NATO: FEBRUARY 28TH HLTF AND NRC (ACE) MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000088

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: NATO: FEBRUARY 28TH HLTF AND NRC (ACE) MEETINGS

REF: STATE 19164 HLTF GUIDANCE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard G. Olson, reasons 1.4 (b
and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: At the February 28 HLTF, Allies agreed on
key themes for the NATO-Russia Council Arms Control Experts
(NRC (ACE)) meeting that followed the HLTF, and more
generally for engaging Russia in the run-up to Bucharest.
All who spoke stressed the need for a continued unified
message; reiterated support for the parallel actions package
as the way to achieve a solution with Russia; and argued for
staying the course on the Allies, phased approach, to
include continued NATO implementation, for responding to
Russia,s "suspension" of CFE implementation. The German rep
raised with the U.S., UK, and French reps prior to the HLTF
plenary the idea of eliciting a firm response on CFE from
Russia by "tabling" and then making public the parallel
actions package prior to Bucharest. At U.S. behest, the
German rep tempered Germany,s idea for the broader HLTF
audience by joining the French rep to press for a more active
NATO CFE Public Diplomacy strategy in the run-up to
Bucharest.


2. (C) Allies rallied in the NRC (ACE) to deliver a
consistent and clear message to Russia underscoring Allies,
commitment to the Treaty but noting that NATO could not
continue to implement the Treaty indefinitely without
Russia,s participation in its implementation; urging Russia
to reconsider its suspension of implementation; and stressing
that the parallel actions package was a creative and generous
offer that addressed Russia,s stated concerns about the
Treaty. The Russian rep inveighed against alleged lack of
"concessions" to Russia in the parallel actions package;
delivered Russia,s own readout of the February 19
U.S.-Russia bilateral meeting; and suggested that the best we
could achieve by Bucharest would be agreement that all
parties support CFE and want to continue working intensively
to resolve differences. END SUMMARY.

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Contacts and Bilaterals
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3. (C) The U.S. HLTF Representative, State/VCI DAS Karin L.
Look, briefed Allies on the February 19 U.S.-Russia bilateral
discussions between Assistant Secretary Fried and MFA Deputy
Minister, Director Antonov and provided a summary of the key
points. She emphasized that the U.S. had used the
discussions not only to underscore the negative impact of
Russia's "suspension" on prospects for progress on resolving
the current CFE impasse, but also to stress that the current
anomalous situation, with Allies implementing, while Russia
is not, cannot be sustained indefinitely.


4. (C) France (Grand) briefed Allies on a bilateral meeting
at the Political Director level (Kislyak-Araud) during which
Russia raised the importance of eliminating the flank regime
for Russia, and criticism of the parallel actions plan as
including unreasonable requirements for Russia related to
Georgia and Moldova and alleged U.S. walk-backs on those
issues, from the position advanced in October, and
displeasure with the progress/pace of the bilateral process.
Grand said the French team retorted that Soviet-style
negotiations ("what,s mine is mine, but what,s yours is
negotiable") were not conducive to progress and that Russia
needs to approach discussions more proactively, without
preconditions. But he also noted considerable pessimism
about Russian intentions in the wake of the meeting. (NOTE:
When reporting on this meeting in closed company during the
quad, Grand said Kislyak supported the idea of meeting in a
small format (quad plus one),perhaps in Vienna. END NOTE)


5. (C) The German rep (Biontino) reported on Russia,s
refusal of Germany,s February 13 CFE inspection
notification. He said that Russian interlocutors who
received the demarche that accompanied the notification
(Anton Mazur) responded by rehashing Russia,s six concerns
about CFE, and highlighting the importance of abolition of
the flank for Russia, the need for a collective ceiling on
NATO set at 1989/90 ceilings, and the idea of a Conference of
States Parties (SP) to discuss further adapting the Treaty
while demonstrating flexibility on provisional application in
the interim. (NOTE: During the quad meeting prior to the
HLTF, Germany and France reported on joint working level
talks set up by France and Germany with the MFA (Anton Mazur)
in Moscow which included the points above, and inter alia, a
"threat" that CFE would not survive NATO enlargement, an
assessment that Russia had little room for maneuver and would
not likely change its position post-elections, and a
preference for a changed format from bilateral to quad plus
one--a point which France, in particular, advocated and
Germany reinforced with repeated calls for inclusiveness.
END NOTE)


