Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USOSCE315
2008-12-18 11:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

CFE/JCG: FALL END-OF-ROUND: GEORGIA CRISIS;

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0315/01 3531123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181123Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6130
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1696
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000315 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR HAYES
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: FALL END-OF-ROUND: GEORGIA CRISIS;
RUSSIAN NON-COMPLIANCE; ALLIED UNITY

REF: A. USOSCE 210 (9 SEP)

B. USOSCE 217 (18 SEP)

C. USOSCE 225 (24 SEP)

D. USOSCE 240 (9 OCT)

E. USOSCE 247 (15 OCT)

F. USOSCE 253 (21 OCT)

G. USOSCE 263 (30 OCT)

H. USOSCE 265 (5 NOV)

I. USOSCE 273 (13 NOV)

J. USOSCE 278 (18 NOV)

K. USOSCE 286 (25 NOV)

L. STATE 128974 (LEGAL)

M. USOSCE 298 (12 DEC)

N. USOSCE 313 (16 DEC)

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000315

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR HAYES
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: FALL END-OF-ROUND: GEORGIA CRISIS;
RUSSIAN NON-COMPLIANCE; ALLIED UNITY

REF: A. USOSCE 210 (9 SEP)

B. USOSCE 217 (18 SEP)

C. USOSCE 225 (24 SEP)

D. USOSCE 240 (9 OCT)

E. USOSCE 247 (15 OCT)

F. USOSCE 253 (21 OCT)

G. USOSCE 263 (30 OCT)

H. USOSCE 265 (5 NOV)

I. USOSCE 273 (13 NOV)

J. USOSCE 278 (18 NOV)

K. USOSCE 286 (25 NOV)

L. STATE 128974 (LEGAL)

M. USOSCE 298 (12 DEC)

N. USOSCE 313 (16 DEC)

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The autumn session of the Joint
Consultative Group was dominated by fallout from Russia,s
invasion of Georgia and Russia,s continued non-compliance
with its CFE Treaty obligations (i.e., refusal of inspections
and failure to provide information exchange data). Russia
continued to try to place the blame for its moratorium on
NATO states, alleged refusal to address its security
concerns. USDel met goals of ensuring Allied unity on CFE
issues in Vienna and encouraging almost all other States
Parties to repeatedly join the U.S. in expressing concern
about Russia,s non-compliance, urging Russia to cease its
suspension of the Treaty, and to agree to the parallel action
package so all can move forward. Continued U.S. leadership
in 2009 remains critical for managing the process among
Allies. The session ended with expectations of positive
momentum from the December 17 Fried/Antanov bilateral --
Allies, perceptions of U.S. efforts on the bilateral track
remain critical. The opening of the winter round on January
20 provides an opportunity for the U.S. to outline plans to
Allies for next steps. End summary.

How the Stage is Set for 2009
--------------


2. (C) Comment: Russia continues to signal its growing
impatience with the senior-level bilateral meetings
(Fried/Antanov),alleging both infrequency and lack of
substance. Russia has repeatedly called into question the
ability at that level to discuss a definition for

"substantial combat forces," modalities for accession of new
partners, or amendments to the adapted Treaty. Russia
consistently advocates that the JCG be given the remit to
move these issues forward. More recently, Russia accused the
NATO states of passivity in finding a solution.


3. (C) Allies have maintained unity in responding to Russian
statements, making it clear that the JCG can not move forward
until Russia agrees to the parallel action package per the
NAC March 28 and December 3 statements. Allies consistently
express concerns that Russia,s non-compliance is damaging
the Treaty and call upon Russia to return to full
implementation. As this session progressed, several
high-level meetings were held elsewhere, allowing the JCG
delegations to exercise patience and giving the separate
meetings the chance to address the impasse.


4. (C) However, all delegations are impatiently
anticipating movement at a minimum from the December 17
bilateral exchange, and are prepared to play a constructive
role when the time is right. Germany is particularly eager
to become more active and may not wait. If there is no
perception of the U.S. trying to make the bilateral
U.S.-Russia track work, Allied unity on CFE could fall prey
to counterproductive unilateral efforts. Delegations will
certainly be looking to the U.S. for leadership on next steps
in general, but for the JCG in particular, if appropriate,
when the winter session begins on January 20. Continued
U.S. leadership is vital to ensure continued Allied unity and

ultimately, positive results. End comment.

Georgia Invasion Negative Fallout
--------------


5. (SBU) At the beginning of the fall session on September 9,
the U.S. and a number of Allies made statements objecting to
Russia,s action in Georgia in August. The interventions
centered on three themes: deploring Russia,s
disproportionate use of force (based on the August 19 NAC
statement); condemning Russia,s recognition of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia (August 27 NAC statement); and violation of the
CFE Treaty provision obligating States to "refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State."


6. (C) Although there was no joint statement by NATO states
as a group, all national statements were solid and left a
strong impression of Allied solidarity. Russia blamed the
events on Georgia,s "criminal military adventurism" and
challenged Allies recognition of Kosovo as a double standard
with respect to Russia,s recognition of the Georgian
provinces.


