GERMAN NON-PAPER ON NATO MISSILE DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000382

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MNUC
SUBJECT: GERMAN NON-PAPER ON NATO MISSILE DEFENSE


1. (C) SUMMARY: Please see text of German food for thought
paper in paragraph 2, which was passed to the Executive
Working Group (EWG) on 10 Oct 2008. The non-paper explains
Germany's thoughts on the criteria the EWG should use to
assess the NATO missile defense architecture options.
Germany has proposed "implications on arms control efforts"
as one of the criteria. This is reminiscent of attempts by
Germany prior to the Bucharest Summit to link missile defense
and non-proliferation/arms control. The U.S. delegation made
clear that missile defense and non-proliferation/arms control
are separate issues, discussed in separate committees at
NATO, but that we believe missile defense supports
non-proliferation. German representative stressed that he
agrees missile defense would have a positive effect on
non-proliferation efforts and implied Germany is not trying
to block NATO efforts on missile defense. He also said the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that
non-proliferation/arms control issues be addressed when
missile defense is discussed. The U.S. questioned whether
"implications on arms control efforts" is an effective
criterion for evaluating missile defense options, but stated
that we want to work with Germany to complete the analysis of
the options. The U.S. suggested that Germany review the U.S.
draft analysis for one of the options, and suggest language
on non-proliferation/arms control which might meet MFA
guidance. We will pass this language to Washington when we
receive it.


2. BEGIN TEXT

German Food for Thought Paper
on Future DRAFT EWG(R) REPORT TO COUNCIL ON OPTIONS FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE
Chapter IV

Chapter 4: Criteria for the assessment of architecture
options for NATO missile defence in accordance with the CNAD
Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence Ministerial Taskings
on Missile Defence

Background:

CNAD was tasked in Riga and at the June 2007 Defence
Ministerial to assess the technical implications of the US
missile defence system on the MD FS proposed architectures
and on the CNAD work stemming from the Riga taskings.

At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of state
and government tasked the Council in permanent session
bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied
security as well as NATO solidarity, to develop options for a
comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage
to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered
by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to
inform any future political decision.

The CNAD report identified architecture options against the
combined 4 threat scenarios from the MD FS as well as against
each threat scenario taken individually. This report, of a
technical nature, forms the basis for further
political-military discussion and was noted by NATO Defence
Ministers at their formal meeting on June 13, 2008.

Aim:

The aim of this food for thought paper is to identify a set
of possible criteria to assess the architecture options
developed by CNAD for the comprehensive EWG (R) Report to be
prepared for the next summit meeting.

Considerations:

Political criteria:

Strengthening collective defence and Alliance cohesion
At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of State
and Government tasked that future work on options for a
comprehensive missile defence architecture should be based
bearing in mind the principle of indivisibility of Allied
security as well as NATO solidarity. The implementation of
these fundamental political principles calls for a broad
participation including in collective planning, consultation,
command and control and communication. A comprehensive
participation of Allies will be the best example for the
cohesion and resolve of the Alliance.

Implications on arms control efforts
Missile defences could become over time an integral element
of NATO's broad based approach to security. Therefore
architecture options for a possible NATO missile defence
system should be assessed taking into account possible
implications in the field of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation.

Implications for third countries

A comprehensive missile defence architecture may affect
security interests of third countries in many ways. It may
require mobile sensors outside NATO territory. During a
missile defence operation missiles will fly over Non-NATO
nations and an intercept may cause damage in Non-NATO
nations. These will require involvement of third countries,
which may range from exchanges of situational awareness
information to cooperation.

Cooperation with Russia

At the Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008 Heads of State
and Government tasked to strengthen NATO Russia missile
defence cooperation. NATO is committed to maximum
transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to
allay any concerns. NATO encourages the Russian Federation to
take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation
proposals and expressed its readiness to explore the
potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile
defence systems at an appropriate time. Therefore,
architecture options should be assessed taking into account
the potential impact on this Bucharest summit task.

Military criteria:

Strengthening Deterrence

In a dynamic, complex and uncertain security environment
Missile Defence must be seen by potential adversaries as a
capable and credible military instrument of the Alliance's
political resolve. Missile Defence must have characteristics
that can demonstrate NATO's political cohesion and compel a
potential adversary to pursue options other than war.

Credibility and Reliability
An important aspect is the question of credibility. The
Alliance must be confident that missile defences will
perform, if employed. This question is crucial in relation
vis-a-vis the possible scenarios as examined in the Missile
Defence Feasibility Study as well as vis-a-vis the Alliance.
A proven technical reliability will be important to win
support of domestic constituencies to include missile
defences as serious factor into security policy planning as
well as to commit budgetary resources to a possible programme.

Fexibility
Another important issue will be flexibility. The architecture
options should be viewed against their adaptability to
various contingencies. It is assumed that a possible future
NATO missile defence system will not be put on a 24/7
hair-trigger alert. It seems more likely that a crisis
situation will develop over time.
It is further assumed that a possible contingency will
develop not simultaneously vis-a-vis all the 4 scenarios of
the MD FS. A significant asset of an architecture option will
be, therefore, its capacity to provide for a quick and
credible response to an emerging crisis situation.
Since 3 out of the 5 architectural options include the NATO
ALTBMD Programme Reference Architecture, special emphasis
should be given to this programme. The ALTBMD Architecture
is, however, designed for the protection of deployed forces,
and is not designed to be permanently positioned to provide
territorial defence for NATO. This limitation has to be taken
into account.

END TEXT
REID