6. (C) The UK (Ford) informed the HLTF of a bilateral
meeting he had in Vienna with Russian Chief Arms Control Rep
Ulyanov, who continued to push for breaking up the elements
of the package, floated the notion of starting with a "blank
sheet" for a new Treaty, and insisted "suspension" and
Russia,s continued refusal of inspections could not be
reversed as it was written into law. The UK pointed out to
Ulyanov that the "blank sheet" idea is pure fantasy and
inquired, rhetorically, why it was seemingly impossible for
Russia to say yes to generous Allied proposals. Turkey (Gun)
mentioned a Minister-level February 22 meeting in Moscow
which only addressed CFE briefly with the repetition of known
positions.

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HLTF Discusses the Way Ahead
--------------

7. (C) Allies agreed on a unified message both for the NRC
(ACE) and for engaging Russia on CFE issues in the run up to
Bucharest. The key elements of the message echoed themes
from U.S.-Russia bilateral exchanges:
-- Russia,s suspension has made it harder, not easier, to
solve the current CFE impasse and jeopardized a valuable
regime that is at the core of the NATO-Russia relationship;
-- the current anomalous implementation situation, where NATO
implements CFE and Russia does not, cannot last forever, and
NATO would need to review its position after Bucharest;
-- NATO,s proposals for ending the impasse on ratification
of A/CFE and the fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments are
reasonable, creative, and generous, and Russia should respond
in kind;
-- the parallel actions plan supported by all Allies is a
package: Allies won,t work on individual elements of it,
like provisional application or a definition of substantial
combat forces, until the entire text is agreed.

8. (C) While the NRC (ACE) discussion betrayed no hint of
Alliance disagreement on substance or approach, in the HLTF
(and more so, in bilateral meetings and the Quad see below),
there was considerable diversity of view on how NATO can most
productively use the run-up to the Bucharest NATO Summit to
make progress on CFE and frame NATO,s public diplomacy
position for the longer term. The French highlighted, and
all other Allies agreed, that if CFE should fall apart, it
must be clear that Russia, not NATO, is responsible. To that
end, France and Germany support a pro-active public message
to Russia prior to the Summit, outlining the generous
proposals the U.S. has advanced on behalf of NATO in the
parallel actions plan, and calling upon Russia to respond.
-- All Allies who spoke in the HLTF were attracted to the
idea of a more active NATO PD strategy on CFE, but several,
including the U.S., highlighted the need to get the details
right in any message intended to engage Russia prior to the
Summit. The UK offered that Allies should ramp up the PD
message by setting out what Allies have done using a hopeful
tone rather than forcing a make or break situation. Turkey
understood, and supported, the notion of a press kit or paper
that made the Allied position and efforts more
understandable, but was not keen on expressing the specifics
of Allied positions more broadly. Turkey called for the NATO
International Staff (I.S.) to develop a paper on this
concept, and the Chair (Deputy Assistance Secretary General
Simmons) noted, in summarizing the meeting, that the I.S.
would assemble a fact sheet outlining the Allied position.
-- The Czech Republic and Romania were supportive of a more
dynamic PD strategy, but were also eager to address how long
Allies would continue to implement the Treaty. Canada
suggested, in thinking beyond Bucharest, that it would be
useful to consider how Allies should signal to Russia that
the current situation is not indefinite and that there are
consequences to "suspension." The U.S. (supported by UK, NL,
NO, TU, FR, Ger) cautioned against creating a crisis or
watershed moment at Bucharest, and reminded all of the need
to demonstrate clear and steady resolve through Bucharest and
then come together to reassess. France concurred that it was
not advisable to set artificial, event-driven deadlines, and
Germany noted no intention to force the schedule, but rather
intensify efforts on three fronts at Bucharest - PD,
diplomatic, and the blame game.
-- France advanced the idea of using the Summit to record a
commitment by NATO and Russia to redouble efforts to get CFE
back on track, but acknowledged that this seemed unlikely,
given differences on core issues. There was a clear
consensus to use the NAC communiqu, at a minimum, to
highlight NATO,s effort to address Russia,s CFE concerns in
a forthcoming and generous way, and call on Moscow to respond
in kind.
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Other issues at HLTF
--------------


