Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO48
2008-02-07 18:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT - FEBRUARY 6, 2008

Tags:  NATO PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000048 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT - FEBRUARY 6, 2008

Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000048

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL READOUT - FEBRUARY 6, 2008

Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary from the NAC Meeting:

-- Afghanistan: The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB) is meeting this week in Japan at the Political
Director level. Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
(CMC) General Henault reported on additional Afghan National
Police in Musa Qala, increased efforts by the Opposing
Militant Forces (OMF) to intimidate locals, use improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and information ops, and
reconstruction projects worth USD 14 million. In the
operational brief, Rear Admiral Moreno of the International
Military Staff (IMS) emphasized that winter weather slowed
operational tempo in all areas. LTC De Ferriere of the
Afghanistan Team, Intelligence Division of the IMS, briefed
on the status of OMF and the effect of foreign influences in
OMF.

The UK noted that according to the UNODC opium rapid
assessment survey, opium production in Helmand had
"stabilized." Several nations noted the importance of
improved public messaging and strategic communications in
shoring up the credibility of the Government of Afghanistan
in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. In his parting thoughts to
the North Atlantic Council (NAC),outgoing NATO Senior
Civilian Representative to Afghanistan Dan Everts argued the
"credibility of ISAF in the eyes of Afghans, the region and
the world" was a significant problem.

-- Balkans: The SYG noted development of a NATO media
strategy. SHAPE briefed on a NATO response to possible
contingencies in Kosovo.

-- Africa/AU: The SYG proposed inviting the new African Union
(AU) Chairperson, Gabon Foreign Minister Jean Ping, and the
new Peace and Security Commissioner, Mr. Ramtane Lamara from
Algeria, to brief the Council in the future.

-- Iraq: The SYG reported that the Private Office had
recently received a letter from Iraqi PM al-Maliki on
"Continuing the NATO-Iraq Partnership." In light of the
letter, the SYG said he had invited NATO Training
Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) Commander LTG Dubik to brief the
Council; exact date to be determined.

-- AOB: The Norwegian PermRep complained about the Military

Committee's discussion of the possible impact of the Oslo
Cluster Munitions process on Alliance interoperability absent
a Council tasking. The Executive Working Group (EWG) reached
tentative agreement on the text for the Interim Report on
Missile Defense and the SYG placed the document under a short
silence procedure. (Note: France broke silence on the
document later in the day, resulting in it being sent back to
the EWG for further discussion.)

END SUMMARY.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


USNATO 00000048 002 OF 006



2. (C/NF) The SYG noted the Joint Coordination and Monitoring
Board (JCMB) was meeting during the week of February 4 in
Japan at the Political Director level.


3. (C/NF) Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC)
General Henault stated there were now 200 additional Afghan
National Police in Musa Qala. He also reported on increased
efforts by the Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) to intimidate
locals, to use IEDs and information ops. He said this trend
was likely to continue. Henault said that USD 14 million in
reconstruction was going on in Musa Qala, including
construction of a new mosque, high school, district center
and clinics. At the same time, he noted that reconstruction
was limited by lack of skilled local officials and workers,
problems with roads, electricity, etc.


4. (C/NF) Rear Admiral Moreno of NATO's International
Military Staff provided the operational brief, emphasizing
that winter weather had slowed operational tempo in all
areas. He pointed out that ISAF operations in RC-East had
increased threefold over last winter, keeping the OMF busy
and resulting in a five-month reduction in OMF attacks.


5. (C/NF) LTC De Ferriere of the Afghanistan Team, IMS
Intelligence Division, gave a brief on the status of OMF. He
stated that the OMF's nature had not changed since Februay
2007 -) the date of the last briefing on the sbject. The
three main groups of OMF remain the aliban, HIG, and
Haqanni. There was, however, anincrease in the local
dimensions of these groupsand also in their association with
criminal actiities.


6. (C/NF) De Ferriere stated that there as an increase in
OMF violence in 2007, despite he OMF's losing some 4000
fighters and several imortant leaders. OMF had not been
able to take trritory (such as their stated goal of
Kandahar) nd had lost Musa Qala. According to De Ferriere,
there were an estimated 5,000-20,000 Taliban fighers, about
1,000 Haqanni, and 700-1,000 HIG. He aid that assessments
indicated that while losseswere felt by OMF commanders, OMF
capabilities wee not degraded (e.g. OMF is now willing to
fightlonger battles than in the past).


