ASRC WORKING SESSION II, JULY 2: ARMS CONTROL AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000171

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR DOWLEY
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: ASRC WORKING SESSION II, JULY 2: ARMS CONTROL AND
CSBMS


1. (SBU) Summary: The keynote speakers at the 2008 Annual
Security Review Conference (ASRC) arms control and CSBMs
working session expressed concern over the CFE impasse caused
by Russia's suspension. Alyson Bailes said the underlying
cause was a "globalization of the security agendas" of the
expanded NATO and EU. Adam Kobieracki agreed the security
environment had changed, and said any follow-on to CFE,
although based on it, would need to reflect the changed
conditions. Russia blamed NATO "expansion" and U.S.-backed
European missile defense for destroying OSCE unity on arms
control. Russia said the U.S. must stop talking and
immediately ratify Adapted CFE if it wants to preserve the
European security regime. The U.S. insisted that Russia
needs to again implement its CFE obligations and fulfill
other conditions before ratification will occur. Germany,
Turkey, and the Czech Republic offered varying degrees of
support for the U.S. position. Russia concluded by
announcing a new proposal for naval confidence- and
security-building measures that parallel existing provisions
in the Vienna Document 1999. End summary.

A Return to Europe
--------------


2. (SBU) Alyson Bailes, a retired British diplomat and
formerly the director of SIPRI, identified the enlargement of
NATO and the EU as among the underlying causes of present
impasses in conventional arms control. Bailes said this
enlargement can be viewed as a "strategic act" that appears
to threaten "some" states, instead of an expression of the
transformation and desire of individual countries. She also
said the "globalization of the security agendas" of NATO and
the EU, including "military actions on a huge scale outside
the OSCE area" contributed to the weakening of the OSCE arms
control acquis. Alluding to the U.S., she said a "philosophy
of action" had replaced risk-limitation and self-restraint.
A return to Europe, in order to "guard the rear," might be
the means to restore unity to the OSCE region and would
include the "rescue" or preservation of OSCE arms control and
confidence-and-stability building.

CFE II
--------------


3. (SBU) Adam Kobieracki, of the Polish MFA emphasizing he
was speaking personally, said the CFE regime was an integral
part of the OSCE arms control framework but was near
collapse. Its information exchange and verification
mechanisms were not functioning and the Adapted Treaty was
still not in force. Although there was no immediate military
threat to European security, except perhaps on its "southern
flank," the CFE crises had serious political implications.
Kobieracki said "principles of modern arms control,"
reflecting changes in the security environment since the
negotiation of the original treaty, should shape any
follow-on agreement to the existing CFE regime. This would
include: arms control measures based on the CFE Treaty but
more cooperative than restrictive; provisions for
predictability, transparency, and greater flexibility; more
confidence-building measures than previously; and limits not
based on the "out-dated" numerical balance of forces between
groups of states.

Russia: Outlook Bleak, But We're Ready to Talk
-------------- -

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4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said the outlook for arms control
was far from positive as he rhetorically rambled using old
statements to prove his point. NATO enlargement had
destroyed the balance and CFE no longer had any connection to
reality. The Adapted Treaty had not entered into force
because it has been artificially connected to other issues.
For some states, arms control was less important than the
withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Transnistria
or the "expulsion of Russian military pensioners" from
Georgia. Some states cavalierly disregard the OSCE principle
that states should not purchase their security as the
expenses of other states. Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence was "legal nihilism" and has set a dangerous
precedent that will be used by separatist movements
everywhere. Existing multilateral forums, like the FSC, were
not equal to these challenges.


5. (SBU) Despite these problems, Russia was ready and open to
serious dialogue in Vienna to escape the impasse over CFE and
other arms control issues, as evidenced by its recent
proposal for a new European security treaty. Russia has
tried to solve these problems in the JCG and NATO-Russia
Council Arms Control Experts, but other states have removed
themselves from arms control. Solutions will require the
joint efforts of all involved states, as occurred several
years ago with the negotiation of the Adaptation Agreement.
Russia was ready to work with its "main partner," the United
States, and others.

