Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO398
2008-10-24 14:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

OCTOBER 16 HLTF: ALLIES COMMITTED TO A UNIFIED AND

Tags:  KCFE PARM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0398/01 2981442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241442Z OCT 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2406
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000398 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 16 HLTF: ALLIES COMMITTED TO A UNIFIED AND
MEASURED CFE APPROACH THAT DOESN'T PULL THE PLUG

REF: A. (A) STATE 109280

B. (B) HLTF-N(2008)0029(INV)

Classified By: Classified by: CDA Kate Byrnes, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000398

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 16 HLTF: ALLIES COMMITTED TO A UNIFIED AND
MEASURED CFE APPROACH THAT DOESN'T PULL THE PLUG

REF: A. (A) STATE 109280

B. (B) HLTF-N(2008)0029(INV)

Classified By: Classified by: CDA Kate Byrnes, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the October 16 NATO High Level Task Force
(HLTF) meeting and meetings on the margins, Allies discussed
potential next steps on CFE (based largely on U.S. ideas
presented at the September 11 HLTF, and a Czech paper
distributed just prior to this HLTF meeting) and addressed
how NATO can best use the November 5-7 Romanian-hosted HLTF
off-site to examine options for a way ahead on CFE and
formulate a solid message for upcoming NATO and OSCE
Ministerials. Key points:

-- Allies confirmed the core message of the September 11
HLTF, that they are unwilling to consider taking any steps in
the near-term ) such as ceasing to implement CFE vis a vis
Russia ) that could make it any easier for the Russians to
pull out of CFE.

-- Some Allies (led by Turkey, supported by Romania, the UK
and the U.S.) stressed the importance of developing a unified
NATO message for the Ministerials. Turkey proposed, without
dissent, that the Allies use the HLTF off-site in early
November to identify key themes for the CFE portion of the
communique. Substantively, the message should underscore our
collective commitment to CFE and to creative solutions )
specifically the parallel actions package ) and address
Russia,s actions in Georgia in a way that is consistent with
longstanding principles and support for Georgia,s
territorial sovereignty.


2. (C) On broader issues:

-- The HLTF Chair (NATO ASYG Martin Erdmann) opened the
meeting by providing important context for the discussion by
describing at length the development of the Allies, position
on NATO-Russia cooperation, largely based on the August 19
Ministers, statement. Erdmann noted that while NATO Allies
are embroiled in an internal debate to achieve a common
interpretation of &no business as usual8 in NATO-Russia,
the European Union and OSCE are fully engaged with Russia,
leaving NATO as the only institution that has &downsized8
its interaction.

-- French HLTF Rep Jacques Raharinaivo then provided a
detailed explanation of the substance of President Sarkozy,s

October 8 speech in Evian, underscoring that Sarkozy chose to
respond to President Medvedev,s speech to prevent the
appearance that he was accepting Medvedev,s proposals on the
future of European security. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS POST 8-8-08. As a means of
providing context for the HLTF effort on CFE, the Chair
(Erdmann) opened the meeting with a review of discussion in
the NATO Senior Political Committee on defining a medium-term
NATO-Russia strategy. Erdmann said flatly that differences
have emerged among Allies on how to define the August 19 NAC
Ministerial decision that NATO would not do &business as
usual with Russia.8 His main point was straightforward:
as NATO Allies debate whether individual meetings should
occur, NATO,s political role is being marginalized while the
OSCE and the EU ) as well as individual Allies ) engage
Russia. This will necessarily color engagement on CFE as
well, he observed.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CONTACTS and BILATERALS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) FRANCE REPORTS ON EVIAN. The French HLTF rep
(Raharinaivo) provided details concerning the October 8
President Medvedev and President Sarkozy speeches at the
Evian World Policy Conference in which France appeared to
have endorsed Russia,s European Security Treaty proposal.
Medvedev,s decision to give a speech on the future of
European security, and not stick to the financial crisis at
hand, caught the French by surprise. The French rep reported
that Sarkozy received a copy of Medvedev,s speech just hours
in advance of delivery, and thus was faced with a choice of
reacting or not responding at all - potentially implying
agreement. Raharinaivo suggested both speeches should be
reviewed together and highlighted some key points:

