Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USOSCE132
2008-05-16 15:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

GEORGIA/OSCE/RUSSIA: COMPREHENSIVE OSCE TOOLBOX TO

Tags:  PREL OSCE GG RU 
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1662
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000132 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL OSCE GG RU
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/OSCE/RUSSIA: COMPREHENSIVE OSCE TOOLBOX TO
ENCOURAGE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ABKHAZIA

REF: A. TBILISI 802 (EXDIS)

B. MOSCOW 1298

USOSCE 00000132 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Julie Finley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000132

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL OSCE GG RU
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/OSCE/RUSSIA: COMPREHENSIVE OSCE TOOLBOX TO
ENCOURAGE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ABKHAZIA

REF: A. TBILISI 802 (EXDIS)

B. MOSCOW 1298

USOSCE 00000132 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Julie Finley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: With the increase in tensions between
Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia, we understand that
Washington is developing new proposals aimed at stabilizing
the situation and eventually resolve the conflict (See Ref
A). In this context, we believe that the OSCE has a number
of tools with security, economic, and human dimension
elements that could contribute to the overall effort of
encouraging peace and reconciliation between Russia and
Georgia in Abkhazia. This cable provides for Washington
policy makers a menu of ideas for OSCE contributions to this
effort. If Washington concurs with any of the suggestions
below, USOSCE is prepared to begin to discuss these issues in
greater detail with interested delegations in an effort to
seek positive measures toward a settlement while maintaining
firm political pressure on Russia to prevent further
infringements on Georgia's sovereignty. End Summary.

OSCE as Mediator
--------------


2. (C) The OSCE could assist U.S. efforts to help reduce
tensions between Georgia and Russia in Abkhazia by setting up
a political mechanism that serves as mediator to help
decrease tensions and resolve the conflict. This could be
either a number of countries grouped around a donor effort to
fund the GoG's peace proposals, eminent persons selected by
the Chairman in Office, or a high visibility personality
working under OSCE auspices to facilitate peace talks. It
could work alongside or instead of the Friends of the
Secretary General. Russia may well oppose such ideas, but
the Chairmanship has the authority to sponsor such a process
and include key participating States (pS) with or without
Russian concurrence.

Tools to Keep Pressure on Russia and Help Defuse Tensions
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The OSCE forum is ideal for keeping the pressure on
Russia to prevent further escalation. Permanent Council (PC)
and Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) briefings have

already been used to inform pS of facts on the ground
regarding the August missile incident or the more recent
downing of the Georgian UAV. We should continue to bring our
concerns before such public forums, including by briefings
from military experts who reviewed the Georgian UAV and radar
data, or reports from UNOMIG on troop buildups. To the
extent that we can use unclassified sources or declassify
other intelligence-derived products, we can help debunk
Russian disinformation, and ratchet up the pressure on Russia
by letting them know that the world is watching closely.


4. (SBU) In addition, OSCE procedures allow for several
measures that could be used for transparency,
confidence-building, and conflict prevention. These include:

-- Extraordinary Exchange of Information under procedures
adopted by the FSC in 1993. Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia
could agree to provide current information on forces and
their locations in writing or in the form of briefings to the
FSC. (Note: This cannot be compelled, but a Georgian offer
would require Russia to refuse to reciprocate.)

-- Use the 1999 Vienna Document to Request:

a) Consultation and Cooperation Regarding Unusual Military
Activities. Georgia can trigger this mechanism by a request
for an explanation of such activities. Reply to the request
is to be made within 48 hours. Both the request and the
reply are sent over the OSCE network with copies to all pS.
It can be followed up by a call for a meeting chaired by the
CiO.

b) Voluntary Hosting of Visits: A State whose military
activities concern one or more other pS may invite those pS
and others to visit(s) in an effort to help dispel the
concerns. Georgia could show its openness by offering to
host a visit to the Kodori Valley or Patriot Camp to prove
that they are not engaged in a destabilizing buildup of
forces, and challenge Russia to do the same at its facilities
in Abkhazia inside and outside the UNOMIG zone.

