Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO58
2008-02-14 12:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

Tags:  MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL 
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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1639
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000058 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA
DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)
STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, JAN 16, 2008

Classified By: DEFAD BRUCE WEINROD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000058

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA
DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENSE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)
STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, JAN 16, 2008

Classified By: DEFAD BRUCE WEINROD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) The Steering Committee for the NATO Senior Defense
Committee on Proliferation (DGP) met at NATO HQ on January
16, 2008 and was jointly chaired by Ms Laura Gross (OSD/GSA)
and Mr. Pawel Durys (MoD Poland).


2. (C) The Steering Committee received a briefing by the
U.S. on plans for providing &deliverables8 to the Heads of
State and Government at the NATO Summit in Bucharest. The
SECGEN,s roadmap for Summit planning contains &21st Century
Challenges8 as one of its focus areas and the DGP has
identified four options that are suitable to be highlighted
under that rubric: an information campaign featuring
pamphlets, video clips or exhibits; a pro forma DGP progress
report via the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP),with
the addition of a detailed matrix tracking progress on
various initiatives; a framework document for a proposed
overarching NATO WMD strategy; and the contribution of
appropriate language to the Summit communiqu. The four
options found general acceptance by the committee. Canada
supported communiqu input but reminded the group of its
continuing questions about a standing maritime interdiction
force. The Chair pointed out that inputs to the communiqu
are best made by nations rather than the NATO staff. In
light of time, it was announced that the food-for-thought
paper will not be put under silence, but that each individual
component will undergo silence procedure.


3. (C) The U.S. then provided an overview briefing on the
framework document for an overarching NATO Policy to Prevent
the Proliferation of WMD and CBRN Defense. The development
of the policy will entail a review of all existing
WMD-related documentation and the identification of new
concepts and policies that would provide a roadmap for

transformation of the Alliance's CBRN defense posture. As
the framework document had only recently been distributed,
comments from the nations were largely informal and general
in nature. France indicated that it had comments to make on
several sections and, in particular, had a preference for the
word &dialog8 rather than coordination. Italy felt that
the civil-military link had been appropriately highlighted at
Riga and should be stressed in all follow-on work. Turkey
provided general support but felt that the notion of outreach
might be exceeding the remit of NATO. It thought that work
with host nations and the EU should be a higher priority.
Several nations voiced concern that the framework document
was ambitious but the committee went on to accept that
comments would be submitted by February 1 with the objective
of having it ready for the Bucharest Summit.


4. (C) The WMD Centre provided an update briefing on the
topic of Improved Cooperation and Coordination on CBRN
Defense. This effort seeks opportunities to invite the NATO
Military Authorities (NMA) and NATO's lead committees to
brief on ongoing progress to improve NATO CBRN defense
capabilities. The next step in this project is an Ad-Hoc
workshop of NATO Bodies to take place on February 26 at NATO
Headquarters. Attendance is expected by national experts and
heads of about ten NATO committees at plenary level. An
agenda will be developed shortly with the aim to foster an
exchange of views on current CBRN work in NATO, discuss the
use of CBRN scenarios and plan a program of regular
consultations. France commented that it wished to look
further at any dialog with civilian bodies and felt that
prior approval would be required before any coordination
could be considered.


5. (C) The WMD Centre introduced the 2007 NAC WMD Seminar
lesson-learned document by reviewing the objectives and the
actual seminar discussion topics, which fell broadly into
three areas: capabilities, exercises and training, and
outreach. Most of the topics have reached general consensus
however several nations chose to speak on the subject of NATO
common funding. The UK offered wording to the effect that
the subject should be &investigated8 and that it be done in
consultation with the NATO Senior Resource Board (SRB).
Greece wished the operant verb to be &explore.8 Italy
wanted the terminology to include &multi-national funding.8
Turkey addressed a number of issues: it did not wish to see

additional bodies created for intelligence sharing, the
existing arrangements were sufficient to accomplish the
outreach goal, it was uneasy with external coordination
referred to in the overarching strategy area, and was clear
that any support to host nations must be based on established
needs and a verified risk. France wanted the area of
civil-military coordination better defined and pointed out
that procedures were already otherwise established. External
coordination should only be considered on a case-by-case
basis with a view to the added value. Work with the EU is to
be done within the remit of the NATO-EU Capability Group.
She pointed out that the review of Intel procedures may be
appropriate but the description in the document is not
specific enough. The Chair requested that nations submit all
of their comments by February 1. The WMD Centre will prepare
a revision thereafter and the document will be placed before
the DGP plenary in late February for approval.


