposal, although it
would prefer a less complicated calendar. Norway, Belgium,
the UK, and Sweden welcomed the proposal, Sweden noting that
it had voluntarily forgone performing inspections prior to
March 15 this year to ameliorate the quota race. Italy
called the German proposal "useful," noting that the real
problem was the absence of military activities to inspect in
the first months of the year. The quota race is contrary to
the "spirit" of VD99. Finland suggested other solutions
could include bilateral agreements or guest inspectors.
France noted it continued to study the proposal. It endorsed
multinational inspection teams as a possible solution.


25. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) termed the German proposal
"interesting," noting that in 2007 inspection quotas for
Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the U.S. were exhausted within
the first two months of the inspection year. (Note: Russia
was probably referring to the U.S. evaluation quota as the
U.S. lacks an inspection quota. End note.) Russia said it
would be useful to analyze the data to know who goes where,
noting that Ireland had suggested EU membership might affect
inspections and NATO members presumably do not need to
inspect each other.

Regional Measures
--------------


26. (SBU) Lithuania (Ziugzda) announced it had bilateral
agreements with Russia and Belarus to supplement the VD99.
Hungary (Szatmari) described the provisions of its bilateral
agreements with Serbia and Ukraine that enhance the
transparency provided by the VD99. The U.S. (Silberberg)
called for the continued use of regional, sub-regional, and
bilateral measures. Germany and Belarus also supported
regional measures, Belarus adding that "knowing who is on the
other end of the telephone" greatly enhances confidence.

OSCE Communications Network
--------------


27. (SBU) Greece noted that although new OSCE Communications
Network (CommNet) software had been distributed to all pS in
2007 (INA version 2.2),the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia had not installed it and instead used an altered
template. As installation of the latest version of the INA
was mandatory and partial installation of it was not allowed,
Greece asked the CPC to address this concern.


28. (SBU) Ireland (Donagh) noted that delegations in Vienna

USOSCE 00000060 005 OF 008


did not ordinarily have access to the CommNet and recommended
that they be provided terminals.

Global Exchange of Military Information
--------------


29. (SBU) The coordinator asked if there would be any
advantage to combining the deadlines for the submission of
data under the GEMI and AEMI. Although Sweden, Finland, and
Serbia insisted that single deadline would be more efficient
and enhance compliance, the UK, Canada, Greece, Italy, and
the U.S. preferred separate deadlines and submissions, citing
differences in the purpose and nature of the two exchanges.

WORKING SESSION 2

Conventional Arms Transfers
--------------


30. (U) There were no comments.

Non-proliferation
--------------


31. (SBU) The coordinator (Pavlov, Belarus) asked what had
been done in the FSC to address earlier proposals on
non-proliferation, including enhancing implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 and reviewing the OSCE
principles of non-proliferation.


32. (SBU) The U.S. commented favorably on the progress made
throughout the year on non-proliferation initiatives,
including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
and UNSCR 1540. The U.S. invited pS to contribute to the
UNSCR 1540 Best Practices Guide and urged them to develop
national action plans for implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Stabilizing Measures
--------------


33. (SBU) The coordinator asked why the provisions for
stabilizing measures had never been used since their adopting
in 1993. Greece (Sourani) reprised its comments from earlier
in the AIAM that lack of political will explained why
stabilizing measures were not used, not a lack of crisis
situations. Canada (Linteau) compared this agreement to a
fire extinguisher, pointing out that just because he had not
used it in ten years did not mean that he did not need it.
Instead, he suggested, as Greece had earlier, that the
measures should be reviewed to see if they were still
adequate.

Anti-Personnel Landmines
--------------


34. (SBU) Discussion focused on the results of the special
January 23 FSC meeting on anti-personnel landmines (APL) and
the need to make the proposals from that session "more
tangible." Germany, Canada and Turkey discussed ways of
improving the OSCE's role in the international effort to
eliminate APL.

Code of Conduct
--------------


USOSCE 00000060 006 OF 008



35. (SBU) The pS welcomed the recently adopted FSC Decision
(FSC.DEC/1/08) on awareness raising and outreach for the Code
of Conduct. Several pS stated the Code was very important as
one of the most important contributors to security and
stability in the OSCE area.


36. (SBU) There was an extended discussion on the latest
proposal to update the Code Questionnaire, which was
introduced by the FSC Coordinator for the Code (Eischer,
Austria). Turkey asserted some of the new questions went
beyond the scope of current Code provisions and will need
extended further discussion before the updated Questionnaire
could be approved. Finland (Olin) said that past surveys
have "proven" that the Questionnaire needs to be updated
while Sweden (Nilsson) said that this was "probably one of
the most important issues for the rest of the year for the
FSC."