9. (C) The U.S. thanked Germany for proceeding with its
February 13 inspection notification and noted the need for
continued attempts to inspect Russia during the new Treaty
year beginning in the latter half of March. Look said the
U.S. would be willing to attempt an inspection in late March
(at the start of the new Treaty year),but said we would
defer to other allies who wanted to take this on. (This
planning question will be settled at the March 7 VCC.) The
Chair indicated that Armenian authorities had indicated they
would welcome the possibility of an Ally attempting an
inspection of Russian forces in Armenia.


10. (C) The I.S. provided a readout of VCC Experts,
Meetings and current working papers, noting Russia,s
unprecedented level of inspection and evaluation activity
under Vienna Document. The Chair commented on the effective
efforts of Allies in the JCG-T to organize a focused dialogue
in the JCG, a sentiment shared by many Allies, and the need
to continue this dialogue as part of the multi-faceted Allied
approach to discussion. Norway and Netherlands raised the
expectation that CSBMs would be addressed during the Annual
Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) in Vienna. Look, as
per guidance, clarified the U.S. position on CSBMs,
emphasizing that the U.S. remains opposed to discussion of
any substantive proposals by Russia.


11. (C) The I.S. Food for Thought Paper on "From Now to
Bucharest - The HLTF and CFE" (HLTF-N(2008)0005-REV1) served
as a framework for discussion in the HLTF. Look noted that
the U.S. had specific comments on the content of the paper
and would raise suggestions, such as deleting the paragraphs
on Ambassador Rogozin,s comments and focusing on President
Putin,s statements, directly with the I.S.


12. (C) Raising NATO,s Profile in the Fields of Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation. Allies agreed
that the CFE text in paragraph 6A reflected HLTF agreed text,
but that the CFE-related conclusions in paragraph 10 needed
additional review and input. (NOTE: These CFE-related
conclusions have been subsequently dropped altogether from
the paper. END NOTE)

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NRC (ACE) - ALLIES UNIFIED AND ON MESSAGE
--------------


13. (C) A total of 16 Allies spoke, some more than once in
the NRC Arms Control Experts (ACE) meeting that followed the
HLTF. The meeting opened with 15 NATO speakers following one
after the other in rapid sequence, all delivering variations
of the same message. Prior to the meeting several Allies
stressed the need to ensure the Russian team had a clear line
for their reporting cable to Moscow, and the NATO speakers
did not mince words: Russia has set back prospects for a CFE
solution with its suspension of Treaty implementation, and
Russia should reverse it; Russian positions on many elements
of the parallel actions plan are unreasonable and
unjustifiable (read: flank, NATO collective ceiling,
Moldova, Georgia); NATO cannot continue to implement CFE
forever if Russia won,t participate; the parallel actions
plan and U.S. efforts have NATO Allies, support and Russia
should be more creative instead of finding ways to complicate
a deal. High Points (in addition to the points just
reported):

-- Turkey observed that it has shown "utmost flexibility" in
the past when Russia demonstrated the need for an increase in
its flank equipment entitlements, and would do so again. But
the idea of abolishing the flank regime for Russia is a
non-starter for Ankara. He added, rather sharply, that
Turkey would welcome Kislyak to Ankara for his many-times
postponed visit, including addressing CFE.

-- France cited the need to think about a positive message at
Bucharest.

-- Germany said that all Russia,s six CFE concerns are
addressed in the parallel action plan, and noted that FM
Steinmeier had publicly underscored CFE,s importance for
European security. He also stressed the importance of
"inclusiveness" in discussion of any CFE solution.

-- Belgium (Comment: who is sometimes outside the mainstream
on CFE. End comment) delivered a ringing endorsement of the
parallel actions plan and then accused Russia of changing its
position and priorities, with the effect of making resolution
harder. He summed up that first, Russia calls for
ratification of the Adapted Treaty. Then Russia says A/CFE
isn,t good enough and has to be changed. Then Russia
suspends implementation of the current Treaty, arguing that
this will help to save it. Suspension will not help save CFE,
but will erode the regime, he said.

