OSCE/FSC: 23 JULY PLENARY: NAVAL CSBMS--ALLIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000194

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR DOWLEY
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2009
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: 23 JULY PLENARY: NAVAL CSBMS--ALLIES
VERY SKEPTICAL, STOP SHORT OF OUTRIGHT "NO" TO RUSSIA

REF: STATE 73257

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: The final meeting of the OSCE,s Forum for
Security Cooperation (FSC) of the winter/spring session
included a presentation by Ireland on the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (Dublin agreement). Russia Also led a
discussion under Security Dialogue on its Naval CSBM
proposal. Britain, Canada, Italy, Greece, France, Germany,
Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden joined the U.S. in
expressing various levels of skepticism over Russia's
proposal. None supported it. Citing CFE suspension, Canada
also rejected it outright.


2. (U) Reports were also provided by the Chef de File for the
FSC contribution to the ASRC and by Chairperson of the
Informal Group of Friends on SALW on the recent biennial
meeting of states on the UN program of action on SALW. The
Chair (Estonia) ended the session by reporting on the work
accomplished during Estonia's chairmanship. End summary.

Russia Promotes Its Naval CSBM Proposal
--------------


3. (U) Russia (Ulyanov) provided a presentation on Russia's
Naval CSBM proposal, first distributed 4 July under
FSC.DEL/120/08. Ulyanov stressed that he wanted to engage in
a dialogue and welcomed all comments, "both pro and con." He
began by attempting to address some of the criticism he
expected to receive. He pointed out that the proposal is
meant to improve transparency on a significant military
capability not currently covered by a CSBM.


4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that pS always ask the question, "Does
Russia perceive a threat that this CSBM would address?" In
response, he said that each pS has the right to raise issues
not only concerning their own security, but also issues
affecting pan-European security. The Russian proposal would
add to, not detract from, transparency and security.


5. (SBU) Ulyanov referenced Ukraine's work in the Black Sea
sub-regional CSBM as a positive, if limited example. On the
pan-European level, we have only one minor reference to naval
forces in the Global Exchange of Military Information, and
that refers to aggregate naval force levels.


6. (SBU) Ulyanov then said the in Russia's view the following
are Pros:

-- Since three out of four sides of Europe are surrounded by
seas, it is only logical to cover those areas with CSBMs.
The proposal only applies to the seas bordering pS.

-- Russia's proposals are modest and similar to those
employed for land forces.

-- The proposal does not impact current law of the sea
because they only apply to planned exercises.


7. (SBU) He then proceeded to describe what Russia viewed as
legitimate but surmountable concerns.

-- There are those who say the measure lacks reciprocity as
not all pS have naval assets, we can dismiss this but could,

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hypothetically, overcome this issue under Chapter X, with an
agreement only among those pS with navies. However, we would
rather not segregate sP into groups. Not all pS have
territory in Europe or have armed forces, but all pS enjoy
the same rights and privileges.

-- Some pS require verifiability. Russia believes that
National technical Means is sufficient for this, however, if
other want verifiable measures, we can discuss it.

-- Some argue that there will be an added cost. Transparency
has a price, and in this case it is minimal and related to
visits. But if the added cost is beyond resources of some
pS, we can look at non-standard solutions, such as requiring
the requesting pS to bear the cost of the visit.

-- The measure has been tabled twice before--once in the days
of the cold war and once in the late 90's--and it was
rejected twice. We think this measure might be a good test
to see if the old block mentality as changed.

Skepticism of Russian Proposal
--------------


8. (SBU) In all, twelve pS, including the U.S., responded to
Russia's presentation. Most noted that their comments were
preliminary, and half remarked that Russia's proposal would
require some time to thoroughly study. None suggested a time
when they would finish their "study." The majority
registered skepticism, noting that nothing had changed in the
proposal since the last time it was rejected in 1999, and
that even Russia conceded in the proposal that there is no
current security concern posed by naval forces in the zone of
application. Others touched on more technical aspects such
as the definition of the "zone of application," "combat
vessels"...etc but most offered to at least consider the
proposal. Canada (Gosal) was particularly critical, stating
that more should be done to ensure current CSBMs are being
fully implemented before considering new CSBMs. Canada was
also the only pS to publicly link its pessimism to Russia's
suspension of its obligations under CFE.


9. (SBU) Without rejecting Russia's proposal outright, the
U.S. (Neighbour) pointed out that the U.S. sees no added
value in discussing the proposal because there is no
recognized security concern to be addressed with a CSBM.
Naval CSBMs were discussed and dismissed before in the OSCE,
including long after the Cold War ended. Neighbour concluded
that in the absence of a concern to address, the U.S. did not
see how it would be productive to discuss measures which do
not provide any collective benefit to OSCE states.


10. (SBU) To counter Russia's point that transparency is
important even in the absence of a specific security concern,
the UK (Gare) said that the UK is in favor of transparency,
but it should shed light on areas where others are concerned.
She emphasized the difference between the need for CSBMs on
land which is sovereign territory, and at sea, i.e.,
international waters where anyone can go at will. Gare
added, "There is no transparency with the Forum regarding the
layout of my dining room furniture, but there is also no
concern. I would be happy to invite the Forum to my home to
let them view the layout of my dining room furniture if there
was a concern. Transparency for transparency's sake is not a
security benefit." (Note: Shortly after the FSC meeting the
Spanish Mission sent an official Note Verbale to the United

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Kingdom requesting permission to inspect Gare's dining room
for "furniture of mass destruction." End note.)