USOSCE 00000132 002.2 OF 003



c) Inspections and Evaluations: Unfortunately, the 2008
quota for inspections and evaluations for Georgian territory
has already been exhausted.

d) Chapter X - Regional Measures: States may undertake
additional "voluntary" measures above and beyond their normal
commitments under the Vienna Document. Georgia could, for
instance, arrange a non-quota multinational inspection, led
by another pS, of its territory. Such an inspection could
include portions of Abkhazia under Georgian control (e.g.,
Kodori Valley) and could highlight Georgia's (and if they
agreed Russia's and Abkhazia's) willingness to be
transparent.

-- (C) PC to authorize mission monitoring officers (MMOs)
for Abkhazia, in a mandate expansion: The OSCE already has
MMOs in South Ossetia. These would be organized along the
same lines, concentrating foremost on territory not within
UNOMIG's zone of operations.

-- (C) Encourage and support joint police training and
community policing in the entire region, including a civilian
police force in the Gali district as called for in the
Ministerial Statement of 2005. OSCE experience in Kosovo
with Community Policing is directly relevant.

-- (C) NATO Radar: Use the NATO Caucus at the OSCE to raise
the sense of urgency to allow NATO activation of the ASDE
radar, linking Georgia's defense radar to NATO in real time.

-- (C) Aerial Monitoring of the Zone of Conflict (or a
greater area) by a third party, with results (either
real-time or delayed) available to both parties. This
previously has been proposed by UNOMIG, and would be a
regional parallel to the basic premises of the Open Skies
agreement overseen by FSC delegates at the OSCE.

Economic Tools
--------------


5. (C) The OSCE could also resort to economic levers,
specifically by working to:

-- (C) Establish an Economic Reconstruction Program for
Abkhazia modeled on the ERP in South Ossetia. The CiO could
convene a donors conference before the next OSCE Ministerial,
just as Belgium did for South Ossetia in 2006.

-- (C) Urge OSCE support for the Georgia plan for a
free-trade zone for Abkhazia and support access to foreign
markets for Abkhaz goods shipped through Tbilisi/Georgia
proper (similar to the EUBAM effort on Moldova's borders).

Human Dimension Tools
--------------


7. (C) Focus greater attention on the plight of refugees
from Abkhazia: One of the key OSCE mandates elsewhere
(especially in the Balkans) is reporting on and facilitating
return and resettlement of refugees. IDPs and refugees from
Abkhazia are part of the UNOMIG mandate, so this would be a
coordinated undertaking. This would require a change in
mandate for the OSCE Mission in Georgia, with Russian
acquiescence.

-- (C) Open the long-discussed joint UN/OSCE human rights
office in Gali district, as called for in the Ministerial
Statement of 2005.

Public Diplomacy Tools Through the OSCE
--------------


8. (C) CiO visit: A visit by Finnish FM and OSCE Chairman in
Office (CiO) Stubb to the area could help mobilize European
public opinion to the problems. Itinerary could include a
high-visibility tour of one or more newsworthy sites (e.g.,
border control area, Georgian radar facility, UNOMIG
checkpoint),with press and TV invited to accompany. Press
conference at the end of visit to present impressions and
findings. Follow-up visit(s) should also incorporate
opportunities for press to accompany and report on group
activity. The U.S. could support CiO efforts by bilateral PD
efforts, including wider distribution in the public domain of
U.S. Permanent Council and FSC statements, op eds in national

USOSCE 00000132 003.2 OF 003


and European media outlets by leading USG figures,
publication of a State Department Fact Sheet with updated
information about the history of the Abkhaz conflict and
Georgia's relations with Russia, and even a tour for
journalists -- patterned after NATO journalist tours -- of
Georgia, including entry into Abkhazi
a, and briefings in Vienna by OSCE officials on
conflict-resolution efforts and by U.S. and allies' experts
on the existing technical evidence from recent
tension-generating military incidents.
FINLEY