-- Medvedev invited all European countries to an essentially
ad hoc forum; Sarkozy clearly said the OSCE ) to include
North America ) was the place to discuss it;

-- Medvedev referred to Europe throughout his speech; Sarkozy
repeatedly used from &Vladivostok to Vancouver8 to leave no
doubt as to the geography in play;

-- Medvedev was interested in talking about a mix of security
issues as varied as non-conventional arms control, terrorism,
and counter-narcotics; Sarkozy deliberately mentioned
conventional arms control and human rights;

-- Regarding Medvedev,s area of influence concept, Sarkozy
stressed that &what is near abroad, for Russia is near
abroad, for Europe too;8

-- On the question of an OSCE Summit prior to the end of
2009, the French rep explained the date was intended to be
close enough to keep Russia from criticizing Allies for not
responding, but far enough away to buy time for Allies to
develop a unified approach. France recognizes, he said, that
in reality events could intervene to cause the dates to slip
even further.


5. (C) OTHER CONTACTS:

-- Belgium: Rep De Witte reported on a September 19 meeting
in Sochi (coordinated before August 8) between Prime Minsters
Leterme and Putin during which Putin described Russia,s
envisioned European security architecture much as Medvedev
later outlined in Evian. Regarding CFE, Putin stressed that
Russia had ratified and &implemented8 the adapted CFE
Treaty which the West had not, and moreover (Putin
incorrectly asserted) which the &Baltics had refused to
sign.8

-- Greece: Rep Daskarolis briefed Allies on October 13
discussions in Athens between the head of the Greek OSCE Task
Force and Russian Ambassador Voronkov on the upcoming Greek
OSCE Chairmanship. In this meeting Russia outlined its
European security architecture proposal along the lines of
Evian but indicated that the platform for this architecture
was not yet clear, specifying both the OSCE and UN in Geneva
as possibilities. Greece highlighted President Sarkozy,s
proposal for an OSCE summit in 2009 and also offered that the
upcoming OSCE Ministerial in Helsinki should be seriously
considered for further discussion. On CFE, Russian reps
remarked to their Greek counterparts that the U.S.-Russia
track had failed ) it was time to seek another such as the
JCG ) and that Russia had no intentions of doing away with
CFE which is an integral component of European security
architecture and should be part of a larger Treaty.

-- Bulgaria: Rep Georgiev reported on both a Prime
Ministers, meeting in Sochi on the economy and Georgia, as
well as discussions in Moscow with Ambassador Voronkov
similar to the Greek discussions. Georgiev added that
Voronkov also noted the upcoming Chairmanship of Kazakhstan
(2010) as an opportunity for an OSCE Summit and indicated
that CFE discussions with the U.S. had stopped altogether.

-- The Netherlands: Rep Kleinjan questioned France in
particular, and the group at large, on what the intent of an
OSCE Summit would be, noting that a summit should have a
clear deliverable or intended result; Kleinjan cautioned that
Medvedev would likely read this as an answer to Russia,s
proposal.

-- U.S.: U.S. Rep State/VCI DAS Karin L. Look expressed
skepticism regarding Russian proposals for a new European
security architecture, particularly at a time when Russia is
undermining an important component of the Euro-Atlantic
architecture ) CFE and the principles that are its
foundation. She echoed the Dutch comments on the need for a
clear purpose for an OSCE Summit and confirmed that A/S Fried
had postponed CFE talks with Antonov for the time being but
had not taken the parallel actions package off the table.

-- United Kingdom: Rep Ford indicated that Foreign Secretary
Miliband had met with Foreign Minister Lavrov on the margins
of the UN General Assembly to seek further details on the
Medvedev,s five foreign policy principles, namely on the
right to protect Russian citizens and the right to spheres of
influence. (Note: Ford had commented in the quad meeting the
day prior to the HLTF that he wanted to clarify misleading
press reports that indicated Miliband and Lavrov had had a
&cozy chat8 on the European Security Treaty when, in fact,
it had been more of a questioning session and opportunity to
highlight the irony of Russia,s position. End Note)


6. (C) THE WAY AHEAD. As a basis for discussing next steps
on CFE, the HLTF Chair (Erdmann) reiterated U.S. proposals
tabled at the September 11 HLTF as well as the discussion on
the 11th and then referenced a food for thought by the Czech
Republic on a set of proposed &constructive8 steps for
Allied delegations in Vienna, and another food for thought by
the International Staff on Russia,s CFE obligations and the
crisis in Georgia (ref B) (both received by the U.S. del only
upon arrival at NATO on the 16th). Initially, Erdmann tried
to structure the HLTF discussion around the options set out

by the U.S. at the previous meeting. Germany (Biontino)
objected, noting that options were missing such as Germany,s
proposal to separate Georgia and CFE by taking a long term,
strategic approach. Erdmann instead structured discussion on
the issues contained in the Czech paper to provide focus.

