RAPID REACTION FORCES PROPOSALS: THE STATE OF PLAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000112

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN,
SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR DOWLEY
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: RAPID REACTION FORCES PROPOSALS: THE STATE OF PLAY

USOSCE 00000112 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: Hugh M. Neighbour, Chief Arms Control Delegate, for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russia on April 22 seemed to accept that the
Quad Allies need a few more weeks to come up with a concrete
response to its proposal for an information exchange on rapid
reaction forces. Meanwhile, Britain, France, and Germany
insist that the U.S justify its contention that Germany's
draft counter-proposal, not yet shown outside the Quad, would
duplicate provisions in the adapted CFE Treaty. They are
also openly concerned whether the U.S. can deliver on finding
a "new approach" that would capture information on Russian
forces not presently available to Allies. They suspect a
U.S. counter-proposal would actually constitute a new measure
that would contradict HLTF guidance. The other Quad members
are ready to answer Russia with the current German
counter-proposal, and want a favorable U.S. response or
U.S.-proposed changes to their plan soon. End summary.

Meeting with Russia - Successful Stall for Time
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2. (C) Quad Allies met with Belarus and Russia April 22 to
stall for more time to respond to the latter's rapid reaction
forces (RRF) information exchange proposal, first tabled in
the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in December

2006. Allies said they were still consulting with each other
and, while they could not make any promises, expected to have
something concrete to propose to Russia soon. Russia
regretted there was still nothing concrete from the Quad,
having repeatedly put off the discussion because the Allies
were not ready. Nonetheless, Russia indicated it could wait
a few more weeks. The meeting went as well as it could, at
least for the Quad, particularly given that the four allies
did not promise anything other than to continue working the
issue.

Skepticism of U.S. "New Approach"
--------------


3. (C) Meanwhile, Germany, France, and Britain in turn are
waiting for the U.S. to deliver on its hint of a "new
approach" to the RRF proposal, which we understand might, for
starters, attempt to capture information about peace keeping
forces (PKF). Although the U.S. has not produced a written
counter-proposal, it has told the other Quad members that
Washington is considering a number of ideas that would make
the RRF proposal more reciprocal and balanced.


4. (C) Allies reacted with skepticism to this news and
irritation at what they perceive as a U.S. failure to focus
on an important issue, commenting that the U.S. may now have
reversed itself by considering a "new CSBM" that could be
contrary to HLTF guidance and the Allies' long-standing
position in Vienna. After long discussion, however,
Britain's delegation here agrees that incorporating PKF would
not violate HLTF guidance and, once it sees a U.S. proposal,
expects to be willing to try to convince Germany of this.


5. (C) Germany, in particular, does not see a good reason to
include PKF in a measure addressing RRF, and wants to know
how Allies could deliver information on PKF operating outside
of the mandate of NATO or EU, as in the case of the UN in
Cyprus. Germany still believes its draft counter-proposal,
meant to replace the original Russian proposal, would give
NATO and the EU more information on CSTO activities than vice
versa. (Note: Rev. 2, the current version, emailed to
VCI/CCA April 17, reflects substantial British, but not U.S.,
input. End note.)

Allied Insistence on Offense as Good Defense
--------------

USOSCE 00000112 002.3 OF 002




6. (C) Britain, France, and Germany see an Allied
counter-proposal, such as that developed by Germany, as the
only way to rebut the Russian proposal. They do not want the
FSC to be working from Russia's paper, but seek to replace it
with a Quad counterproposal. Simply saying no will not work
any more, they insist. They are also concerned that such a
refusal could risk Russia's acquiescence in other areas of
security cooperation at the OSCE, such as Afghanistan.

Allies Reject U.S. View that German Paper Duplicates A/CFE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The other three Quad members are clearly impatient
with what they see as U.S. indecision, and decline to accept
the U.S. contention that operative paragraphs (OP) 1 and 3 of
the German non-paper (Rev. 2, the current version),would
duplicate parts of the adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE). Operative
paragraph 1 provides for provision of information on RRF
deployments; OP 3 encourages provision of additional
information voluntarily through the Vienna Document. The
other Quad members are insistent that the German
counter-proposal will have no impact if it is reduced to
nothing more than the FSC chair "seeking" briefings on RRF
per OP 2, as the U.S. has recommended. They also say it
would not have the desired impact if it only covers PKO and
does not address RRF.


8. (C) In the absence of details the support U.S. concerns,
the other Quad members are now unified on the position that
the information exchange described in the German paper would
not duplicate A/CFE. They explain that the proposal would
not require exact numbers of treaty limited equipment but
would instead permit "aggregate" quantities of troops and
major weapons and equipment.


9. (C) The Quad allies also argue that any information
provided would not be in a formalized CFE or A/CFE-style
notification, but in any format of the provider's choosing,
including briefings. All three allies argue that the
information to be provided is readily available, often widely
known shortly after a deployment, not classified, and would
not jeopardize the success of an RRF mission. If the U.S.
cannot accept OP 1, then the three others expect an
alternative proposal from us.
SCOTT