-- Italy delivered an unusually strong and well-constructed
message, stressing that Russia,s suspension is not going to
help save CFE, despite Moscow,s claim; it,s going to make
resolution more difficult. Provisional application is a
non-starter in current circumstances. CFE is not unfair to
Russia. We should agree to examine the Treaty after entry
into force to see if it needs updating.

-- Spain and the Czech Republic, normally on opposite ends of
the spectrum regarding Russia, were both uncharacteristically
terse, said the parallel actions package is good and
generous, and warned that the current situation, with Allies
implementing CFE and Russia not, cannot last indefinitely.
Russia should reconsider the suspension decision.

-- Norway lamented that CFE is a pillar of his nation,s
security, and that it would wither away unless we resolved
the issues before us.

-- UK, Romania, Greece, and Lithuania were among those who
most pointedly pushed Russia to think about the future. The
parallel actions plan, with its creative elements on
Istanbul, was a good deal for Russia, they stressed. It was
hard to see what Russia expected to achieve though its
suspension, which could only make hard issues more difficult,
and erode the Treaty,s viability. The Lithuanian said
"there should be no illusions: Russia is making a strategic
choice." The UK asked how Russia intended to proceed.

-- The U.S. NRC (ACE) rep Jennifer Laurendeau, speaking at
the end of the opening tour de table, noted that the U.S. had
recently hosted a Russian CFE team in Washington for another
round of businesslike discussions on the parallel actions
plan, reiterated concerns raised by others about Russia,s
suspension including both its impact on the Treaty and on the
goal of military transparency and mutual cooperation that is
at the core of the NATO-Russia relationship urged the group
to reflect on the way ahead, including what might be achieved
by Bucharest.


14. (C) Several Allies, including Germany, Turkey,
Lithuania, and the U.S. came back more than once when Russia
presented a detailed, but confusing, readout of the February
19 U.S.-Russia bilateral talks and an offer by the Russian
rep, Ambassador Ulyanov that would allegedly lead to
Russia,s resumption of its CFE implementation.

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Russia Responds
--------------


15. (C) Ulyanov,s long, largely predictable response to
Allies, questions and concerns gave no hint that Russia is
hoping to resolve the CFE impasse anytime soon. At its core
was the familiar litany of Russian concerns about CFE,s
"unfairness" to Russia e.g., the flank regime and the fact
that some members of the Eastern Group of States have joined
NATO, the idea that NATO had never taken Russia,s concerns
seriously until they implemented their "suspension", NATO,s
long insistence on fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments,
which, he said, meant in practice that Russia undertook
concrete actions to pave the way to entry into force of the
Adapted CFE Treaty, while NATO "sat back and watched" but did
not move forward on ratification of the Adapted Treaty, the
fact that Russia,s concerns on the flank were held at the
highest political levels and would have to be addressed, and
the idea that Russia,s suspension was a way of calling
attention to these Russian concerns, not a step intended to
destroy the Treaty.


16. (C) At one point in his intervention, the Russian rep
offered that Russia would resume implementation of the CFE
Treaty if NATO would agree to move forward in the NRC (ACE)
on 1) discussion of conditions for accession to A/CFE by new
NATO Allies; 2) a definition of "substantial combat forces;"
3) discussion of lower territorial ceilings for NATO members
in order to "compensate" Russia for NATO enlargement.
Ulyanov also suggested Vienna as the context for a discussion
of "substantial combat forces." Allies didn,t take the
bait: Germany responded immediately that the parallel
actions package had to be dealt with as a whole. The U.S.
stressed the "package" theme also, but observed that the high
level attention NATO Allies have given, and continue to give,
to Russia,s CFE concerns should justify ending the
suspension, if its purpose was to focus discussion on those
concerns. Laurendeau added that at the end of the day Russia
should end its suspension because it wants to preserve the
Treaty and remove obstacles to A/CFE,s ratification by all
30 States Parties.