6. (C) Allied Command Operations (ACO) updated the committee
on Alliance CBRN defense capabilities. The Explosive
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Centre of Excellence (CoE) is
located in Slovakia with an establishment of about 100
personnel. They recently conducted a Countering Improvised
Explosive Devices (C-IED) workshop there and now manage a
course at the NATO School in Oberammergau. ACO reminded the
committee that there is no standing Reach-Back capability
other than that provided through national resources when the
Joint Assessment Team (JAT) is activated. Reach-Back is part
of the general intelligence fusion process to be provided by
the NATO facility at JAC Molesworth. Two officers from the
JAT will be assigned to Molesworth to support CBRN Reach-Back
and an experienced CBRN expert from the CBRN CoE in the Czech
Republic will be assigned to SHAPE to develop the management
structure. ACO reported that the new CONOPS now supports the
Reach-Back concept and the full range of tasks outlined in
the Render-Safe concept.


7. (C) The International Military Staff (IMS) provided the
current status of the Multinational Medical Analysis Centre
in Munich. The planning group for the facility recently met
and decided to use the French ASTER system as an architecture
and to prepare a real-world trial, situated in Kosovo, to
make progress on operating details, in line with the ACT
experimentation program. The trial will take place in the
3rd quarter of this year and will set the stage for the
permanent establishment of the facility toward the end of the
year. In response to a question from Turkey, the IMS
explained that the Munich Centre is, in effect, a gap effort,
i.e., it is intended to provided an interim capability for a
few years and is not a formal NATO structure. The concern
about how intelligence is handled at Munich will need to be
worked out but the working principle will be that it is
available to all troop contributing nations and, for the most
part, will not be classified because of the large number of
civilian actors involved.


8. (C) A briefing entitled "Disease Surveillance and CBRN
Defense: Opportunities to Improve Preparedness" was given by
Col Donald Thompson of OSD/GSA. The assessment from the ISAF
Medical Advisor in Afghanistan was that NATO nations maintain
only basic medical reporting systems while deployed and that
interoperable systems were not available. He stressed that
civil-military cooperation is indispensable for a future
system and cited the operational and scientific challenges
that must be overcome. The center-of-gravity in biological
defense is disease surveillance and the long-term solution is
MEDICS. Five recommendations were provided: the quick
involvement of the Multinational Medical Analysis Centre in
Afghanistan to provide reach-back support for disease
surveillance data integration; develop an immunization and
casualty tracking system for ISAF; integrate and cooperate
with other relevant international data sources such as the
World Health Organization (WHO); integrate efforts with
similar processes in U.S. and NATO security oriented agencies
such as the U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program;
integrate with other efforts in civil consequence management,
disaster preparedness and host nation capacity building
projects. Turkey returned to the subject of intelligence
sharing and expressed concern about its status: if it is
unofficial it may not be actionable. The Munich facility

should have a NATO blessing of some sort such as that for
EUROCORPS. In a reply to France, the briefer explained that
his message was not about new initiatives but about
reinforcing existing arrangements that should already be in
place.


9. (C) The committee began its discussion on outreach with
an intervention from the IS section responsible for
supporting the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). The IS
representative explained how the DGP effort fits in to the
NUC work on defense and security sector reform and
characterized the joint DGP workshop with the Ukraine as a
unique contribution. We should find opportunities for their
participation in NATO operations. The Chair shared a letter
from Ukraine containing their view on items of interest for
discussion. The Czech Republic briefed the agenda and
administration arrangements for the workshop which was to
begin later that same day. The workshop objective is to
identify project areas for cooperation with Ukraine that can
then be put on the agenda for another workshop with Ukraine
at plenary level to be held in May. The Chair asked the WMD
Centre to prepare a report of the workshop by February 1 in
time for nations to provide comments at the February DGP
meeting.


10. (C) The second DGP outreach effort is the annual joint
meeting with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),
which will take place on February 27. The focus of the
meeting will be the DGP Host Nation Support paper and the
International Partner's Tabletop Exercise (TTX) to follow in
April. The Host Nation Support paper will be enclosed with
an invitation to EAPC members to be sent out shortly. Some
partner nations will be invited as well.


11. (C) The third outreach item is the TTX which will be
held on April 15th. The scope of this event is much wider
than the EAPC with attendees invited from nations in the
Mediterranean Dialogue Group, the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative and selected contact nations as well. The program
will consist of a general threat and capabilities briefing
followed by some scene-setting video clips featuring a
bio-attack on deployed forces. Nations will then be invited
to brief on how they would deal with the situation and what
capabilities they would employ. The event is expected to
have some public interest and the Public Diplomacy Division
will be asked to prepare public affairs products that can be
used.


12. (C) The Chair informed the committee of a tasking
received from the NATO Senior Political Committee (SPC)
requesting inputs to a document entitled "A Framework for
Further Work on Raising NATO,s Profile in the Field of Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation." She stated that
the DGP will submit a response to the SPC by February 1
citing the DGP work on Maritime Interdiction.


13. (U) The next DGP meeting will be at plenary level on
February 27.
OLSON