DAS KRAMER GIVES NATO ALLIES READOUT ON US-RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000078

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER GIVES NATO ALLIES READOUT ON US-RUSSIA
CFE TALKS

Classified By: A/DCM W.S. Reid for reasons 1.4 (b) anbd (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 22, Deputy Assistant Secretary
David Kramer briefed NATO Allies in Brussels on Assistant
Secretary Fried's February 19 meeting with Russian Deputy

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Foreign Minister and Disarmament Director Antonov regarding
the CFE Parallel Actions Package. Kramer reported that the
latest round of bilateral negotiations was constructive and
businesslike, but there was little progress on the four
primary issues ) Georgia, Moldova, the Flank regime, and a
NATO collective ceiling. He said that the U.S. has been
flexible, positive, and forward leaning, but that approach
has not been met with reciprocity from the Russians. Antonov
had proposed to meet with A/S Fried again before Bucharest,
and the sides were working to schedule a session. Kramer
underscored that Russia,s &suspension8 has made it harder
to find solutions on CFE, stressed the importance of unity,
and noted that NATO adherence to the Treaty, without Russian
implementation, is likely not viable over the longer-term.
Allies appreciated the readout. Their questions focused
primarily on the impact of the ongoing CFE negotiations on
the NATO Bucharest Summit. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) At a February 22 meeting of NATO Deputy Permanent
Representatives DAS Kramer briefed Allies on A/S Fried's
February 19 meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and
Disarmament Director Antonov, the first with the Russians
since the OSCE Madrid Ministerial and Russia's December 2007
"suspension" of its CFE implementation. The meeting lasted
over 3 hours. Kramer described the Fried-Antonov channel as
the primary channel for reaching agreement on a package to
end the current CFE impasse, and that both sides agreed to
meet again in March. Kramer's talking points are included in
paragraph 11.

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Negotiations Aimed at Reaching Agreement
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3. (C) Kramer recalled that the overall objective of the
talks with the Russians is a package agreement on CFE that
would lead to Allies, ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty
and Russia,s fulfillment of remaining Istanbul commitments.
The Parallel Actions Package remains on the table and the
U.S. is ready to work to find a way forward on that basis.
Kramer said the U.S. continues to emphasize to the Russians
that these discussions must not seek to rewrite the Adapted
Treaty, e.g., by reopening the flank regime. Commenting on
the extensive discussion on Moldova and Georgia, he noted
that the proposal on the table is as far as the U.S. is
prepared to go. However, the U.S. (and Russia) agreed to
re-look at the text, and the U.S. agreed to discuss the
Georgia text with Tbilisi. He labeled the meeting on
February 19 as constructive, though the Russian position did
not show any forward movement and may have slipped back with
regard to the Istanbul Commitments. He stated to Allies a
number of times that it is very important that engagement
with the Russians continue in a professional, businesslike
fashion. He said that there were a number of "secondary"
issues that seem close to resolution, or likely to be
resolved once the main issues are settled. This was not so
much a sign of Russian flexibility as a reflection of the
character of the issues.

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Russians Caught Off-Guard?
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4. (C) The Russians seemed to be surprised during the
February 19 negotiations, Kramer reported, when the U.S.
stated that Russia,s suspension of its Treaty implementation
on December 12 makes it harder to find solutions on CFE, and
that Allies' adherence to the Treaty may not continue
indefinitely. Kramer felt that the Russians were "caught
off-guard," indicating to him that they may not have fully
thought through the consequences of their actions. Antonov
did mention that Russia had no plans to withdraw from CFE.

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Allies' Questions
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5. (C) Allies focused on the implications of the CFE
negotiations for the NATO Bucharest Summit in April, and
sought DAS Kramer's advice on dealing with President Putin in
Bucharest. The Portuguese went so far as to ask, "What kinds
of bombs could Putin drop in Bucharest?" In response, Kramer
reemphasized that Allies need to continue engaging the
Russians in a constructive and businesslike way. He urged
Allies to stay united and to remain focused on NATO,s
objectives, and proceed on what is in the Alliance,s best
interest. At Bucharest, he said that Allies may have to
"agree to disagree" with the Russians on a number of issues.
Kramer strongly urged "Allies to think about how best to
manage disagreement with Russia during the Summit."


6. (C) Kramer continued by saying he did not expect any
breakthroughs with the Russians before Bucharest on CFE, but
that U/S John Rood is meeting with them in Budapest on
missile defense, and that we expected another bilateral
meeting on CFE in March. He expected that CFE would
inevitably be on the agenda at the NATO-Russia Council
meeting at the Summit. He summarized by saying, "While there
are opportunities to make substantial progress in the
negotiations before the Summit, don't get your hopes up."


