CFE/JCG: GEORGIA/RUSSIA SPAR OVER ISTANBUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000265

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM,
NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL,
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: GEORGIA/RUSSIA SPAR OVER ISTANBUL
CONTINUES

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: During the November 4 JCG, Russia
rebutted Georgia's October 28 JCG statement in which Georgia
detailed Russia's failure to fulfill its Istanbul
Commitments. Georgia responded to Russia's rebuttal,
reiterating many of the points it made during previous JCG
meetings. Germany and Belarus were the only other
delegations to contribute to the debate. Germany expressed
serious concern that the CFE impasse would continue if Russia
does not fulfill its Istanbul Commitments, and especially
questioned what Russia planned to do with respect to Gudauta
in light of the August war. Although some delegates during
last week's JCG suggested canceling the November 4 and 11
meetings due to technical reasons, all countries appeared to
be present at today's plenary with the usual faces; the UK
decided to send a more junior representative. End Summary.

Whoever Has Implemented the Most Istanbul Commitments, Raise
Your Hand!
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2. (SBU) The Joint Consultative Group (JCG) met on October
28 under the Chairmanship of Portugal (Barata). As promised
during the last JCG meeting, Russia (Ulyanov) delivered a
lengthy rebuttal countering Georgia's October 28 statement in
which it detailed Russia's failure to fulfill many of its
Istanbul commitments. Ulyanov asserted that Russia had
reduced the amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) within
the territory of Georgia per the Joint Statement of the
Russian Federation and Georgia of November 17, 1999. He
noted that even Georgia had acknowledged Russia's compliance
with its Istanbul Commitments with the exception of Gudauta.
Ulyanov, however, said that Gudauta was 'dismantled and
decommissioned on time' and that OSCE monitors had observed
only 'peacekeepers, civilians, and cattle' on the base.
Ulyanov also noted that no agreement had been reached between
Georgia and Russia on subsequent utilization of the bases, so
Russia thought it 'permissible to maintain peacekeepers'
there.


3. (SBU) Ulyanov then went back on the offensive and
accused Georgia of not fulfilling all of Georgia's Istanbul
Commitments, specifically, the use of facilities at Vaziani
and Gudauta and Russian temporary deployments at Batumi. He
expressed disapproval that delegations around the table had
not called out Georgia on its noncompliance. Ulyanov singled
out (again) the Czech Republic for 'observing a double
standard.' Ulyanov explained that discussions on this matter
were appropriate for the JCG because of the 'Georgian
factor,' which Ulyanov defined as one of 'the main factors in
determining the fate of CFE.' Ulyanov surmised that arms
control must not be an important priority in Tbilisi if the
Georgians had tried to resolve the South Ossetia/Abkhazia
issue by putting pressure on Russia with respect to CFE.
Ulyanov concluded that this was a 'strategic error' on the
part of the Georgians because Russia is 'keen to see CFE move
ahead but no less keen on other subjects.'

Gudauta Is No Longer Russia's to Handle
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4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that the U.S. has said there will be
no ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty without Russia's
fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments, but said the
Georgians have been given 'carte blanche.' Ulyanov ended his
monologue by commenting that Gudauta was no longer an issue
since it now belongs to the Republic of Abkhazia and,
therefore, is for the Abkhazian authorities to decide.


5. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) responded that the failure to
decide how to utilize the Gudauta and Vaziani bases was not a
relevant argument. The first article of the Joint Statement
of the Russian Federation and Georgia of November 17, 1999
required that the TLE located at the bases be dismantled by

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July 1, 2001. Giorgadze clarified that, in other words, this
meant that Gudauta had to be dismantled first before
determination could be made on the base's subsequent use.


6. (SBU) Germany (Richter) commented that, yes, in fact,
many Istanbul Commitments have been fulfilled, but this does
not excuse away those which have not yet been fulfilled.
Richter expressed that Germany had considered its Istanbul
Commitments crucial and, thus, fulfilled all of them. He
took issue with Russia's passing off responsibility onto
Abkhazia and questioned how we could turn to a state we have
not recognized to fulfill a commitment taken by Russia in

1999. He raised concern that this impasse was not
'constructive' to moving forward on the Parallel Actions
Package.

The 'Cornerstone' of European Security...or, Georgia?
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7. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reacted to Germany's comment with
respect to the Parallel Actions Package by saying it would
not go back to capital for further guidance since 'all talk
has stopped...unless we talk about the three brief meetings
that took place this year.' Ulyanov expressed disbelief that
states would link local conflicts to the 'cornerstone of
European security,' and questioned what other states Parties
thought was more important. Georgia (Giorgadze) disagreed
with Russia's unwillingness to link the two and said that
what happened in August was full-fledged war. He accused
Russia 'of toppling the CFE Treaty, not to mention other
international laws,' by invading Georgia. He then noted the
title of a recent newspaper article he had seen that read,
'Russia Killed CFE and Buried it in Georgia.' (COMMENT:
Giorgadze later clarified that the article title does not
reflect an official position of the Government of Georgia.)


8. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) thanked Germany for its
intervention and called on Allies to fulfill their commitment
to expedited ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Germany
(Richter) returned to the importance of the Parallel Actions
Package and asserted that the only reasonable approach is to
ensure that we do not look independently at things we could
be doing, hence the term 'parallel.' Richter reiterated that
the situation had become more complicated now that Russia is
throwing its responsibility onto Abkhazia to fulfill a
commitment that Russia signed onto in 1999.

JCG-T Plus 4...What Should We Do?
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9. (C) At the JCG-T plus 4, chaired by Portugal on 3
November, Allies wrung their hands over their failure to get
Russia to agree to the cancellation of the November 4 and 11
JCG meetings due to technical reasons. Several delegations,
including the UK, expressed that they were considering
whether to be absent from the November 4 JCG and instead send
junior delegation members to represent them. The UK,
Netherlands, France, and Greece felt that showing up to the
meeting would be an 'admission of guilt,' and that the
technical reasons argument was actually a cover-up for an
ulterior motive to cancel the meetings. Germany (Schweizer)
disagreed and said technical reasons could simply mean that
delegates required more time to prepare for this week's HLTF
in Romania and, therefore, it was reasonable to request the
cancellation of the next two JCG meetings. (NOTE: During
the November 4 Plenary the UK, which is normally represented
by First Secretary Berenice Gare, instead was represented by
Sam Toporowski, whose title according to the OSCE address
list is &support officer8 and is more junior than Gare.)


10. (C) Allies expressed frustration in a circuitous
dialogue over what to do beyond the November 4 JCG. The
Netherlands (Kleinjan) cleverly suggested that the delegates
hold two additional JCG meetings, which would essentially
'bump the Russians up' in the schedule to preclude them from
sitting in the Chair during the Helsinki Ministerial. The UK
delegate (Gare) commented that the Dutch proposal was indeed

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creative. Additionally, Gare noted that it would seem 'odd'
for Russia to refuse more meetings since Ulyanov expressed a
desire for the JCG to have more dialogue. Denmark (Peterson)
thought it might be hard to justify adding two additional
JCGs since we did not even add one extraordinary JCG in July,
2007, when Russia announced their intent to suspend
participation in the CFE. Turkey (Begec) asked whether
anyone had any information on how the Russians planned to
'use/abuse' their time in the chairmanship, but his question
went unanswered.

Next Meeting
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11. (U) The next JCG Plenary will be on November 11 under
the Chairmanship of Romania. The next JCG-T will be on
November 10 and will be chaired by Luxembourg.
FINLEY