Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USOSCE235
2008-10-06 11:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

CFE: ANTONOV FAILS TO DIVIDE ALLIES AT VIENNA LUNCH

Tags:  PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9265
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0235/01 2801156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061156Z OCT 08 ZDK
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5950
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0059
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0602
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1157
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1097
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000235 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: CFE: ANTONOV FAILS TO DIVIDE ALLIES AT VIENNA LUNCH

Classified By: CHARGE KYLE SCOTT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000235

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: CFE: ANTONOV FAILS TO DIVIDE ALLIES AT VIENNA LUNCH

Classified By: CHARGE KYLE SCOTT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)


1. (C) Summary. The Russian chief arms control delegate,
Mikhail Ulyanov, hosted a lunch on October 2 in honor of the
head of the Russian MFA arms control and disarmament
division, Anatoliy Antonov. The lunch was billed as an
effort to put forward Russian views on the current state of
arms control in Europe, but it was clearly aimed to drive
wedges between the U.S. and the other invited allies,
including the PermReps from Germany, Italy, France and the
UK. If that was the aim, it failed, as Antonov's appeals to
allies for opportunities to hear the Russian view "anywhere,
anytime" were met with statements of satisfaction with the
U.S. lead in bilateral talks between NATO and Russia, and
clear pressures on Russia to find some way to return to
elements of the CFE regime. Antonov replied that he saw no
compelling reason for Russia to reconsider its suspension of
CFE, although it did not intend to withdraw from the Treaty
entirely. At the same time, Antonov warned that a decision
to give MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would likely cause Russia
to reconsider arms control in Europe, and that under these
circumstances he "would see no place for CFE." End Summary.

PARTICIPANTS
--------------


2. (SBU) Hosts: Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Mikhail
Ulyanov, Anatoliy Antonov, MoD rep, and local Russian arms
control delegate

Others:
UK OSCE PermRep Ian Cliff
French OSCE PermRep Eric Lebedel
Italian OSCE PermRep Francesco Bascone
German OSCE PermRep Heiner Horsten
U.S. Charge Kyle Scott

Antonov: We're Wasting Time Not Talking
--------------


3. (C) Antonov kicked off the lunch noting that the situation
for arms control discussions was not good. He made a point
of expressing effusive praise for his American counterpart in
recent talks, A/S Fried, but argued that "creative" American

proposals that were originally tabled in 2007 have been
watered down and walked back steadily by allies and
Georgia/Moldova ever since. Antonov described the status of
negotiations by the end of his July 29 meeting with A/S Fried
on the Parallel Actions Package, first proposed to the
Russians at the "2 plus 2" bilaterals in Moscow in October
2007, as "very close" on Moldova, but conceded that
subsequent events in Georgia meant that this issue was
probably not ripe for progress at this time. In both cases,
he insisted that his mandate was to deal with the arms
control aspects of the problems; he was not authorized to
seek a resolution to the frozen conflicts themselves. Thus,
Antonov claimed, the major remaining sticking point in the
Moldova discussions dealt with the size and nature of a
possible civilian peacekeeping mission as part of a peace
settlement-) something he is not able to deal with.


4. (C) Antonov, describing the essence of his phone
conversation with A/S Fried in September in which the U.S.
side said it would not be able to meet as planned due to
events in Georgia, declared "We are wasting time not

USOSCE 00000235 002 OF 003


talking," adding that he is open to consultations, anywhere,
with anyone. He vowed that "we should not sacrifice
disarmament and non-proliferation to current political
problems."

The Baluyevskiy Flank Proposal
--------------


5. (C) Antonov also said Moscow wants more discussion of
flanks. He reminded the group of the Baluyevskiy proposal,
which is only an informal proposal at this time. Even so,
Russia was waiting for some sort of reaction to the idea.
When the Italian PermRep suggested that he saw little
difference between "eliminating the flank zone for Russia"
entirely and the Baluyevskiy proposal of making all of
Russian territory included in the flank restrictions, Antonov
and Ulyanov argued that there was a major difference: under
the Baluyevskiy idea, constraints would remain on Russian
transfers of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) from east of the
Urals into "European Russia," and Russia would also not be
allowed to exchange quotas with countries like Belarus or,
perhaps, Armenia.