7. (C) Kramer said that he hopes President Putin is coming to
the Summit to be constructive and to put some new ideas on
the table, but that he cannot rule out that Putin is coming
to "put on a show" or to "drop a bomb (figuratively)." He
told Allies that one theory purports that Putin is coming to
the Summit to restrict Allies, actions, especially on issues
like offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and
Georgia. The Summit will be one month after Russian
elections and one month before the new President takes office
) Kramer made clear his opinion that no outcome other than
Medvedev winning the Presidency is possible ) and further
opined that Putin is trying to regain the political spotlight
in Russia while Medvedev seems to be trying to catch up. In
response to a question from Italy, Kramer highlighted Russian
cooperation on Afghanistan as a potential deliverable for
Bucharest, as Russia and Allies share many similar concerns.
Perhaps on issues like Missile Defense and the post-START
arrangements Allies could find common ground with Russia, he
speculated.

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Flank Regime
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8. (C) Allies asked several questions probing for signs of
Russian flexibility on the flank regime. Kramer replied that
the Russians have not been totally rational on this issue,
but they have been more than clear: the flank regime would
apply to Allies, not to Russia. Even President Putin has
stated this position, which has served to tie the hands of
the Russian negotiators. Kramer responded to a question from
Spain by saying that de-linking the flank issue from the
overall agreement is not a good approach for Allies to take.
He concluded by saying that if Russia had an issue with the
flank regime, they should not have ratified the Adapted
Treaty.

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Georgia
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9. (C) The Lithuanians asked about the way forward with
Russia regarding Georgia, and said that they could not
foresee any future Russian concessions. DAS Kramer agreed
with their assessment and responded that Georgia had agreed
to move forward with ratification of the Adapted Treaty based
on Russian &documentary transfer8 of the Gudauta base from
Russia to Georgia. Russia will continue to insist on
Georgia,s explicitly granting the Russian forces the right
to use the Gudauta military facility; the Georgians cannot
publicly agree to this for political reasons. Kramer pointed
out that, compared to Akhalkalaki and Batumi, Gudauta is an
insignificant and minor base, and letting it impede a CFE
solution indicates a lack of political will in Moscow to wrap
up the issue. In fact, making progress on Gudauta will
achieve a common goal ) ratification of the Adapted treaty -
and Georgia/Russia relations in general.


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Provisional Application
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10. (C) Asked what language the Russians were willing to
accept on provisional application of the Adapted Treaty,
Kramer said that provisional application was only briefly
touched upon at the February 19 meeting and it is not clear
exactly what language Russia will accept. Antonov repeated
the Russian position that they would like the Adapted Treaty
provisionally applied 12 months after agreement on the
parallel actions plan. A/S Fried countered that for the U.S.
and many Allies, provisional application is impossible before
Parliaments have ratified. While the Russians appeared to
note this point, the discussion did not go further.

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Talking Points
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11. (C) Following are cleared talking points on the meeting
that were shared orally with Allies February 21; DAS Kramer
also drew on these in his comments.

Background: On February 19, Assistant Secretary Fried and
Russian MFA Disarmament Director Antonov conducted the latest
round of bilateral negotiations on the CFE Parallel Actions
Package. Discussion was non-polemical and businesslike, but
there was little progress on the four primary issues )
Georgia, Moldova, the flank regime, and a NATO collective
ceiling.

- A/S Fried and Director Antonov held consultations on the
Parallel Actions Package in Washington, the first since
Russia,s December 2007 &suspension8 of its CFE
implementation. The meeting lasted more than three hours and
covered the full range of CFE issues. The tone was
constructive throughout.

- The Russian team noted ) and we would agree ) that some
of the (secondary) issues on the table seem close to
resolution. We also agreed that more time is needed on other
issues. A/S Fried and Antonov agreed to continue to meet
and, in particular, to meet in March -- i.e., before
Bucharest ) to follow up.

- We,ll provide a more detailed readout at the HLTF. A few
notable points:

- At this meeting there was no movement on four key issues )
Russia,s desire to eliminate the flank regime for Russia
while retaining it for all other flank countries, their push
for a collective ceiling for NATO, and positions on Moldova
and Georgia.

- The Russians mentioned Kosovo several times in the meeting,
particularly with reference to Georgia and Moldova. Regarding
Moldova and Georgia the Russians reiterated their old
position that CFE and the Istanbul commitments are not
related; A/S Fried underscored that Moldova and Georgia had
been part of the package from the beginning, and that those
countries had been creative and helpful. The Russian side
indicated it wanted to continue its current presence in both
countries, essentially without change, but agreed to continue
discussions. We explained that simply continuing the status
quo was not acceptable and that Russia should find a way, as
Moldova and Georgia have offered by supporting our proposal,
to eliminate the obstacles to ratification of Adapted CFE by
all 30 States.

- The U.S. underscored that Russia,s &suspension8 had made
it harder to find solutions on CFE, and for Allies to
consider beginning the ratification process. We noted that
the current anomalous situation, with NATO implementing the
Treaty and Russia not, was not viable over the longer-term.

- In response to U.S. questions about Russian thinking on the
way forward, Antonov dismissed &rumors8 that Russia might
take some further step, like withdrawing from the Treaty.
(Note: Antonov made this comment in response to a question
about the status of Russia,s position, presented at the CFE
Extraordinary Conference in June 2007, that Adapted CFE
should be provisionally applied or in force by the end of

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June 2008.)


12. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this message.
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