11. (SBU) Additional interventions expressing various degrees
of skepticism were made by Italy, Greece, France, Germany,
Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden. To Ulyanov's
discomfort, Italy pointed out that Russia,s proposal would
cover Allied ships operating in the Persian Gulf. Finland
and Sweden both observed that the tonnage threshold was set
so high and their naval ships today are so small, that that
not a single one of their naval units would be covered by the
CSBM.

Deaf to Hints, Russia Ignores Skepticism
--------------


12. (C) Ignoring the trend, Ulyanov responded by thanking all
pS for the constructive comments and noted with pleasure that
the proposal had generated a great deal of discussion. He
confirmed that the current proposal had not changed from
previous proposals, explaining that Russia understands that
there is no consensus on Naval CSBMs, and therefore a bolder
proposal would be pointless. He also noted that Russia had
no special reason for tabling this proposal now other than to
respond in part to the Madrid Ministerial decision requesting
that the FSC review CSBMs.


13. (SBU) Ulyanov pushed back against Canada's comments,
stating that there is no reason that the FSC can not improve
the implementation of existing CSBMs while working on new
measures, and flatly rejected any connection between CFE and
Russia's current naval proposal. Russia concluded by stating
that the Russian proposal is not a "take it or leave it
proposal" and that Russia is open to discussion on any aspect
of the proposal. Ulyanov said Russia looked forward to
further discussion, and said he would like to see another
discussion on the plenary, followed by more technical
discussions in the appropriate Working Groups.


14. (C) Afterwards, Ulyanov privately told USDel (Neighbour)
that irrespective of skepticism expressed, he was pleased
with the discussion, that there had been a lot of engagement.
When USDel reminded him that nobody had favored, and that
while the U.S. had not slammed the door shut, the view of the
U.S. and many was that discussing a naval CSBM would not be
productive, Ulyanov said that was not a problem. He then
launched into an attack on Canada and questioned Ottawa's
right to have a voice in the OSCE.


15. (C) Note: In a separate conversation on the margins with
USDel (Meyer) the incoming FSC Chair, (Finland, Kangaste)
opined that Russia may have tabled a decision they know will
fail in order to build a case for submitting a negative
report on CSBMs to Ministers in Helsinki, with the objective
of reporting that the CSBM regime is broken. Both Finland and
Germany (in previous discussions) opined on a link between
Russia's recent actions in the FSC regarding CSBMs and
Medvedev's Pan-European Security initiative. End Note.

Cluster Munitions Convention
--------------


16. (U) Lieutenant Colonel J. Burke from Ireland's Defense
Forces also provided the Security Dialogue with a
presentation on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which
was agreed in Dublin on May 30, 2008. LTC Burke touched on

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the basic characteristics of cluster munitions, concerns
countries have with their use, the evolution of discussions
from small group of like-minded states in 2002 to a consensus
on the convention by 111 states in Dublin this year. While
pleased with the results from Dublin, Burke noted that 90
percent of current stockpiles of these munitions are held by
non States Parties to the convention. (LTC Burke's briefing
has been distributed as FSC.DEL/134.08)


17. (U) France (Simonet) reported on its parallel work on the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva,
the goal of which is to bring in other states that are not
signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. France,
and the United Kingdom (Gare) asked Burke to comment on
efforts to bring others into the fold. Spain recounted its
recent decision to emplace a unilateral ban on the
production, trade and use of such munitions.


18. (U) The U.S. (Neighbour) reported on recent change to
U.S. Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions.
Drawing from Reftel, Neighbour explained the new U.S. policy
objectives, timelines and efforts toward clearing areas
affected by such munitions.


19. (SBU) Following the U.S. statement, Burke noted that
while the U.S. policy does not go as far as the convention,
it does represent a welcome significant step. To reinforce
this point, Burke noted that unexploded munitions which were
rendered safe through a self-destruct or self-disarming
mechanism did not count toward the U.S. one percent
acceptable failure rate, giving the U.S. an even more
rigorous standard. He also said the new U.S. standard was to
be measured in a natural environment, not under ideal
laboratory conditions. Burke's largely helpful comments
reinforced the U.S. position.

Reports and other Business
--------------


20. (U) Following Security Dialogue, the Chef de File for the
FSC, (Finland, Kangaste) presented a brief report on the FSC
contribution to the 2008 ASRC. The Chairperson for the
Informal Group of friends on SALW (Belarus, Pavlov) followed
with a report on the Third Biennial Meeting of States on the
2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit trade in SALW in All its Aspects. The reports
have been issued under FSC.DEL/139/08, and SEC.GAL/125/08
respectively.


21. (U) Under any other business, Ireland reported it had
endorsed the statement of principles to the Global Initiative
to Combat the Spread of Nuclear terrorism and had notified
the Russian and U.S. embassies in Dublin. Colonel Huub
Vellinghs, Dutch Royal Army, introduced himself as the new
Senior Military Representative to the Netherlands. The U.S.
(Neighbour) introduced two new U.S. del members, Joe Porto
and Colonel J.C. Crownover, and noted that Jon Claus would
soon return to Washington.


22. (U) The Chair wrapped up with a comprehensive report on
the work accomplished during Estonia's Chairmanship
(FSC.DEL/140/08),followed by a brief introduction of the
Finish agenda for fall, which was released under
(FSC.INF/11/08). The next FSC plenary and Working Group
meetings will take place on 10 September.


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23. (U) USDel will note septel unfinished FSC working group
and other items that will be taken up again in September.
SCOTT