-- Czech Rep Smigolova outlined Prague,s paper proposing
&consecutive8 steps to respond to Russian non-compliance:
reduce the frequency of JCG meetings to once or twice a
month; stop implementing CFE vis a vis Russia by reducing
Russia,s access to Treaty-mandated notifications of changes
to military organization/numbers transmitted via the OSCE
Communication Network; and finally by not providing annual
Allied CFE data to Russia on December 15. Smigolova
suggested that a continued &observation8 mode by the
Alliance was no longer an act of good will but rather a
&manifestation of Allied weakness.8 From the Czech
perspective, the proposed steps are technical in nature, not
irreversible, and simply meant as a counterbalance to level
the playing field.

-- Response to the Czech paper was clear: no Ally who spoke
(see para 8),aside from Canada (which was without
instructions),was willing to consider seriously the idea
that NATO Allies should stop implementing CFE as an
actionable step for the December Ministerials.


7. (C) On the idea of reducing the frequency of JCG meetings,
the UK (Ford) ) supported by Canada, Denmark, and the U.S.
) strongly advocated minimizing JCG meetings, citing lack of
substance and the prospect that Russia was now scheduled to
chair the JCG in December. The Netherlands (Kleinjan),
Romania (Micula),Hungary (Molnar) and Turkey (Gun) concurred
that Allies should prevent Russia from chairing the JCG in
December during the Ministerials, this year,s scheduled data
exchange, and the anniversary of Russia,s suspension, but
only advocated technical reasons to cancel or postpone
meetings rather than sending any type of political message
through a generalized reduction. Italy (Colaceci),
Luxembourg (Pilot) and Greece (Daskarolis) noted that JCG
meetings can serve as opportunities to explain Allied
positions. Luxembourg asserted that &refusing dialogue8 is
a sign of weakness. Several noted that Allies have
successfully managed JCG discussions and do not need to be
micro-managed.


8. (C) Discussion of the Czech proposal that NATO should
selectively stop implementing CFE vis a vis Russia was
revelatory of increasing Allied reluctance to take any step
now that could have the effect of making it easier for Russia
to walk away from the Treaty. Allies also worried that if
NATO &suspended8 implementation vis a vis Russia, it might
appear that we were adopting a Russian approach that we had
previously branded as illegal:

-- The U.S. (Look) first disputed the Czech rep,s comment
that this period had been a &manifestation of Allied
weakness8, noting efforts on the parallel actions package
and Allies, continued assertion of Treaty (e.g. inspection)
rights. Rep Look then observed that we cannot simply
withhold data from Russia ) that would be illegal (as is
Russia,s &suspension8) unless we first made critical
decisions about Russia,s actions and decided to implement
those decisions. We would need to make national
determinations and statements that Russian actions
constituted 1) material breach of Treaty obligations, or 2)
brought about a fundamental change in circumstances, or 3)
justify the imposition of countermeasures. Look emphasized
that these were serious, senior level decisions that could
not be easily reversed ) and ones that Allies would want to
make together. She underscored the need to keep options open
over the next six months ) to include preparing CFE data for
the December exchange and continue planning for inspections
during the next Treaty year ) as Allies maintain unity of
effort in moving forward on CFE while holding onto core
principles.

-- Turkey (Gun) concurred this would be a high level
political decision and warned that Allies should not
criticize Russia and then make the same mistakes.

-- Italy, Romania, and Luxembourg questioned whether the
Czech proposed steps would constitute an Allied breach of the
Treaty while the UK warned there were legal pitfalls
associated with them. Romania suggested that we keep the
Czech ideas &in our armory.8 Italy noted there may be
merit in some form of reciprocity suggesting that the
Alliance might consider &something like8 what the Russians
had done ) i.e. give an aggregated data summary in lieu of
the full exchange.

