CFE/JCG: OCTOBER 14 -- GEORGIA CALLS OUT RUSSIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000247

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM,
NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL,
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: OCTOBER 14 -- GEORGIA CALLS OUT RUSSIA,
RECEIVES BROAD SUPPORT

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: At October 14 JCG, Georgia accused
Russia of violating core principles of the CFE Treaty
(non-use of force, host nation consent) and non-compliance
with Treaty provisions. In a surprisingly lengthy give and
take (which included seven different interventions by
Russia),the U.K., Ukraine, France, Romania, Germany, Turkey,
the U.S., and the Czech Republic expressed support for the
Georgian statement. In response, Russia accused Georgia of
not fulfilling its Istanbul commitments, justified Russian
action during the August conflict as necessary to protect
peacekeepers and civilians, and compared Russian recognition
of Abkhazia/S. Ossetia with others' recognition of Kosovo.


2. (SBU) Russia also provided a long dissertation on how it
believes its suspension of CFE is in accordance with
customary international law and the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. The Russian interventions provoked subsequent
additional interventions by the Czech Republic, Moldova,
Georgia (twice more),Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, Romania,
Canada (twice),Turkey, the U.S., Britain, and Luxembourg.
While these interventions by no means offered absolute
backing for Georgia, there was not a word of support for
Russia. Germany and the U.K. pleaded for all to let the past
go, and focus on the future for ways to solve the current CFE
impasse. End summary.

MODERATE GEORGIAN APPROACH GARNERS BROAD SUPPORT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (SBU) Georgia (Dolidze) delivered a relatively moderate
statement, which had been toned down substantially after
consulting the United States and a number of other
delegations, against Russia's invasion, calling it a "clear
violation" of one of the core principles of the CFE Treaty as
stated in the Preamble to "recall their obligation to refrain
in their mutual relations, as well as in their international
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State." The Georgian statement emphasized the CFE Treaty as
a "cornerstone of the European security system" and asserted
that Russia's recent actions further undermine the Treaty and
its principles.


4. (SBU) The United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Romania,
Germany (Richter),Turkey, the United States, and the Czech
Republic expressed various levels of support for the Georgian
statement, particularly taking up the USG theme that recent
events have made the impasse on CFE more complicated. The
U.K. (Gare),Ukrainian (Herasymenko),and Romanian
(Neculaescu) delegations noted their concerns for further
"erosion" of the Treaty. The German, UK, and U.S.
delegations recalled NAC statements on August 19th and 27th
in which Allies expressed their grave disapproval of Russia's
activities. France (Simonet) noted that the fundamental
principles in the CFE Treaty's preamble have been "greatly
weakened by actions in Georgia" and added, with satisfaction,
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory as
an "important step" to fulfilling the agreement reached
between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev.


5. (SBU) Germany (Richter) said Russia's recognition of the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has made the
overall situation worse. Turkey (Begec) stressed that no
State Party should have an interest in the collapse of CFE
and raised its concern that there are currently no means by
which to verify whether or not numerical limitations for
Russia are being abided by. Ukraine, the Czech Republic
(Reinohlova),and Romania raised Russia's failure to uphold
the Istanbul Commitments.


6. (SBU) The United States (Neighbour) noted that Georgia's
statement was appropriate and timely for discussion in the
JCG. Inter alia, he reiterated the U.S. commitment to

USOSCE 00000247 002 OF 004


resolve the impasse that began with Russia's decision last
year to stop implementing its CFE obligations, expressed hope
that Russia would comply fully with the host nation consent
requirement of the CFE Treaty, and commented that the
situation has now become more complicated by Russia's recent
military actions in Georgia.

RUSSIA CHARGES "DOUBLE STANDARDS" ON ISTANBUL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (SBU) Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Ulyanov before
attempting to respond in detail to the points raised by other
delegations first suggested that his colleagues from Ukraine,
the Czech Republic, and Romania had "selective memory" in
recalling the Istanbul Commitments. He suggested that during
JCG meetings until now he had not heard any other delegations
question Georgia's upholding of its commitments and accused
these countries of having "double standards" in their
policies. He mentioned instances where Russia had met the
deadline proscribed by the Istanbul commitments but that
Georgia had failed to fulfill similar obligations.


8. (SBU) Ulyanov then presented several arguments, at times
in an unstructured and incoherent manner, to defend Russia's
actions, including the U.S. military action against Iraq in

2003. He suggested that Russia used force not against the
political or territorial integrity of Georgia, but rather
against "aggressor" Georgia," which had "ferociously attacked
innocent civilians and peacekeepers He said that Russia's
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
came only after the recognition of Kosovo and that Russia, in
fact, had supported the territorial integrity of Georgia for
almost a decade and a half. He asserted that Russia's
decision on recognition is "not subject to review" and not up
for discussion.


9. (SBU) Ulyanov was particularly strong in his comments
against the United States, noting that the Georgians have
repeated the "American slogan" that the Treaty does not
provide for the possibility of moratorium, or suspension.
Ulyanov suggested that the real "deadlock" occurred when the
United States, Georgia, and others, linked ratification of
the Adapted Treaty to "secondary issues," making it a
political decision. He called this a "strategic oversight"
on the part of the United States and said that resuming CFE
would depend on the willingness of others around the table in
making progress on the parallel actions package.

RUSSIA CLAIMS IT HAS A LEGAL BASIS FOR SUSPENSION OF CFE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (SBU) Ulyanov then launched a lengthy monologue on the
legal basis for suspension, recalling its July 30 note to the
Netherlands as depository of the Treaty in which Russia put
forth its case for suspension. Ulyanov argued that Article
57 of the Vienna Convention allows States Parties to suspend
a treaty temporarily. He also said that paragraph 2 of
Article 19 of the CFE Treaty gives States Parties the right
to suspend the treaty in light of "extraordinary events."


