CFE: MAY 20 JCG PLENARY: RUSSIA WANTS GUARANTEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000135

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR DOWLEY
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: CFE: MAY 20 JCG PLENARY: RUSSIA WANTS GUARANTEES
ON NAC STATEMENT

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: At the May 20 JCG Plenary, Russia
dissected the 28 March NAC Statement on CFE in a futile
attempt to draw Allies into interpreting and discussing the
details of the text. Russia complained that the NAC
statement had few specifics on ratification of A/CFE,
accession, the definition of "substantial combat forces,"
and equipment ceilings and offered Russia no guarantees
in return for its compliance. Russia wanted detailed
discussion on the specifics of the NAC statement and the
parallel actions package in the JCG. Turkey and Germany
reminded Russia that the NAC statement was a high level
political offer by NATO members. Belarus opposed discussion
of the definition of "substantial combat forces" only by
NATO and Russia but instead wanted the discussion in the
JCG where it was a participant. Russia planned to bring
up for discussion at the next JCG meeting the NATO 1998
Statement on CFE, asking NATO States Parties to reaffirm it,
in particular the term "substantial combat forces."


2. (C) At the JCG-T plus 4, Turkey briefed Allies on its
CFE consultations with Russian DFM Kislyak, including
recent Russian public statements for expanding the "flank"
area to include all of Russia (within the AoA). Germany
wanted to engage with Russia on the 28 March NAC Statement,
but Allies concluded that it would be best to avoid too
detailed a discussion. Allies agreed to continue with the
normal JCG meeting schedule, but could cancel the meetings
for practical reasons. Washington see paragraphs 10, and

12. End Summary.

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PLENARY: GUARANTEES AND PROMISES
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3. (SBU) At the May 20 JCG (Joint Consultative Group)
under the Chairmanship of Iceland, Russian representative
(Ulyanov) informed Allies that Russia sees positive aspects
of the 28 March NAC Statement on CFE, but also believes it
is imbalanced and too vague with not enough detail.
Ulyanov commented that the statement was an "actions for
promises" offer with no guarantees that Russia would get
anything in return for its compliance. Ulyanov detailed
four specific concerns:

-NATO is only offering to "move forward" towards
ratification while Russia is required to take steps with
respect to Georgia and Moldova; what does "move forward"
mean? How long will it take? How soon can countries
complete ratification? When will countries deposit their
instrument of ratification? Is there going to be
provisional application if there is a delay in ratification?

-NATO only promised to discuss accession of the
Baltics and Slovenia. There is no guarantee of mutual
agreement. An agreement on this could be difficult due to
probably differing views on territorial ceilings and the
flank region.

-There is no guarantee that the term "substantial
combat forces" will be defined. The NAC statement only
stipulates that NATO and Russia will develop a definition.

-What does "changes to the level of equipment
ceilings" mean? Is it a reduction or an increase? What
do the changes consist of? What timeframe?


4. (SBU) Ulyanov scoffed at the idea that Russia would
lift its "suspension" in return for such vague promises in
the NAC statement. He declared that the JCG needed to
discuss the details of the NAC statement in order to
provide for guarantees that would enable the parallel
actions package to be agreed to "in the right time." He
then accused the forum of not being willing to tackle the core

issue to enable the Treaty to overcome the current crisis.
Additionally, Ulyanov questioned whether Estonia intended to
increase its holdings of TLE and mentioned that one State
Party (unnamed) in November indicated that it wanted to
depart from the intent of the NATO December 1998 statement.



5. (SBU) Germany (Richter) responded by reminding Russia
that the 28 March NAC Statement and the Bucharest Summit
Declaration of 3 April came from the highest political
level. NATO's commitments are similar to that of the
Istanbul commitments. Although the timeline of actions
still needed to be harmonized, the NAC statement is
"promises for promises." To counter each of Ulyanov's
complaints, Richter opined that NATO States Parties'
political intention is to ratify and adhere to A/CFE
following signature of the parallel actions package, that
the Baltics and Slovenia have promised to accede to A/CFE
would consult with the Allies and Russia. Richter
suggested a discussion in the JCG of Treaty terms, to
include permanent stationing, headroom, ceilings, etc., and
offered to provide a historical analysis of the term
"substantial combat forces" in the JCG (Note: Richter raised
this issue in the JCG-T plus 4. USDEL and others cautioned
Richter to limit discussion of this topic to Allies
only. End Note). Richter also commented that though it
is not specifically stated in the NAC text on equipment
ceilings, reduction is implied. It is the only realistic
interpretation in light of equipment level trends and the
current European security situation.


6. (SBU) Ulyanov stated that he was delighted at the
Russia - Germany "professional" dialogue, but that
Richter's statement was from a national perspective and
wondered what NATO's positions were on Russia's concerns.
Ulyanov then complained that the parallel actions package
required Russia to take specific actions on Georgia and
Moldova while no details on the Baltics' accession or
"substantial combat forces." Russia needed "clarity,"
"clean-cut commitments spelled out."

