Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO41
2008-02-04 11:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

KREMLIN KEEPS AMB ROGOZIN ON A SHORT LEASH IN HIS

Tags:  NATO PREL MARR RU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000041 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR RU
SUBJECT: KREMLIN KEEPS AMB ROGOZIN ON A SHORT LEASH IN HIS
NRC DEBUT

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000041

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR RU
SUBJECT: KREMLIN KEEPS AMB ROGOZIN ON A SHORT LEASH IN HIS
NRC DEBUT

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Russian nationalist
politician-turned-diplomat Dmitri Rogozin launched into a
lengthy litany of Russian grievances on missile defense (MD),
NATO enlargement, CFE, and Kosovo at his first NATO-Russia
Council meeting on January 30, albeit in a more measured tone
than in his recent press interviews. Rogozin emphasized that
he represented President Putin, not the Russian MFA, and had
just met with Putin (although we later heard his opening
intervention was written word for word by the MFA). In an
oblique reference to the threat posed by Iran, Rogozin
acknowledged that North America and Europe are threatened on
the "southern flank" but pointed out that Russia is as well
and that Russia's views on that threat should be given
greater weight by Allies. He encouraged a joint NATO-Russia
missile defense response to counter the threat in place of
the current U.S. and NATO MD plans, which could force Russia
to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF). He blamed Allies for not ratifying the Adapted CFE,
but did NOT/NOT call for a new treaty to include naval assets
as he had in recent press statements. Rogozin proposed
increased NRC cooperation on Afghanistan, counter-narcotics,
counter-terrorism, emergency response to ecological
disasters, and public diplomacy. Ambassador Nuland and
Allies characterized the Parallel Action Plan as the solution
to the CFE standoff and pushed back on his assertions on
Kosovo. Nuland said Russia's acknowledgment of the ballistic
missile threat we share could be the first step towards joint
MD cooperation. END SUMMARY.

--------------
MD: COMMON THREAT FROM THE "SOUTHERN FLANK"
--------------


2. (C) During his address to the NRC, Rogozin praised the NRC
for proving its worth last year with the missile defense
consultations. He said the NRC should continue this work to
address disagreements over the U.S. Third Site and NATO
Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defense program (ALTBMD).
While acknowledging Allied concerns about the threat from the

"southern flanks" -- a reference to Iran and possibly
Pakistan -- Rogozin said that Russia was even closer to the
threat and that therefore its evaluation of the extent of the
danger should be given more weight. He said the U.S., NATO,
and Russia should have a common MD program. Ambassador
Nuland said our common acknowledgment of the threat from the
"southern flank" could serve as the foundation for
cooperation. She challenged her counterparts to use the
Bucharest Summit to initiate work to link U.S., NATO, and
Russian radars in a network to protect all of our peoples.
In his second intervention, Rogozin said President Putin is
ready to cooperate on a common MD umbrella but cautioned that
"all the treaties are interconnected." He elaborated that if
the U.S. and NATO proceed unabated with their plans -- rather
than with development of a unified system that includes
Russia -- this could undermine the INF Treaty. (NOTE: After
the meeting, Russian Political Counselor Kochukov told us
that pulling out of the INF is seriously under consideration
by Putin. END NOTE.)

--------------
NATO ENLARGEMENT: SHOW US A LITTLE "RESPECT"
--------------


3. (C) Rogozin stressed that any movement towards "NATO
expansion" to Ukraine or Georgia at the Bucharest Summit
would negatively impact NATO's relations with Russia. The
Ukrainian public, argued Rogozin, is not ready for MAP,
especially in the south and east. He said the mood in
Ukraine is against enlargement, and that forcing MAP through
could be a threat to the very existence of Ukraine as a
sovereign state. On Georgia, Rogozin said MAP could shatter
the "fragile peace brokered by the Russian Federation." He
said Russia would be undergoing a transition of power during
the Bucharest Summit; if NATO wants good relations with the
new President, it should treat Russia with respect.
Enlargement would raise tension along the borders between
NATO and Russia, according to Rogozin. The UK and Hungary
challenged this assertion. Hungary said NATO was the only

Alliance it voluntary joined in its history, and its
membership had not diminished anyone else's security.