7. (C/NF) De erriere said that the OMF's weaknesses included
teir use of foreign fighters, their fragile lines o
communication to Pakistan, their lack of heavy weaponry, and
the questionable level of commitment by lower-level fighters.
He said their strengths included their use of information
ops (including attacks on government and foreigners),their
funding from the narcotics trade, their ability to exploit
weaknesses of the GoA, their sanctuaries in Pakistan, their
use of guerilla and asymmetrical tactics, and the increasing
cooperation among the three main groups.


8. (C/NF) De Ferriere said that in 2008 there was likely to
be a continuation of 2007 tempo; an increase in OMF
activities in RC-South; and a focus on attacking ANSF, NGOs,
and foreign civilians. He noted the emergence of a
generation gap among OMF, with younger more aggressive, less
ideological leaders displacing more ideological older figures
(most of whom were educated in Pakistani madrassas) as an
important dynamic worth watching. He said that there was

USNATO 00000048 003 OF 006


evidence of this gap both among fighters and their leadership
(e.g. Bakht Mohammed had challenged Mullah Omar.) He said
the Pakistan factor was important, as there were an estimated
1.5 million students in the Pakistani border region, with
about 10 percent being trained by fundamentalists. There was
also strong evidence of Iranian influence on the OMF in the
west. The other important dynamic he pointed to was the
interest by some OMF figures in a reconciliation.


9. (C/NF) He said that there had been an estimated 45 percent
increase in the number of foreign fighters in OMF from 2006
to 2007. These foreign fighters had brought with them new
tactics, particularly on the use of improvised explosive
devices and heavy weapons. Thirty-one percent were
Pakistanis, with Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks also in
significant numbers.


10. (C/NF) UK PermRep Eldon noted that the recently released
UNODC opium rapid assessment survey had reported a
stabilization of production in Helmand. Eldon also argued
that "We're only in the second or third year of a 20-year
campaign." Several nations noted the importance of improved
public messaging and strategic communications to shore up the
credibility of the Government of Afghanistan in the eyes of
Afghans. CMC Henault noted that the NAC has approved the
Strategic Communications paper and SHAPE was now staffing its
implementation.


11. (C/NF) Outgoing NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR)
to Afghanistan Dan Everts briefed the NAC, saying the
greatest problem NATO faced was the "credibility of ISAF in
the eyes of Afghans, the region and the world." Everts said
that he saw two fights in Afghanistan -- the fight against
the OMF and the fight for stability and security. He said
that local Afghans do not always see the link, often viewing
ISAF troops as foreign occupiers and being suspicious of the
motives of the international community. He said that NATO
needed good messaging to educate Afghans, including local
mullahs and community leaders, about ISAF and the GoA's role.
Everts also commented that reconstruction needs had been
"under resourced" while the military effort had been
"overemphasized." He opined that "the Iraq war has siphoned
off resources needed in Afghanistan." Everts noted that the
Afghan parliament had been "marginalized" by both Karzai's
administration and the international community. He added
that this marginalization was dangerous as there were
powerful figures in parliament harboring anti-western views.


12. (C/NF) Everts strongly argued for better cooperation
within the international community (both between civilian and
military elements, and among the different civilian actors)
and the elements of the international community should stop
"bilateralizing" their relationships with the GoA. The
international community needs to approach Karzai with unified
positions. To this end, NATO's Comprehensive Strategy will
be important. Everts added that he sometimes felt
under-utilized as SCR by the ISAF military leadership and
urged that the SCR be "structurally linked" to the
commander,s group so he can participate in key discussions.
He said that Afghanistan was not a priority at UN HQ,
agreeing with the Turkish PermRep's comment that UNAMA was
leery of associating too closely with ISAF and pointing out

USNATO 00000048 004 OF 006


that one IED strike on UNAMA could cripple UNAMA's work for
months.

--------------
Balkans
--------------


13. (C/NF) The SYG reported on the re-election victory of
Serbian President Tadic and expressed his hope that this
would ensure that good cooperation between the Serbian armed
forces and KFOR will continue. He noted that following the
election the impetus toward the resolution of Kosovo,s
status will intensify and that it was important to reassure
all local and international actors of KFOR,s capability and
commitment. Lastly, the SYG mentioned the development of a
public diplomacy message for Kosovo, noting that NATO now had
themes and a message the Alliance can draw on and which can
be updated as necessary. The CMC informed the Council that
in response to any situations that fall outside the recently
provided NAC guidance, preparations had been made to handle
time-sensitive requests from COMKFOR, JFC Naples, or SHAPE
through the Military Committee.