Allies Defend CFE
--------------


6. (SBU) Germany (Foreign Office Deputy Political Director
Pohl) called for a return to full implementation of CFE,
followed quickly by entry into force of the Adapted Treaty.
Although acknowledging that the security landscape in the
OSCE had changed since CFE was negotiated and holding were
far below thresholds, the Treaty still had application in a
time of asymmetric threats. Further changes to the CFE
regime, beyond those found in the Adapted Treaty, were not
necessarily good, although some of the ideas raised at the
October 2007 FSC meeting on the future of arms control should
be explored.


7. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Pocuch),echoing Kobieracki,
said that doing nothing about the impasse over CFE was not an
option, and described Russia's suspension as a catalyst for
the continued erosion of European security.


8. (SBU) Turkey said its position was reflected in the
Bucharest NATO-Russia Council statement. Entry into force of
the Adapted CFE would allow a review of all provisions.
Turkey was never insensitive to the security concerns of its
partners and expected they would show the same consideration
to Turkey's needs. Russia's suspension undermined the
benefits of the CFE regime for regional and sub-regional
security.

Belarus: New Mechanisms, Like Naval CSBMs
--------------


9. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) agreed that the FSC should be used
for intensive dialogue: it had been created for this. As the
OSCE's political-military instruments were not working

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efficiently, they need to be updated to reflect changing
military organization, doctrine, and technology. Pavlov
recommended considering the additional measures, including
naval CSBMs, contained in the non-consensual annex to the
1994 Lisbon Document.


10. (SBU) Switzerland said participating States need to
continue to implement the OSCE principles and norms. The
FSC, as Russia had said, was the forum to discuss
implementation and new measures like those raised in the
Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the special FSC
meeting in 2007 on the future of arms control. Continued
efforts at outreach and awareness-raising for the Code of
Conduct were also important, e.g., the Code seminar for OSCE
Partners in Almaty planned for September.


11. (SBU) Armenia (Tabibian) in his initial intervention
called for all participating States that have agreed to arms
control agreements to live up to their obligations and not
unilaterally refrain from fulfillment of distasteful
commitments and obligations. He noted that doing so creates
mistrust and instability with neighbors.

U.S. Urges Russia to Resume CFE Implementation
-------------- -


12. (SBU) The U.S. (DASD Daniel Fata) said if the OSCE wants
to build on the CFE, then it needs a CFE in force. Russia
needs to return to compliance and fulfill those conditions
prerequisite to the ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the
other States Parties. Fata said two large questions still
remain. First, how do the States Parties get to the stage
where changes to the Adapted Treaty would be possible?
Second, how would it be possible to negotiate a treaty that
all 30 States Parties would benefit from?


13. (SBU) Fata said the portrayal of Russia as the aggrieved
party because of NATO enlargement and missile defense may be
good political theater, but not good policy. Russia's
security is enhanced by stable, secure neighbors. No state
was building up its forces because of Russia or had declared
Russia an enemy.

Even Russia Will Benefit from Missile Defense
--------------


14. (SBU) On missile defense, Fata said the NATO communique
at Bucharest made clear that the system proposed offered all
Europe a response to the common threat of long-range
ballistic missiles. Russia itself had privately acknowledged
concern over this threat. The U.S. and its European partners
want relations with Russia based on mutual security.

Russia Wants Actions, Not Words
--------------


15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said if the U.S. wants to save CFE
it needs to start ratification immediately. Russia was ready
to work with its partners in Vienna, but it needs actions,
not just words.

Russia Proposes Naval CSBMs
--------------


16. (SBU) Ulyanov added that the OSCE needs to improve the

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European CSBM regime. Naval forces have traditionally been
outside that regime but Russia was now distributing a
food-for-thought paper that proposed naval CSBMS
(FSC.DEL/120/08). Ulyanov said there was nothing outrageous
in them and suggested discussion of them should begin at the
July 23 FSC under the rubric of "CSBMs in the maritime field:
arguments for and against."


17. (SBU) The naval CSBMs would include: an information
exchange on personnel and major equipment of naval forces;
prior notification and observation of naval activities;
annual exchange of naval plans; a list of naval contacts.
Much of the language of these provisions is borrowed from the
corresponding sections in the Vienna Document 1999. As in
the Vienna Document, the area of application is defined only
as "the waters adjacent to the region of the OSCE."


18. (U) A complete readout of the ASRC, including the other
working sessions and the address by SACEUR General John
Craddock, will be provided septel.
FINLEY