7. (SBU) On October 14, Georgia accused Russia of violating
core principles of the CFE Treaty (non-use of force, host
nation consent) and asserted that Russia,s actions further
undermine the Treaty and its principles. Georgia received
broad support from Allies for its statement, including
references to the NAC statements of August 19th and 27th.
Many echoed the U.S. theme that Russia,s actions in Georgia
have further complicated the impasse on CFE. Turkey
stressed that no State Party has an interest in the collapse
of CFE and raised concern that there is no means to verify
whether or not Russia is abiding CFE,s numerical
limitations. Romania raised Russia,s failure to uphold the
Istanbul Commitments.


8. (C) Russia accused States of having "selective memory"
with respect to the Istanbul Commitments and accused others
of imposing "double standard" policies (another reference to
recognition of Kosovo). Russia claimed that the U.S. and
others made a "strategic oversight" by linking ratification
of Adapted CFE to "secondary issues", e.g., Istanbul
Commitments. The U.S. stressed that the Treaty is not an
instrument that can be implemented "a la carte." Comment:
The U.S. played a critical role in prepping the Georgian
statement for content, and by garnering support of Allies.
U.S. efforts ensured the message was delivered successfully,
and earned us credit both with Allies and Georgia. End
comment.


9. (SBU) On October 21, the Czech Republic, Georgia and U.S.
engaged Russia on its failure to fully implement the Istanbul
Commitments. The Czechs pointed out that Georgia and Moldova
have fulfilled their part of the agreement and accused Russia
of not fulfilling its part. Georgia pointed out several
areas where Russia had not complied with the agreement, and
promised to provide a legal analysis of Georgia,s
fulfillment and Russia,s shortcomings. The U.S. emphasized
that the concept of "host nation consent" was paramount to
move forward beyond the current impasse.


10. (SBU) On October 28, Georgia provided the promised legal
analysis detailing Russia,s failure to fulfill many of its
Istanbul Commitments. Georgia noted that although Russia had
reduced its Treaty limited equipment in a timely manner, and
closed the Vaziani base, Russia had stopped its withdrawal
from Gudauta, maintained combat forces there and used it in
support of its invasion into Georgian territory. Russia
countered that it had not violated provisions of CFE, but had
exercised its rights under Article 51 to defend civilians and
Russian peace keeping forces in South Ossetia.


11. (SBU) Russia claimed several times that Gudauta was no
longer an issue because it now belongs to Abkhazia. Germany

challenged this Russian position and questioned how a state
that has not been recognized by any other States except
Russia is supposed to fulfill a commitment signed by Russia
in 1999? Germany expressed the belief that Russia,s attempt
to pawn off this responsibility onto Abkhazia only made the
situation more complicated.


12. (SBU) Russia also claimed that Georgia had not lived up
to its agreement by not setting up an anti-terrorist center
in Batumi. Russia questioned why delegations were not
raising Georgia,s non-compliance in the JCG. Russia also
claimed that Georgia made a strategic error in attempting to
resolve the South Ossetian/Abkhazia issue through arms
control mechanisms. Russia cares about CFE, but not less
than other subjects. Russia also expressed disbelief that
States would link local conflicts to the "cornerstone of
European security" and wondered which was more important.
Georgia took the opportunity to mention a newspaper article
titled, "Russia Killed CFE and Buried it in Georgia."

Russia,s CFE Inspection Refusals Mount...
--------------


13. (SBU) In September, the U.S. and Turkey announced that
Russia had refused additional inspection requests.
Throughout the session on a nearly weekly basis, delegations
brought such refusals to the attention of the JCG (including
Bulgaria, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, UK, Czech, Germany,
Norway, Italy, Poland, and Canada). USDel successfully
encouraged other NATO states to show solidarity by expressing
support for aggrieved Allies on these occasions, especially
neighboring states - and they did so regularly. Russia
consistently reminded States that its moratorium prevented it
from hosting such inspections, and blamed Allies for not
addressing its concerns that led to the moratorium. France
characterized Russia,s actions as "paralyzing" CFE, and
Romania said their actions were contributing to the "erosion"
of the Treaty. In December, the U.S. noted that Russia had
denied over two dozen inspections over the past year. A
chorus of Allies said Russia,s actions further undermine the
Treaty.

....And Lack of Information Exchange
--------------


14. (SBU) On October 28, the U.S. raised Russia,s failure to
provide quarterly information on its forces in Kushchevskaya
as of October 1, as required by the Final Document of the
First Review Conference. At USDel urging, all of the States
with coastline on the Black Sea (except Russia) expressed
similar concerns over this Russia failure, as did Britain,
Germany, France and Norway.


15. (C) On November 10, Allies began preparations for a joint
statement drawing on the NATO communique, on Russia,s likely
non-participation in the December 15 information exchange.
On November 25, Russia informally told delegations that, like
last year, it would not provide its CFE Treaty data on
December 15, but rather provide a one-page aggregate summary.
Norway provided draft language to Allies for the NATO
statement on Russia,s lack of data, including a paragraph
from the draft NAC communique. A JCG-T was held in Helsinki
on the margins of the OSCE Ministerial to finalize the text
after the NAC December 3 statement was agreed. Poland, on
behalf of the Allies in the CFE Treaty, presented the
statement on December 16, regretting Russia,s act on
non-compliance with its Treaty obligations.

