SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY: HELSINKI OSCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000290

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM OSCE OVIP PHUM PREL PROG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY: HELSINKI OSCE
MINISTERIAL


1. (SBU) Madame Secretary, we look forward to seeing you at
the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki. FM Stubb
has succeeded in attracting a record number of ministers to
this OSCE meeting, and hopes to rally the Organization in a
renewal of the Q&Spirit of Helsinki.Q8 Following closely on
the NATO Ministerial, Helsinki will come face to face with
the challenge of dealing with increased Russian assertiveness
(with a good sprinkling of intransigence),especially against
the backdrop of last AugustQ,s conflict in Georgia. The
Russians hope to convert the entire meeting into a showcase
for President MedvedevQ,s proposals for a European Security
Treaty. Our European allies are wary of RussiaQ,s approach,
but seem all too willing to play along. Your participation
in Helsinki will be important to keep our allies and the
Organization focused on the values and common view of
security that is reflected in the Helsinki Final ActQ,s
balance, and to challenge Russia to explain the widening
chasm between RussiaQ,s rhetoric and its flouting of OSCE
commitments and principles.

A 21st Century OSCE
--------------


2. (SBU) The OSCE played an important role in helping to move
toward a Europe whole and free. It remains the largest and
most comprehensive regional security organization in the
world, spanning Eurasia and North America, and including 56
countries and 11 Partners coalesced around a comprehensive
security approach that includes human rights, economic
freedoms, and political military confidence and security
building measures. More recently, however, the consensus of
the 1990s has broken down, and RussiaQ,s increasingly not
constructive attitude has caused this consensus-based
organization to drift. It is returning to its origins Q) a
forum to confront directly and seek to work through issues
with a resurgent Russian Federation.

Helsinki
--------------


3. (SBU) Despite FM StubbQ,s efforts to rally the
organization, expectations for Helsinki are low. Still, we
can use the gathering to further our policy goals,
particularly vis-Q-vis Russia, and to underscore and reaffirm
existing commitments that underpin current European security.
We should seek to have the Ministerial reassert, in both
practical and symbolic ways, the values and commitments
enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (HFA).


4. (SBU) FM Stubb has hung his hopes for a successful
ministerial on adoption of a political declaration that aims
to articulate a common denominator consensus on European
security and next steps. He has purposefully avoided the
Vienna negotiating forum that has failed to deliver for the
past half decade, hoping instead to make a pitch directly to
ministers in Helsinki. His draft was delivered only one week
before the ministerial gathering, and papers over significant
differences obvious to all. Many of our European allies, led
by Germany and France, are ready to adopt this approach in a
desperate effort to deliver a message of common ground with
Moscow. Given both the still raw emotions from the conflict
in Georgia and swirling and conflicting expectations for a
treaty and a summit, this declaration seems unlikely to serve
simultaneously all the purposes intended for it. We will
continue to negotiate in good faith, but in the end,
foregoing the declaration may be necessary.

European Security Architecture
--------------


5. (SBU) The other major element of the gathering is the
Ministerial lunch, where A/S Fried will represent you. The
Finns intend to focus discussion on ideas for EuropeQ,s
future security, and this is where MedvedevQ,s wedge-driving
proposal for a new security treaty and SarkozyQ,s codex for
an OSCE summit next year come into play. The Finns perceive
a gathering momentum for these proposals, but they are also
sensitive to our view that the current architecture, were it
to be respected, adequately serves EuropeQ,s security
interests. They hope that a thorough airing of views, led
on our side by A/S Fried, can help ease some of the emerging
transatlantic differences on this issue, and their draft
political declaration clearly signals they would like the
ministerial to emerge with agreement to consider convening an
OSCE summit in the near future Q) something that has not
happened since 1999. Your work in Brussels at the NATO
Ministerial can have an impact on Helsinki, as the tone of
the NATO communiquQ should have an impact on attitudes around

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the table in Helsinki and will likely influence the course of
the discussion.