-- The Netherlands and Denmark expressed the need for caution
with the Netherlands stressing that Allies should take no

step that would cause the Russians to &pull the plug8 on
the Treaty and noting it was too early to discuss such
actions now but rather consider them in Romania. Greece
wondered if the Czech proposed steps ) which Greece claimed
would constitute an Allied suspension ) were even options
for Allies who consider Russia,s suspension &illegal.8

-- Canada (Arpin) was the exception offering a preliminary
reaction (without instructions) that noted the Czech proposal
was a &moderate8 response to Russian suspension, could be
reversed, and should remain on the table for discussion in
the run up to December formal decisions.


9. (C) Postponement of Fried-Antonov Talks. In the HLTF and
on the margins, several Allies, notably Turkey, expressed
interest in U.S. plans to resume discussions with Russia, but
none pressed that doing so was urgent. The U.S. team made
clear that A/S Fried was open to the idea of resuming CFE
meetings, but that Allies would need to find a way in the CFE
context to deal with the fact that Russia has failed to
implement the August cease fire agreement. We would need to
move forward on CFE in a way that demonstrates not only our
desire to preserve the Treaty, but our determination to use
CFE to benefit Georgia,s security and maintain key
principles.

-- Turkey (Gun) said they had hoped for a better result on
Georgia than had been achieved at Geneva. Gun said clearly
that in the current circumstances Turkey would not urge the
U.S. to reengage on the Fried-Antonov channel. Gun stressed
the need to save CFE while not ignoring what happened in
Georgia. This, of course, had complicated resolution of the
Gudauta issue and injected a number of new concerns. Gun
suggested that we should hold off on any radical actions that
might jeopardize the Treaty and see what happened in Georgia,
basically &park this complicated issue8 until developments
were more positive and could serve to reenergize the process.
December was not the time to give a radical message to
Russia. He hoped that by then there would be reason to ask
the U.S. to again see Antonov.


10. (C) Allies generally welcomed the I.S. food for thought
paper on the CFE implications of Russian actions in Georgia
as useful and unexceptionable. The German rep (Biontino),
only supported mildly by Italy and Greece, again stressed
that Allies should fully separate the issues of Georgia and
CFE. Biontino suggested taking a strategic, long term
approach on CFE and that discussion on the way ahead should
look to the spring following the current period of transition
with regard to Georgia and to upcoming elections.


11. (C) HLTF Off-Site. Allies endorsed the UK idea of
structuring discussions at the November 5-7 Romanian-hosted
off-site around scenarios: 1) the possibility that Russia
withdraws from CFE (vice continues to suspend
implementation); 2) Russia continues its suspension (and
there is no immediate progress in U.S.-Russia talks); 3)
Russia returns to implementation (and there is progress on
the parallel actions package); and 4) the possibility that
suspension spreads to other non-NATO states. U.S. rep Look
suggested, and it was widely accepted, that Allies also think
about whether Russia has an endgame or result in mind (i.e.
how does all end in Russia,s thinking),and how we can best
work with and channel that. Turkey, supported by Romania,
the U.S. and UK, underscored the importance of developing a
unified NATO message for the Ministerials and using the
off-site to identify key themes and tones for the CFE
language for the communiqu. These key elements will likely
arise naturally from a discussion of the &scenarios8
sketched by the UK.


12. (C) MEETINGS PRIOR TO THE HLTF. Prior to the HLTF, the
U.S. met with Quad reps from Germany, France and the UK, as
well as conducted bilateral meetings with Romania and Turkey.
During these meetings Allies previewed and discussed the
same points that they made in the main HLTF meeting.


13. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Regarding the HLTF schedule for the
remainder of the year, Allies agreed on the need to meet
between the HLTF off-site and the December Ministerials to
focus on finalizing the communique language, but did not
agree on a specific date since the IS was not in a position
to commit to the timing of the draft ministerial text or the
availability of meeting rooms. The HLTF meeting following
the off-site is tentatively scheduled for November 21.
Immediately following the November 5-7 off-site, the IS
intends to distribute draft CFE text for the ministerial
communiqu which the HLTF-Deputies would then work prior to
the tentatively scheduled Nov 21 HLTF meeting.
BYRNES