Suspension Legal - or Not?
--------------


16. (SBU) On October 14, Russia made a long statement
claiming that its suspension of CFE is in accordance with
customary international law and the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. Russia cited its July 30 note to the Treaty
depositary (Netherlands) which put forth its case for

suspension. On November 18, U.S. comments on another
refused inspection noted that "neither the CFE Treaty nor
customary international law" provide a basis for Russia,s
action. Russia then repeated its claims that it has a basis
for legal suspension, and challenged the U.S. to provide its
own detailed legal arguments.


17. (SBU) On December 9, the U.S. presented its legal
analysis strongly refuting Russia,s claim that it has such a
legal basis. The U.S. analysis effectively cleared the air
and was welcomed and supported by several Allies. Russia
thanked us for providing the long-sought information, and
will send it to Moscow for review during the recess. Germany
cautioned that a legal debate will not move us forward and
urged for a joint political approach, with a clear nod to the
pending December 17 bilateral meeting.

Let the JCG work on the Parallel Plan
--------------


18. (C) Russia continued to press for JCG discussion of parts
of the parallel action plan as the best venue to deal with
all the issues. Russia complained that the Fried-Antonov
meetings do not happen frequently enough to make real
progress. Also, those meetings do not include all interested
parties (meaning non-NATO States Parties).


19. (C) On November 25, Russia previewed that on December 9
it would make a pitch for how the JCG can play a role in
"saving CFE." On December 9, Russia took note of the joint
NATO statement citing paragraph 34 of the December 3 NAC
statement that calls upon Russia for further cooperation.
Russia believes the JCG is the best place to tackle the
parallel plan, which needs further work as it is unbalanced.
Russia repeated its spurious claim that the plan requires
actions by Russia, but only promises by NATO states. In
reply, Allies unanimously called upon Russia to agree to the
parallel plan first, as a prerequisite for discussing
elements of it in the JCG. Russia,s behavior in Georgia and
at the OSCE Ministerial had not made it any easier to move
forward in the JCG or elsewhere.


20. (C) On the eve of the December 17 U.S.-Russia senior
bilateral, Russia again challenged the joint statement by
NATO states in the Treaty referring to further cooperation.
Russia asked "where and when" was such cooperation supposed
to happen? The U.S. replied that Russia could begin,
"tomorrow, at the Fried-Antonov talks in Geneva." In a move
intended to drive a wedge among other parties, Russia asked
how could such cooperation happen if all interested states
were not taking part? The U.S., Turkey, and Germany
clarified that the U.S. was not in Geneva only for itself,
but would be leading on behalf of NATO states.

JCG - Let,s Keep on Meeting
--------------


21. (SBU) In September, USDel put forward the proposal to cut
back on the number of JCG meetings, as discussed and endorsed
at the HLTF. Allied delegations resisted this notion,
saying it is important to keep all lines of communication
open, but agreed to propose cancelling a total of 3 meetings.
This was resisted by Russia which pointed to its right as a
State Party to call meetings. In the end, there was
agreement to cancel one meeting that conflicted with another
event outside Vienna. In a flurry of consultations in late
November, the JCG agreed to end the session on December 19,
and resume in 2009 on January 20. The U.S. expressed regret
for this "business as usual" schedule, and urged States to
consider scheduling meetings when there is really something
to discuss. Russia warned that holding fewer JCG meetings
might send a "bad political sign" that we have in fact
"buried CFE." (JCG.DEC/3/08)


22. (SBU) Comment: Most Allies did not support reducing the
schedule to monthly or bi-weekly plenary meetings. Pending

the results of the December 17 U.S.-Russia bilateral meeting
and other policy decisions, we may be able to revisit this
proposal in 2009 if appropriate. However, for the time being
there does not appear to be any appetite for decreasing the
number of meetings except on a case-by-case basis as other
events provide such an opportunity. End comment.

No Consensus on a JCG Letter to the Ministerial
--------------


23. (SBU) On October 3, the Dutch delegation provided a
draft "JCG Letter" to Ministers for Allied review and
coordination before introducing it to the JCG for discussion.
The U.S. provided initial remarks to include a reference to
the Istanbul Commitments, and suggested it should reflect
what the JCG has actually covered, rather than sticking to a
short and factual statement that would, in effect, be
misleading. The U.S. and Germany debated the best way to
capture Russia,s suspension of the Treaty. In mid-October,
the JCG Chair troika (Norway, Netherlands, and Portugal)
agreed to share the outline of the letter with Russia to test
the waters on its acceptability. On October 28, Portugal
informed Allies that informal consultations on the text were
not promising. Georgia was insisting on a reference to
Russia,s violation of the CFE Treaty during the recent
conflict. In comparing Allied text with a paragraph proposed
by Russia, it became clear that consensus would be impossible
on such a letter. The JCG plenary agreed with the Chair,s
suggestion to not prepare a letter this year.
FINLEY