FSC:RUSSIA BLASTS U.S. ON CSBM POLICY, U.S. AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000233

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC:RUSSIA BLASTS U.S. ON CSBM POLICY, U.S. AND
OTHERS ON ARMING GEORGIA

REF: A. USOSCE 212

B. EMAIL WRIGHT-MEYER FROM OCTOBER 1


1. (SBU) Summary. Russia criticized what it called the
"depraved" U.S. policy of linking all Russian initiatives in
the FSC to "unrelated and secondary issues" such as Georgia
and CFE. The U.S. position is "unreasonable," and
"demonstrates that Washington has lost all interest in arms
control." The U.S. restated standing guidance on new
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM)s, noting
that recent Russian actions have raised serious concerns over
Russia's commitment to collective security.


2. (SBU) In security dialogue, Russia blamed the August
conflict in Georgia on participating States (pS) that
contributed to systematic and unprecedented program of
militarization by the "Saakhashvili regime." Russia cited
data from OSCE and CFE exchanges to support its accusations,
and concluded by introducing a Russia proposal that would ban
all pS from providing military assistance to Georgia. The
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Turkey, Lithuania, Georgia
and the U.S. rebutted Russian allegations with strong
interventions in support of Georgia's legitimate right to
develop its armed forces. Many, including the U.S.,
questioned Russia's own culpability in arming separatist
militias.

3. (SBU) In support of the Finnish Chairmanship,s emphasis
on SALW, three NGO,s -- Small Arms Survey, Saferworld, and
GRIP gave presentations to the FSC. In Working Group (WG) B,
the Estonian-Lithuanian proposal on a cyber security workshop
gained wide support. The decision to hold the next AIAM on
3-4 March 2009 was agreed in WGA. See para 14 for guidance
request. End Summary.

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Russia Blasts U.S. for "Depraved Policy on CSBMs
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4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) launched into the U.S. during the 1
October FSC plenary, criticizing Washington's alleged policy
to block all Russian proposals on new CSBMs. Referring to
the U.S. comments in the 10 September FSC (Ref A),Ulyanov
characterized as "depraved" Washington's linking of Russia's
initiatives such as its proposed Rapid Reaction Force CSBM to
CFE and Georgia. Ulyanov asserted that the U.S. dispenses
its support for Russian initiatives like gifts, while it
attempts to punish what it claims is poor behavior by
opposing proposals. He criticized the U.S. for failing to
engage productively on any of three key FSC topics that
emerged from the Madrid Ministerial--Code of Conduct, SALW
and CSBMs. Ulyanov characterized the U.S. approach as
"totally unreasonable." He concluded that the U.S. had lost
all interest in arms control, a serious development that
will, he claimed, result in a significant imbalance in the
work of the OSCE.


5. (SBU) In refuting Ulyanov's rants, the U.S. (Neighbour)
underscored Washington's commitment to all existing CSBMs,
which, when adhered to by all Participating States (pS),
remain relevant to the security of Europe. Neighbour
reminded pS that the U.S. assesses all new CSBMs against
three criteria--significance, balance and verifiability. He
pointed out, however, that recent Russian actions have raised

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serious concerns over Russia's commitment to collective
security. He characterized Russia's apparent belief that its
partners should simply ignore its miscalculations as
unrealistic. The U.S., having great concern over Russia's
recent decisions, is considering its position, including
proposals for new CSBMs in the FSC.

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The Arming of Georgia
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6. (SBU) Ulyanov provided a multimedia presentation
(distributed under FSC.DEL/154/08) purporting to prove that,
with the assistance of several pS, Georgia had long engaged
in an unprecedented military build up with the goal of
forcibly bringing South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under
Tbilisi's control. In support of his allegations, Ulyanov
cited readily available data from various OSCE and CFE
information exchanges illustrating increases in Georgia's
defense budget and equipment holdings. The U.S. found itself
among the long list of pS (Ukraine, the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, Israel, Turkey and France) that
had provided arms and assistance to Georgia since 2002.
Ulyanov concluded that pS which provided military assistance
to Georgia in spite of repeated Russian warnings had
contravened OSCE principles enshrined in documents on
conventional arms transfers and SALW, and shared
responsibility for the August conflict.

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Russia Calls for Ban on Military Assistance
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7. (SBU) Ulyanov said that while one could understand the
errors of the past, it was clear that pS must act now in
response to voices calling for a reaming of Georgia. He
appealed to all pS to heed Russia's warning and to adherer to
principles to which all pS have committed. Ulyanov announced
the distribution of a Russian proposal (FSC.DEL/155/08,
Proposal for a Draft FSC Decision on Supplies of Conventional
Arms and Small Arms and Light Weapons to Georgia,) which
calls on pS to refrain from providing any military assistance
to Georgia. Despite Ulyanov's call for its proposal to be
placed directly on the 15 October plenary agenda, the Chair
(Kangaste, Finland) announced that Russia's proposal will be
introduced in one of the working groups on 15 October in
accordance with standard FSC rules and procedures.