6. (C) Antonov urged allies to look at the proposal seriously
and react. He repeated that it was still an informal
proposal because if it were put forward officially it might
elicit an immediate rejection by NATO allies and could cause
Russia difficulty in adjusting it if there were a serious
dialogue on the basis of the proposal.

What Is to Be Done?
--------------


7. (C) Antonov urged Allies to re-engage with Russia on arms
control rather than allow talks to continue to languish. He
recalled A/S Fried's call for more intensive dialogue back in
July, and also welcomed the idea of including other partners
in the dialogue on key issues. Rather than conclude that
there is nothing to be done in the current situation, Antonov
was ready to meet anywhere and with anyone to explain Russian
positions and seek new paths forward. While he highly
respected the Fried-Antonov channel, he said he worried that
allies were not getting the full picture or did not fully
understand the steps they were taking. How else could he
explain the "shocking" unified NATO position at Bucharest, in
which NATO had expanded its demands and created new linkages
that went beyond the Fried-Antonov talks.


8. (C) Charge Scott noted that Antonov's portrayal of the key
proposals made during the July 29 Fried-Antonov talks was
basically accurate, but the U.S. did not share his
interpretation of "how close matters had been." Scott also
stressed that A/S Fried has called on Russia to find some way
to resume at least partial implementation of the CFE Treaty
as a confidence-building measure, although Antonov had
indicated this would not be possible. It was Russia, Scott
said, which had already put a stake in the heart of CFE, and
then followed the July 29 Fried-Antonov meeting with an
invasion of a sovereign country in violation of CFE basic
principles. The burden for next steps was not with the NATO
allies but with Russia, Scott concluded.


9. (C) The Italian PermRep said his country favored a
continuation of dialogue. Russia had shocked the NATO allies
into new action by suspending CFE; he also urged Moscow to

USOSCE 00000235 003 OF 003


now give serious consideration to revising its suspension
decision. He noted that the Treaty's ceiling limits were not
as important at this time as the CSBMs embodied in the
frequent military-to-military exchanges, the inspections, and
the annual exchange of information. Antonov was no
persuaded, noting that he saw no reason or action which would
persuade the Russian Federation to go back to the
"anachronistic" CFE Treaty.


10. (C) UK PermRep Cliff supported the Italian view of the
importance of the Treaty's measures as CSBMs, as well as the
proposal to return to the Treaty. He argued that he could
not imagine "moving to step B as long as one party is in
breach of Step A." He also said the UK was very comfortable
with having "one country" negotiate for all the allies on the
complex issues at play and felt it was being kept fully
informed of the state of negotiations by the U.S. If there
were any questions, he noted that the Russian delegation here
in Vienna is also working hard to ensure that Russia's
positions are well-known. Cliff wondered aloud, however, how
the Parallel Actions Plan could now survive, since the
question of Gudauta was such an essential part of the
process. With the Russian invasion of Georgia and the
decision to permanently base Russian forces at Gudauta, it is
obvious there could be no progress in the near-term.


11. (C) His message of comfort with the U.S.-led process was
shared by Germany, although German PermRep Horsten also noted
that Germany wants to keep channels of communication open.
While progress "out in the open" was unlikely, he suggested
that there may be "forward movement elsewhere if we keep
channels open for dialogue." At this, Antonov asked if any
initiatives such as the Paris Conference or the Bad Saarow
gathering were being considered, but no one else indicated an
interest in a repeat of those efforts.


12. (C) Ulyanov suggested the Fried-Antonov talks should be
complemented by meetings at the expert level in Vienna. No
other participant voiced any enthusiasm for this approach

Possible Complete Withdrawal from CFE if MAP Moves Ahead
-------------- --------------


13. (C) French PermRep Lebedel asked if the first anniversary
of Russia's suspension of CFE might lead to further Russian
steps, especially in light of the NATO and OSCE Ministerials
that precede it. Antonov said that Moscow has no special
plans to withdraw, if that is what the question was about.
That said, he declared, a MAP decision for Ukraine and
Georgia remains a red line for Moscow and Russia would have
to reconsider arms control in Europe if that takes place.
Under such circumstances, Antonov said he would "see no place
for CFE."
SCOTT