14. (C/NF) Providing a SHAPE update, General Porter said that
current planning guidance was sufficient and that troops and
plans were ready. He emphasized that during the time period
following a declaration of independence KFOR was planning on
being flexible and responsive in order to respond to
unforeseen events, moving -- if required -- away from fixed
site, static operations. In an attempt to illustrate the
range of complex scenarios that KFOR could face, General
Porter provided several potential scenarios: Serb exodus from
Kosovo; Serbian Ministry of Interior (MUP) uniforms in the
north, with or without additional MUP from Serbia; and, an
infrastructure crisis. He also updated the Council on the
recent joint reaction training and planning between KFOR and
UNMIK. In response to several PermReps' inquiries over
UNMIK's current capability, General Porter said that UNMIK
had no intention of drawing down and would remain at full
strength. He said UNMIK would continue to have a visible
presence in the north in close coordination with KFOR. UNMIK
and the local police would have the lead on most policing
operations, but with KFOR in support. Turkey took a stand on
General Porter's remarks regarding KFOR support to
international organizations, stressing that any support to
such organizations had to be in accordance with agreed NATO
procedures. In response, General Porter said that his
remarks were intended to focus on support for KFOR in
extremis situations and to NGOs supporting potential
humanitarian efforts.


15. (C/NF) Italy reported that its Foreign Minister was in
the process of briefing the Italian Parliament on issues
relating to the status of Kosovo, adding that a public
statement would also be made. The Italian PermRep noted that
Italy had called for the international community's unity and
solidarity during the resolution of the Kosovo status, adding
that NATO enlargement to all three Balkan countries would
help contribute to regional stability. Norway, Slovenia, and
Hungary noted the importance of KFOR's neutrality in media
messages from NATO. Spain, Romania, Slovakia, and Greece
disagreed with some aspects of NATO media messages, saying

USNATO 00000048 005 OF 006


that the newly developed strategy had elements regarding
future security structures and new tasks that were not in
line with what Foreign Ministers agreed last December. Spain
also requested that the Council receive a briefing from NATO
military authorities on the new tasks for NATO. The SYG
responded that while he noted their objections, the strategy
was not an agreed document and that it was based on the
communiqu.

--------------
Africa - Support to the AU
--------------


16. (C/NF) The SYG proposed inviting the new African Union
(AU) Chairperson, Gabon Foreign Minister Jean Ping, and the
new Peace and Security Commissioner, Mr. Ramtane Lamara from
Algeria, to brief the Council in the future. There was no
objection. Both men were chosen for their positions at the
February 2 AU summit in Addis Ababa.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


17. (C/NF) The SYG reported that the Private Office had
received, and circulated to Allies, a letter from Iraqi PM
al-Maliki that included a request for continued NATO
engagement in Iraq. He added that in order to facilitate
discussion of the issues raised in the letter, he had invited
NTM-I Commander LTG Dubik to brief the Council. CMC Henault
noted that SHAPE, as part of the NTM-I Periodic Mission
Review, had been tasked with outlining new training
requirements for NTM-I and that the requests made in the
Maliki letter would be incorporated into the SHAPE tasking.
CMC Henault promised that the SHAPE input would be provided
by the end of February.

---
AOB
---


18. (C/NF) The Norwegian PermRep said that the NATO Military
Committee (MC) had begun an internal discussion on the
possible impact on Alliance interoperability of the Oslo
Cluster Munitions process. He argued that before this
discussion continued the NAC should address through political
channels whether it thought the MC should receive a tasking
to embark on such a process, adding that he did not believe
the MC could start this process without an instruction from
the NAC. He went on to say that Oslo did not yet have an
official position on whether such a tasking should be issued.
The SYG said that PermReps could discuss this issue during
one of their informal meetings in March.


19. (C/NF) The Executive Working Group (EWG) reached
tentative agreement on the text for the Interim Report on
Missile Defense. Fielding suggestions by several Allies --
including recommendations for the EWG to re-attempt consensus
or, alternatively, have the International Staff issue a
Chairman's Report for the Defense Ministerial )- the SYG
placed the document under a short silence procedure. (Note:
France later broke silence on the document, sending it back

USNATO 00000048 006 OF 006


to the EWG for further discussion.)
OLSON