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PLENARY: WE'RE LITTLE BUT DON'T FORGET US!
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7. (SBU) Luxembourg (Pilot) voiced its support for
Germany's intervention. With reference to the NAC text on
equipment ceilings, Pilot confessed that although
Luxembourg currently had no TLE on its territory, in the
near future, it will increase its national holding of ACVs
to its current limit (40) so that its peacekeeping forces
could participate better in exercises and operations.
Pilot hoped that this would not cause concern for Russia.


8. (SBU) In predictable fashion, Belarus (Pavlov)
commented that he was happy to see "structured dialogue"
emerging in the forum and echoed Russia's call for
specifics to be discussed in the JCG. Pavlov said that
negotiations of the parallel actions package should not
prevent detailed work on its aspects in the JCG. To buttress
his point that details should be worked on in the JCG, Pavlov
objected to the NAC text that called for only NATO and
Russia to develop a definition for the term "substantial
combat forces." He complained that his country too had
interests in the definition.


9. (SBU) Turkey (Begec) stated that NATO's position is in
the March 28 NAC Statement and that "equal ambiguity" is
written in the parallel action package for both sides.
Begec pointed out that NATO equipment ceilings trend has
been downward and that the Alliance's position on the term
"substantial combat forces" has not changed since NATO
statements made in December 1996, March 1997, and most
recently in December 1998. Begec challenged Russia to make a
commitment at the political level similar to that of the
NAC commitment by issuing a text at an equal level.



10. (SBU) Ulyanov informed all that at the next JCG
meeting he would bring up for discussion the NATO 1998
Statement on CFE, asking NATO States Parties to reaffirm
it, in particular, the term "substantial combat forces."


11. (SBU) Under AOB, the Chair raised the issue of
postponing the June 24 JCG (HLTF date) and cancellation of
the July 1 JCG (ASRC date). On the margins, the next chair
(Negro, Italy) asked USDEL about holding a JCG on Friday,
June 27 to avoid cancelling two JCG meetings in a row.


12. (C) Comment: In the JCG Ulyanov mentioned that there
were different versions of the parallel actions package,
telling some that Russia has a different version. Other
delegations had also expressed similar concerns. It would
be helpful for USDEL to provide the latest version to our
Allies. End Comment.

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JCG-T plus 4: THE INTERPRETER
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13. (C) Slovakia chaired the JCG-T plus 4 on May 19.
Turkey (Begec) provided a summary of its CFE consultations
with Russian DFM Kislyak. Begec informed Allies that
Russia had reiterated to Turkey its desire to discuss the
definition of "substantial combat forces," accession terms
for the Baltic countries and Slovenia, and reductions
in the ceilings of NATO States Parties. In addition Russia
also wanted to eliminate its limitations in the flanks.
Russia told Turkey that it wanted all of Russia to be
a "flank country." Begec told Allies that Turkey remained
firm with Russia by reiterating Allies position as detailed
in the 28 March NAC Statement on CFE.


14. (C) Germany (Richter) raised the issue of Russian
General Balyuevskiy's recent public statements on expanding
the "flank" area to all of Russia territory within the
AoA. Turkey noted that Balyuevskiy said the same to Turkey
while in Ankara. Richter mused about the consequences of
such an action: lack of potential reinforcement over a
Basic Temporary Deployment and the need to negotiate with
other "flank" States Parties for upward movement of
ceilings.


15. (C) In anticipation of Russia's discussion of the
March 28 NAC Statement in the JCG, Richter suggested that
Allies be prepared to discuss details of the statement -
interpreting what each NATO promised action/step meant -
to convince Russia that the NAC statement was a serious
offer. He stated that "CFE is at stake; our job is to keep
it alive." The UK commented that there was no need to
convince Russia that the Allied offer is genuine since it
had came from top political leaders. Richter suggested
discussion of commonly used Treaty terms such as headroom,
temporary deployment, stationing, and ceilings, and offered
to brief the JCG on the origin of the term "substantial
combat forces" in order to increase the participants'
understanding of the concept. Turkey, the UK, Romania,
and the U.S. opposed Germany's suggestion, stating that
such discussion should stay in the JCG-T only to ensure all
agreed to the definitions. After much discussion, there
was general agreement to avoid any detailed discussion and
to voice general support for the March 28 NAC statement.
Greece (Sourani) reminded Allies that Greece had no
intention of lowering its A/CFE Territorial Ceiling and
that if any Ally stated otherwise in the JCG, Greece would
have to object.


16. (C) Allies agreed to continue with the JCG meetings
as scheduled in order not to send the "wrong" political
signal to Russia. That said, all agreed that the meetings
could be canceled for practical reasons, e.g., the June 24
JCG meeting due to the HLTF in Brussels).


17. (SBU) The next JCG-T plus 4 will be on May 26. The
next JCG will be on May 27 under Italian Chairmanship.
FINLEY