Small Arms and Light Weapons
--------------


37. (SBU) Pavlov (Belarus) introduced the topic, speaking as
both session coordinator and chair of the Informal Group of
Friends of SMALL Arms and Light Weapons (SALW),by giving a
status report on the projects in Tajikistan and Belarus.
(Comment: Pavlov mentioned plans for a donor visit to
Tajikistan in September or October 2008. As a major donor,
delegation recommends that U.S. should participate in the
visit. End comment).


38. (SBU) Discussion followed on an OSCE contribution to the
2008 Bilateral Meeting of States (BMS) of the UN Program of
Action (POA) for SALW. Several states including Finland,
Germany, and Belarus supported a special FSC session to
prepare for the BMS.


39. (SBU) Finland (Olin) pointed out that reported quantities
of SALW exported from one country and imported by another do
not always correspond in the OSCE data exchange. Turkey
offered that one possible explanation could be that importing
and exporting pS use different rules to determine when to add
the equipment to their registers.

Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
--------------


40. (SBU) Turkey also suggested adding information about
stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) to the Annual
SALW Data Exchange. Switzerland supported Turkey. The
coordinator pointed out that the data exchange requirement
was contained in the OSCE Document on SALW, but not in the
Document on SCA, and pointed out that the negotiations "could
be difficult." Turkey rejoined that many negotiations in the
past at the FSC had been difficult and this issue could be
solved as previous issues had been.

MANPADS Export Controls
--------------


41. (SBU) The coordinator reminded that there was still a
Food-for-Thought on the table for updating the OSCE
principles on MANPADS export control to reflect December 2007
Wassenaar Arrangement amendments (FSC.DEL/46/08/Rev.1). In
response to a question posed by Russia, the U.S. confirmed
that its MANPADS proposal (FSC.DEL/52/08),which would adopt

USOSCE 00000060 007 OF 008


the latest Wassenaar amendments without reopening the 2004
FSC decision (3/04),was still on the table.

SALW Brokering
--------------


42. (SBU) The CPC (Kitomaki) gave a brief synopsis of the
results of the "one-off" exchange of information on SALW
brokering. She reported that 39 States had submitted the
information in time to be included in the Survey, and that
three more had submitted the information since then. Finland
(Kangaste) proposed that the CPC be tasked to issue a
revision with information from the three other States
included, then this could be followed up with a more detailed
discussion in the FSC on ways to improve implementation.

End User Certificates and Verification for SALW Exports
-------------- --------------


43. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson) recommended that the FSC follow
the pattern established for the other "principles," i.e.,
MANPADS export controls and SALW brokering of SALW, by
agreeing to a one time data exchange, to be followed by an
assessment of the implementation. This item would also be
useful under the "future activity" entry for an OSCE
contribution to the UN BMS on the UN SALW POA.

WORKING SESSION 3

Improvement of Implementation
--------------


44. (SBU) The coordinator (Kleinjan, Netherlands),who had
not distributed a separate agenda for the session, invited
comment on any aspect of implementation. Apart for the brief
comments noted below, there was no discussion and the session
finished an hour early.


45. (SBU) Germany said each pS should decide what they can
and will do to enhance implementation of VD99. For example,
Germany had decided to include information and notifications
beyond what was required in the document. Germany believed
it was important to set an example of enhanced compliance.
Belarus asserted its preference for FSC decisions rather that
Chairman's statements as a means to improve implementation.


46. (SBU) Turkey noted that although one State Party's
suspension of its CFE obligations was a problem, pS should
beware of allowing this concern to cause a "self-destructive
domino effect." The impasse over CFE should not be allowed
to kill debate in the FSC on the VD99 and other CSBMs.
Turkey would continue to welcome discussion of all CSBMs in
the FSC and consider each on its own merits.

CLOSING SESSION: "Keep CFE Out of FSC Work on CSBMs"


47. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, and
Sweden called on pS to continue their work in the FSC on
CSBMS "without reference to problems encountered in other
arms control fora," as Germany put it. Italy said that
"artificial linking" of the CFE problem to other arms control
work should not be allowed.


48. (SBU) Spain and the UK traded reservations over the
application of the VD99 to Gibraltar in light of their

USOSCE 00000060 008 OF 008


dispute over sovereignty.
SCOTT