-- Comment: While it is impossible to say for certain
whether the Russian rep,s "conditions" for ending the
Russian suspension were a serious, instructed proposal,
corridor chat after the meeting suggested that Allies did not
read them that way. Most found it not credible that Ulyanov
might be in a position to offer conditions for ending a
suspension that had been ordered by President Putin. End
comment.


17. (C) Ulyanov,s second surprise was to ask Russian CFE
expert Anton Mazur to provide a read out of the U.S.-Russia
bilateral talks on February 19. Mazur focused on one element
of Ulyanov's mantra: that the parallel actions package
contained no concessions by NATO. He went further, and
suggested that the U.S. had walked back important offers on
some issues since the October 2 plus 2 meeting, while adding
new elements that suggested to Russia that the U.S. was
trying to resolve the frozen conflicts via CFE. Laurendeau
responded to Mazur's long readout only briefly, noting that
all the elements of the package that are now on the table
have been essentially the same, though elaborated, since
October; that whether you call them "concessions" or creative
thinking, the package reflects major movement by NATO and
others, like Georgia and Moldova, on longstanding positions,
including through the offer to move on ratification of
Adapted CFE in parallel with (not in the wake of) Russian
fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments; and agreeing with
Mazur's characterization of the talks as businesslike, though
without progress on the four key issues (flank, collective
ceiling on NATO, Georgia, and Moldova).


18. (C) Russia closed the meeting with a suggestion in
response to queries by the U.S. and others regarding
Russia,s envisioned timeline and outcome on the current CFE
impasse that the most that could be expected on CFE by the
time of Bucharest would be NATO-Russia agreement that we are
committed to CFE and are prepared to continue intensive
dialogue to overcome current misunderstandings.

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Meetings on the Margins
--------------


19. (C) U.S. rep Look and team met on the margins of the
HLTF with the UK, France, and Germany, and the Baltic States.
Look, accompanied by Laurendeau, also held bilaterals with
HODs from Canada, Romania and Turkey. At his invitation,
Look also met Russian rep Ulyanov for dinner; she was
accompanied by Laurendeau and U.S. JCG rep Neighbour.


20. At the key Allies (quad) meeting, Germany and France
proposed ideas for a NATO statement on CFE that would be
issued prior to Bucharest, challenging Moscow publicly to

respond constructively to our CFE proposals at or prior to
the Summit. Germany said that they were under instruction to
raise some variation of these ideas in the full HLTF.
Following consultations with Washington, the U.S. team was
able to steer the proposal, in a more constructive direction.

-- The initial German proposal was to get a formal NATO
imprimatur on the parallel actions plan and make it public,
with the message that NATO has developed reasonable and
generous proposals on all the issues Russia has raised
regarding the CFE Treaty, and call on Russia to respond.

-- The French variant was to develop a short NATO statement
that makes the point that NATO has responded constructively
and creatively to all of Russia's CFE concerns and add some
details such as the headers from the parallel actions package
calling on Russia to respond in a similar spirit.

-- The U.S. demurred with regard to the German proposal.
They said it would not be easy, and maybe impossible, to get
all Allies to agree to every word of the package; it would be
problematic to go public with language on Moldova and
Georgia; and it would probably infuriate Russia to see
negotiating text made public. The UK remarked that the idea
was interesting, but cautioned on the necessity of carefully
weighing whether it would actually increase prospects for
success and of not distracting attention from other Allied
issues for the Summit. Discussion thereafter focused on the
French variant, and the hurdles that would accompany it. The
French stressed that they not only want to draw out a Russian
response, but prepare to ensure that any blame for lack of
progress on CFE or the loss of the regime itself lies firmly
with Russia.