6. (SBU) We need to challenge Russia to explain exactly what
it believes isnQ,t working well now, what it is proposing as
a replacement and how it treats existing security frameworks.
Moscow must explain why OSCE participating States should
engage seriously with Russia on this initiative at a time
when Russia has abandoned its CFE Treaty obligations and
failed to honor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
a neighbor.

Georgia
--------------


7. (SBU) Aside from MedvedevQ,s security treaty proposal,
Georgia is sure to be a secondary topic in Helsinki.
Unfortunately, it appears to us in Vienna that most of Europe
considers the relationship with Russia too important to put
in jeopardy by standing firm in favor of GeorgiaQ,s
sovereignty. The Finns want any discussion to be Q&forward
looking,Q8 and most delegations appear willing to Q&move
on.Q8 We will have to press hard to keep a focus on Georgia,
especially as Russia is threatening to close down the OSCE
Mission in Georgia unless its legal mandate is adjusted to
reflect MoscowQ,s version of Q&reality on the ground.Q8 No
final decision on Mission mandate is required at the
Ministerial, as the mandate formally expires on December 31.
However, we see benefit in political-level consideration of
this issue in early December, or we face a likely stalemate
and possible mission closure four weeks later. We have
advised the Finnish Chairmanship of our preference for
resolution of this by the close of the Ministerial so that
the situation receives prominence during the meeting.

Other Issues
--------------


8. (SBU) Other issues that will form the context for Helsinki
include RussiaQ,s decision late last year to suspend its
participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE),in large part because, it said, Allies had
failed to ratify the adapted CFE treaty. The U.S. and Allies
have repeatedly made clear their support for CFE and the
future entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. No
specific action on CFE is expected at the Ministerial but it
will be an important backdrop issue. The strong language
agreed for the NATO Ministerial will be helpful in this
regard.


9. (SBU) With these big ticket issues likely to lead to
stalemate, however, the rest of the Ministerial will be small
potatoes. Russia has played a destructive game in
negotiating almost every proposed decision. In the end, we
expect there will be Ministerial Decisions on:

-- Trafficking in Persons Q) The Finns feel this decision is
one of the signature achievements of their Chairmanship; its
main feature is to adopt a Q&victim-centeredQ8 approach to
combating human trafficking.

-- Roma and Sinti Q) Seeking to highlight the plight of these
minorities in Europe, this decision addresses a longstanding
U.S. human rights concern and it looks likely to achieve
consensus support.

-- Rule of Law Q) This German initiative aims to focus on
national legislation in conformance with OSCE human rights
commitments.

-- Inland Waterways Cooperation Q) a technical and
non-controversial decision on pan-European cooperation with
the International Maritime Organization and UNECE;


10. (SBU) In addition, many Western delegations had high
hopes for a decision pegged to the 60th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights that would seek to
re-affirm the progress made in OSCE commitments on democracy,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Unfortunately,
Russia has adopted a posture that clearly illustrates its
effort to pare back commitments and distance itself from the
OSCEQ,s achievements in the 1990s.


11. (SBU) The EU countries are also seeking a decision on the
Security Aspects of Climate Change. We remain skeptical that
the OSCE can find a role that adds value to this issue, but
hope to find common ground with our European friends on this
decision. Russia, however, is playing hardball. Our

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preferred outcome: US and EU together, with Russia
responsible for failure to agree to this high-priority for EU
countries.

Conclusion:
--------------


12. (SBU) OSCE has long been a key freedom and democracy tool
in our toolbox, but Russian actions are taking a toll. The
Finns are looking to navigate a safe course with a minimalist
agenda that gets them a tangible outcome but perhaps at the
expense of long-held security beliefs and principles.
Failure to reach agreement is no tragedy, since it is more
important to stand for common principles and values at this
time than to accommodate RussiaQ,s bullying. Much will
depend on the tactical game, and your involvement is critical
to making certain that responsibility for current tensions
fall squarely on Russia, which has put itself beyond the pale
of OSCEQ,s prior commitments.
FINLEY