Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO395
2008-10-23 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

ALLIES SUPPORT MOREL, BUT MIXED ON GENEVA OUTCOMES

Tags:  MARR MOPS NATO PREL PINR GG RS 
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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2402
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6171
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 5693
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0530
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USNMR BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0845
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000395 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL PINR GG RS
SUBJECT: ALLIES SUPPORT MOREL, BUT MIXED ON GENEVA OUTCOMES
AND PROCESS

Classified By: CDA W. S. Reid, III, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000395

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL PINR GG RS
SUBJECT: ALLIES SUPPORT MOREL, BUT MIXED ON GENEVA OUTCOMES
AND PROCESS

Classified By: CDA W. S. Reid, III, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite his claims of limited success, the
European Union Special Representative for Central Asia and
Georgia, Pierre Morel, underwhelmed many NATO PermReps with
his account of the EU/UN/OSCE-sponsored talks on Georgia held
in Geneva October 15. Morel admitted that the talks did not
solve everything, but he placed a high premium on maintaining
the process and seemed to claim success in creating a
"multi-structural process," which de-emphasized timelines or
clear positive results in favor of nurturing "fragile,
vulnerable, political" dialogue. Mindful of the human
dimension of the Georgia conflict and the approaching winter,
Allies questioned when the issue of Internally Displaced
People (IDPs) would come into view in November in working
group one and underlined the importance of IDP return being
addressed. They also underlined the importance of access to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia for monitors and human rights
workers as well as the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other
Allies questioned when the issue of compliance under the
six-point agreement will be resolved. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Light on substance, heavy on form
--------------


2. (C) At an extraordinary informal meeting of NATO PermPeps
October 23, Morel gave a detailed account of the diplomatic
wrangling -- including the difficulties involved in getting
the parties together -- leading up to the October 15 Geneva
talks. He said his EU directive was to set up "discussions"
rather than "negotiations," stressing that his first priority
was fostering stability. In time, he hoped the discussions
could address underlying security issues in Georgia and the
issue of IDPs. Despite the fact that Russia was not present
during the plenary session in Geneva, he argued that Russia
was interested in continuing discussions; was influencing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to act in a constructive manner;
and was irritated at the behavior of the South Ossetian and

Abkhazian entities present at the talks. Morel reported that
although Georgia was not present during the information
session that followed the plenary session, it remains
committed to the process.


3. (C) Seeking concrete solutions sooner rather than later,
many Allies were less than impressed with Morel's claims of
success in merely formulating a process. The U.S. praised
Morel for his efforts in getting the parties to the table,
but pointed out that even he was probably not fully satisfied
with the outcome of his labors so far (with which he readily
agreed in Q and A.) Several Allies suggested tactical
gestures to appeal to the "entities." The U.S. encouraged
Morel to use alternative means, such as colored badges and
Abkhaz/South Ossetian languages, to acknowledge the presence
of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian entities, but maintained
that they should not be given delegation status or plenary
access (Morel later concurred.) The U.S. asked how the
process can be molded to lead the parties to convergence
rather than divergence. Bulgaria and Estonia warned that
Russia might be using stall tactics to pressure the Georgians
into capitulation before the onset of winter. The German
PermRep, calling the process an emerging "waste of time"
which he guessed was "unavoidable," likened the October 15
talks to the Minsk Group process (NOTE: Morel later defended
the Minsk Group process, taking pride in its "decade long"
prevention of violence and provision of a non-confrontational
regional political dialogue in the South Caucasus. Several
Allied PermReps, including the German, were visibly
unpersuaded, clearly having mentioned the Minsk Process as a
model to be avoided in the Geneva Georgia framework. END
NOTE.) Turkey and the Czech Republic argued that Morel's
efforts had not even resulted in the establishment of a
process. Poland led several Allies (Italy, Hungary and
Canada) in saying NATO should take actions complementary to
the EU/UN/OSCE efforts. France was silent throughout the
meeting.

--------------
Morel: "It won't get any worse"
--------------


4. (C) Allies attempted to refocus the effort, emphasizing
that while the parties struggle with establishing a process,
Russia continues to be in violation of the six-point
agreement by maintaining troops in Akhalgori and the Upper
Kodori Valley. Lithuania, Bulgaria and Canada questioned
whether Russia was doing all within its power to induce
Abkhaz and South Ossetian officials to play a constructive
role in the talks. Germany, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria and
Romania questioned if the talks will ever get past the
process phase and address the real issues, including
resolving the IDP crisis. In reply, Morel averred that, due
to Karasin's high rank in the Russian hierarchy, and the
importance Russia continues to attach to developing good
relations with the EU, he had to conclude that it was serious
in trying to make the talks constructive. He briefly
admitted that the EU deemed "insufficient" the Russian
withdrawal of troops under the six-point agreement, and
explained that the working group formed to address the issue
of IDPs will be co-moderated by the EU and UNHCR, "whose
expertise will be valuable in avoiding the right of return
issues which could bring everything to a halt in this track."
But he quickly returned to his main themes -- the value of
establishing a process and the preservation of the EU-Russia
relationship -- in touting the success of the talks.
Concluding that "it won't get any worse from here," he took
pride that the process survived the initial test, but
acknowledged that there is much work to be done before the
next round of talks on November 18.
REID