-- COMMENT: While the concept of putting the onus on Russia
for responding constructively on CFE is attractive, the
French-German willingness to challenge Russia so publicly in
the run-up to Bucharest was surprising. The wisdom of such
an approach in the context of overall preparations for the
Summit is not clear. Berlin,s motivations for advancing
such a potentially confrontational proposal are a major
question. If Putin rejects the package, would Berlin and
Paris view this as clearing the way to begin negotiating a
new Treaty? Is the goal simply to advance Steinmeier,s
ostensible emphasis on arms control at the Summit? The
French variant could have merit in establishing a clearer,
more assertive public defense of NATO,s CFE position, but it
would require careful handling to ensure the statement
wouldn't have the effect, if issued prior to the Summit, of
distracting from other issues on the Allied Summit agenda.
It was clear in the meeting that Paris had not thought about
the modalities: France did not have a notion of who would
issue any NATO public statement on CFE, or exactly when. END
COMMENT

-- Also in the Quad, Germany and France alleged that Russia
is keen for a Quad plus 1 (citing a Kislyak-Araud meeting
several weeks ago and working level meetings with Anton Mazur
in Moscow prior to the U.S.-Russia bilateral meeting).
France, especially, is interested in such an event before
Bucharest noting (including privately to Look) that France
"insists" on such an expanded format although they are not
particular to the location. Germany reiterated the need for
inclusiveness in support of France,s position. Look made
clear that Russia has been sending sharply different messages
on this matter to U.S. negotiators.


20. (C) Turkey. U.S. rep Look and Laurendeau met at length
with Turkish HLTF rep Gun to go over the status of the
parallel actions package in the wake of the February 19
U.S.-Russia bilateral meeting, and to invite his thoughts on
options for framing the NATO position that Allies are
prepared to review the operation of the Adapted Treaty after
it enters into force. Gun said that at the end of the day
Ankara could probably live with the minor variation of
NATO,s extraordinary conference proposal on future review of
A/CFE that is contained in the U.S. proposal (which drops "as
appropriate" and swaps hortatory language). He said he did
not think Ankara could live with actually mentioning the five
letter word "flank", specifically in the review context.


21. (C) Romania and Canada. In separate bilateral meetings
with Romanian HLTF Rep Micula and Canadian rep Poupart, Look
and Laurendeau went over in detail the February 19
discussions and discussed the way ahead, including the need
for a firm line on CFE in the context of preparations for the
Bucharest Summit, and a clear message to Russia in the NRC
that its suspension had harmed, not helped, prospects for
resolving CFE.


22. (C) Baltic States. The U.S. team briefly met with HLTF
reps from the Baltic states in order to gauge their reaction
to the February 26 defense planning consultations with the
U.S. European Command and interagency representatives in
Stuttgart, Germany. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each
reported a very positive reaction to U.S. engagement, a sense
that the U.S. views their concerns as legitimate, and high
expectations for continued engagement with EUCOM planners.
Follow on meetings are being finalized for the May timeframe
when a EUCOM team will travel to each capital for bilateral
discussions prior to meeting again on a trilateral basis.


23. (C) DAS Look, joined by Laurendeau and Neighbour,
accepted Amb Ulyanov,s invitation to dinner. Ulyanov,s
harangue, which began before beverages were ordered and
continued non-stop through dessert, repeated many elements of
his NRC (ACE) presentation, minus any suggestion of ending
the Russian suspension. His theme was clear: he wants to be
charged with working out a definition of substantial combat
forces, either in the NRC (ACE) or in the JCG, and he wants
that work to begin now. Asked by DAS Look how work on
individual elements of the package would contribute to
resolving differences concerning the four core issues in the
parallel action plan, Ulyanov essentially (though not very
cleverly) said they would not. He said that in meetings
between Acting U/S Rood and Kislyak in Budapest, Rood had
indicated an openness to work on elements of the parallel
actions package in Vienna. Look countered that her readout
of the Budapest meeting did not mention any such conclusion,
but did note that Kislyak had (inaccurately) accused A/S
Fried of "threatening" consequences after Bucharest if
Russia,s suspension of CFE persisted. (Comment: this was
presumably a much-sifted reference to A/S Fried,s statement
that NATO Allies could not continue indefinitely to implement
CFE while Russia did not, and that they would have to
reassess their position after Bucharest. End comment)
Throughout the discussion over dinner it was made clear that
the Russian reps had been given no sense by Moscow that it
feels any urgency to resolve the current impasse or return to
implementing CFE.

--------------
Next HLTF Meeting
--------------


24. (SBU) Next Meeting. Allies agreed to the I.S. proposal
for the next HLTF meeting to be held on March 27.
NULAND