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Rebuttal of Russian Charges
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8. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) responded first, noting that
Russia's presentation was based on data distributed to all pS
in the course of normal OSCE information exchanges. He
called on Russia to be equally transparent about its support
for the separatist regions. Gioradze also countered that
Georgia,s increased military spending came on the wave of
economic prosperity and a seven-fold increase in the
government budget since the Rose Revolution. He added that
over 50 percent of Georgia's military expenditures had gone
to infrastructure and quality of life improvements, salaries
and research and development. Finally, he referred to his

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briefing from the previous week to highlight a long list of
Russian transgressions, and repeated Georgia's call for a
full international investigation to determine "who is right
and who is wrong."


9. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova),Ukraine
(Velchenko),Turkey (Gungen) and Lithuania (Kalibatas)
rebutted Ulyanov's commentary by emphasizing Georgia's right
as a sovereign state to determine its defense needs. They
noted that there was no international restriction on sales of
arms to Georgia, and that all transfers were transparent and
in accordance with all international norms and procedures.
Ukraine's Ambassador Velchenko noted that Ukraine had also
provided military equipment to Russia and could not be
certain Russia had not used Ukrainian equipment against
Georgia. Summing up, Velchenko quipped that if Russia
followed its own logic, Russia should be held accountable for
every conflict in which Russian-made arms are employed.


10. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) expressed full support for the
previous interventions upholding Georgia's legitimate right
to build and develop its armed forces. Turning to Russia's
comments on U.S.-provided training, Neighbour noted that the
U.S. had provided a summary of U.S. military assistance to
Georgia in PC.DEL/763/08. He recalled that the initial U.S.
decision to train Georgian military forces was made in
response to a Georgian request for assistance in combating
Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge, a concern of Russia.
Neighbour explained that follow-on training programs were
designed to prepare Georgia to participate with coalition
forces in Iraq as part of the Global War on Terror. He
emphasized that these programs were fully disclosed in public
documents and were in full compliance with international
agreements and OSCE principles.


11. (SBU) Neighbour then asked whether Russia could claim as
much, noting that by all appearances, Russia had provided
SALW and heavy weapons to separatists. He invited Russia to
explain how such weapons made their way into South Ossetia.
Citing specific provisions of the OSCE documents on
conventional arms transfers and SALW, he invited Russia to
explain why the transfer of weapons to militias in the
breakaway regions would not constitute a contravention of
OSCE principles.

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SALW Round Table
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12. (SBU) In support of the Finnish Chairmanship,s emphasis
on SALW, three NGO,s gave presentations to the FSC. Small
Arms Survey, Saferworld, and GRIP praised the OSCE for its
efforts in writing Best Practice Guides that have wide
applicability and use, while calling for more action in the
areas of transparency in information exchanges, brokering,
stockpile management (including both destruction of surpluses
and improvement of storage practices),marking and tracing,
and greater implementation of existing agreements in general,
and of the UN PoA in particular. The Chairman of the OSCE
Informal Group of Friends of SALW (Schweizer, Germany)
reported on the Group,s recent meeting, noting the
possibility of greater emphasis in the FSC on brokering, end
user certificates, tracing and potential integration of

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elements of SCA and SALW. Presentations for Small Arms
Survey, Safer World and GRIP were distributed under
FSC.NGO/3/08, FSC.NGO/1/08, and FSC.NGO/2 and 4/08
respectively.

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Cyber Security
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13. (SBU) The Estonian-Lithuanian proposal on a Cyber
Security workshop found wide support in WGB. The U.S.
(Meyer) requested two minor clarifying edits (changing
"comprehensive approach" to read, "comprehensive OSCE
approach(" throughout the proposal, and replacing
"counter-measures" with "defensive measures" in the third
point in the draft Annex. Canada (Gosal) suggested
increasing the workshop from two to three days in order to
accommodate more discussion. This proposal found no support.
The draft will remain in the WG while drafters finalize
coordination on dates in March. The Chair expects to move
for a Chairman's Draft Decision at the next WG, October 8.
On the margins, Meyer discussed additional edits (Ref B) with
Estonia (Tiigimae). Tiigimae indicated Estonia could support
changing the emphasis of the first point in the Annex from
"potential threats to cyber security" to "concrete steps to
strengthen cyber security." Tiigimae will issue a Rev.4
before the next WGB. USDel will engage other missions to
rally support for this change.

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AIAM Dates and HOV?
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14. (SBU) WGA agreed on the proposed dates, 3-4 March 2009,
for the next Annual Implementation and Assessment Meeting
(AIAM). FSC.DD/11/08 will be presented to the Plenary next
week for adoption. Discussion will begin soon afterwards on
modalities and agenda, including discussion on whether to
hold a Heads of Verification meeting in conjunction with or
sequentially to the AIAM. Mission requests guidance on
Washington's position on a HOV meeting.
SCOTT