11. (SBU) Russia then took issue with the U.S. position,
calling it "not valid" and cited an article by article
analysis prepared by the Department of State for a
presidential address to the Senate on July 2, 1991 wherein
the Department noted the "right of withdrawal" is in addition
to "any other rights of States Parties including suspension."
He questioned what has made American legal circles change
their minds and suggested the United States is applying
"legally flimsy judgment" in its current analysis related to
CFE.

U.S. AND OTHERS REPLY TO RUSSIAN MISPERCEPTIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


USOSCE 00000247 003 OF 004



12. (SBU) The exchange between delegations lasted almost two
hours. Ulyanov's interventions managed to provoke subsequent
additional interventions, some quite challenging of Russia's
actions, by the Czech Republic, Moldova (Kuk),Georgia
(twice),the Netherlands (Kleinjan),Germany, Ukraine,
Romania, Canada (Gosal - twice),Turkey, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg.


13. (SBU) For its part in reply to Russia's accusations,
USDel (Neighbour) recalled that the Istanbul Commitments were
part of a package deal to which all had agreed. This had
already been explained in detail in the JCG as recently as
last year. He added that thousands of Russian troops were
now within Georgia's internationally recognized borders,
borders that had been recognized by many UN and OSCE
documents, and recognized by Russia itself until very
recently. Neighbour said he was not aware of Georgia giving
host nation consent to this large troop presence; to say that
this made resolving the impasse on CFE more difficult was an
understatement. The U.S. reaffirmed Russia,s noncompliance
with the CFE Treaty in continuing to refuse inspections and
provide data, and said the CFE Treaty is not an instrument
that can be implemented "a la carte." USDel also reserved
the right to reply in greater detail during a later meeting
to Russia's assertions regarding the legality of suspension.


14. (SBU) Germany (Richter),echoed by the United Kingdom
(Gare) and Luxembourg (Pilot),stressed that debates on both
past activities and the legal basis for suspension would not
move us forward. The Germany delegate particularly
emphasized the political will needed to break the impasse.
He said that fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments were to
be upheld for ratification of the Adapted Treaty. He
stressed the importance of the parallel actions package and
said that any new demands by Russia make matters complicated.


GEORGIANS ELATED, APPRECIATIVE FOR U.S. ROLE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


15. (C) After the Plenary, the U.S. delegation was
approached by a beaming Georgian Ambassador Dolidze, who told
USDel that he was very appreciative for U.S. editing
suggestions for Georgia's statement (to keep it CFE-related)
and for urging Allied delegations to intervene. USDel
declined to accept any credit, but did note that many Allied
delegations, including France and Germany, had said they
would not have offered any support for Georgia if it had used
its first (maximalist) statement. In fact, USDel was
informed by France during a meeting of the Quad on October 13
that France, before having seen the revised/toned-down
Georgian statement, was under instructions to urge Georgia to
say nothing at all.

QUAD, JCG-T CONSIDER SUPPORT FOR GEORGIAN STATEMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


16. (C) On October 13 the Quad met to consider support for
the planned Georgian statement during the JCG Plenary this
week. France initially raised concern that the JCG has not
yet reached any conclusions on Georgia's assertion of
Russia's "violations." The U.S. (Neighbour),with support
from Germany (Richter) and the United Kingdom (Gare),
suggested that delegations could lend support to the Georgian
statement without agreeing to the allegations of violations.
The U.K. representative said she would not support anything
beyond NATO's current position. The German delegate
(Richter) echoed the UK's remarks and suggested that he would
refer to NAC statements on the 19th and 27th of August, which
he did the next day.


17. (C) The Quad also revisited the issue of Russia holding
the JCG chairmanship prior to the Helsinki Ministerial and on
its anniversary of suspension of implementation of CFE. The
UK (Gare) strongly cautioned the PR message that this would

USOSCE 00000247 004 OF 004


send if the JCG meetings were in fact chaired by Russia
during these two important events. France (Simonet) and
Germany (Richter) were uncomfortable with the notion of
artificially inventing something purely for the sake of
delaying the meetings, but would welcome the opportunity of
something coming in handy that could be used for grounds to
delay the meetings. The other French delegate (Fournier)
suggested scheduling a HLTF on a Tuesday to provide an
undisputable reason for cancelling a JCG.


18. (C) The JCG-T met briefly on 14 October, i.e.,
immediately prior to the JCG Plenary. Germany gave a heads
up that Georgia would make a statement against Russia's
actions, closely tying them to CFE. A number of delegations,
including the United States, noted that it would support
Georgia's statement during the Plenary. The USDel
(Neighbour) mentioned that Russia had informed him that it
would raise the issue of a legal basis for suspension either
at this week's Plenary or in a future JCG meeting.


19. (C) On the matter of the JCG Chair's letter for the
Ministerial, the Netherlands (Kleinjan) informed the group
that Ulyanov appeared very satirical suggesting that since
"we haven't done much this year, what is there to report?"
Ulyanov said that he would raise the issue with Moscow, but
Kleinjan wasn't convinced of Ulyanov,s sincerity.
Delegations, noted the usefulness of having a letter for the
Ministerial, but recognized the value in waiting the outcome
of this week's HLTF. They agreed to reconsider the letter
once again at the next JCG-T meeting.


20. (U) The next JCG Plenary will take place on Tuesday,
October 21, chaired by Norway. The next JCG-T will be on
October 20 under Icelandic chairmanship.
SCOTT