--------------
CFE AND KOSOVO: STICKING TO THE KREMLIN LINE
--------------


4. (C) Rogozin said the survival of the CFE regime is "in the
hands of our Western partners." He railed against the Treaty
for limiting Russian military movements on its own territory,
explaining that the United States would never agree to such
limitations on military movements "from Arizona to Kansas."
He noted that Russian public opinion was highly critical of
the flank limitations, but once Allies ratify the adapted
CFE, it would engender good will with the Russian populace.
Allies discounted Rogozin's assessment since Russia had
suspended implementation of the Treaty, not the Alliance.
Allied Perm Reps -- led by Germany -- voiced steadfast
support for the Parallel Action Plan as the sole path to
resolve this crisis. Rogozin did not call for a new treaty
or insist the naval assets be included in it as attributed to
him in the press prior to the meeting.


5. (C) Rogozin warned that independence by Kosovo would open
Pandora's box and would provoke further conflict in the
Balkans. Ambassador Nuland strongly refuted this, arguing
that Kosovo sets no precedent because of the unique
circumstances around the brutal Milosevic invasion and status
as a UN protectorate. In a second intervention, Rogozin said
the fact that Kosovo needs 20,000 KFOR soldiers highlights
why it is not ready for independence. At the same time he
admitted that the EU "shares the border" with Kosovo and it
is largely the EU's problem to resolve.

--------------
NRC WORK PROGRAM AND PRACTICAL COOPERATION
--------------


6. (C) Rogozin noted that the NRC Work Program was not
adopted last year and called for it to be unblocked. Several
Allies politely pointed out that all of the Allies supported
U.S. brokered compromise text and Russia was now the sole
hold-out. (NOTE: The Russian Mission expects Moscow's
blessing for the work program in the February 5 NRC
Preparatory Committee which would allow it to then be noted
at the Vilnius Defense Ministerial. END NOTE.)


7. (C) Rogozin ran through a laundry list of areas in which
Russia wants to strengthen practical cooperation including
drug interdiction, counter-terrorism, and emergency response
to ecological disasters. He highlighted that Russian support
for Afghanistan could include a NATO transit agreement and
airlift capacity, but noted cooperation could be made more
efficient by working with "the strong union" of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Rogozin
tried to link Russian assistance on Afghanistan to completion
of a bilateral military transit agreement through Kaliningrad
(a bilateral issue with Lithuania).


8. (C) Rogozin proposed a conference on counterfeiting of
arms and insisted that Russia should be getting royalties on
sales of arms from expired Soviet licenses.


9. (C) Citing his academic background in journalism, Rogozin
pushed for the NRC to do more to influence public opinion.
He said a civic forum in Russia could be used to build
cooperation and engage the public. Ambassador Nuland
expressed satisfaction that Russia was coming around on the
idea of a NATO-Russia civil society forum to create more
practical value for the public.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) In a prior January 29 meeting, Ambassador Rogozin
gave NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer a Russian
hatchet to symbolize that NATO and Russia should bury it
after the turmoil in 2007. There has been much trepidation
within the corridors of NATO about the appointment of the

outspoken nationalist politician as the Russian Ambassador to
NATO. The Russian Mission told us after the meeting that
Rogozin stuck largely to his MFA talking points, and that
Moscow was closely watching his debut. While Rogozin clearly
took a step back from his rhetoric to address the NRC in a
more measured tone, his lengthy intervention still came off
as grandstanding (and a little haughty). He often used the
word "respect," clearly implying that both he and Russia
deserved a great deal from Allies. He seemed to want to
impress the group with his personal expertise on a variety of
subjects as well as with his personal relationship with
President Putin. END COMMENT.
NULAND