|08USNATO371||2008-10-15 17:13:00||SECRET//NOFORN||Mission USNATO|
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S E C R E T USNATO 000371
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Allies delivered their initial responses
to the IS-drafted policy
paper "NATO-Russia Relations in the Aftermath of the Georgia
Crisis." At its base, the document's language of "targeted
and "selective engagement" and emphasis on unity pleased
most Allies. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Norway and
others supported what the French described as a targeted
paper focused on NATO-Russia concrete results and maintaining
coherence with the EU's approach to Russia. These Allies
on the current situation and cooperation in the context of
the NRC. Others (the Baltic Republics, Poland, Czech
Republic, Denmark, UK and Canada)
called for a much broader document with aim to analyze
trends in NATO-Russia relations and set forth both short
and long term goals for the relationship. Those same Allies
sought to look beyond merely the NRC, which, as one Ally
suggested, was concieved in the Yeltsin era and now must be
revisited in the Putin/Medvedev era. Many of these Allies
advocated the inclusion of reference to principles and
values as the basis for NATO policy. END SUMMARY
2. (S/NF) Allies broke into familiar lines of argument
during their October 13 Senior Political Committee discussion
of the IS-drafted paper "NATO-Russia Relations in the
Aftermath of the Georgia Crisis." In order of intervention
(NOTE: Most Allies had only
preliminary guidance and expected detailed instruction
later. End note.):
-- Romania: Supported the pragmatism of the paper and
encouraged a step-by-step approach that remained flexible
as Russia implemented the two agreements. They were
particularly supportive of the references to unity and
pre-coordination as helpful towards a long term approach
but also advocated specific reference to principles and
-- Lithuania: Considered the paper a good first step but
felt it concentrated too much on "realpolitik" and lacked
on principles and values. Also spoke against the notion of
the NRC as the only available tool in N-R relations,
arguing the NRC was conceived in the Yeltsin era and we
must reconsider the vastly different parameters of the NRC
of the Putin/Medvedev era.
-- Norway: Strongly supported the document and continued
dialogue with Russia, refusing to challenge the basis of the
NRC, as previous speakers
suggested. Reacting to the rhetoric of the paper he urged
Allies to realize that Russia would not always simply take
what NATO put on the table.
-- Latvia: Believed the document was narrowly focused on the
NRC, was full of assumptions and not facts, and lacked
reference to principles and values as guiding posts for
engagement. Overall, the paper did not properly characterize
"what Russia is." Advocated referencing back to a 2007
document produced in the PC which provided such an
analysis and tasking further updating of that paper, perhaps
in the Political Committee.
-- Bulgaria: Supported the document and, as others,
supported the necessity of unity and pre-coordination and
advocated inclusion of reference to principles and values.
They also advocated an approach that progressed
incrementally based on Russian fulfillment of agreements.
-- Canada: Took a particularly firm stance: strong advocate
of broadening the paper and looking beyond just the NRC
toward N-R relations in a larger context and in the longer
term. The paper should "remind Russians what the
relationship is based on." They even asked: "Is the NRC
what we want? Are there other channels?" They advocated
looking at trends, elaborating the NATO view on Medvedev's
European security treaty idea and considering NATO policy
on the CFE.
-- Poland: Strong advocate of broadening the document,
analyzing Russian intentions on the international stage and
looking beyond the NRC. The paper needs to reflect "how far
Russia has gone from Yeltsin" and how Russia has strained
the N-R relationship by translating strong rhetoric into
action..."not just in Georgia."
-- France: Believed the document was extremely good,
well-structured, realistic and opportune. They do not
believe the paper needs to go beyond the current crisis, must
remain "targeted" on specific outputs, and
believe it should stick to the NRC. They strongly supported
references to Alliance unity and emphasized the necessity
for coherence between NATO and other international
-- Estonia: Argued that there were missing parts in the
document particularly reference to principles and values
and stated facts on Russia's breach of principles of
international law. They believed the paper needs to be done
"unattached to the Georgian crisis" and reflect how the
Alliance has changed its views, attitudes and perceptions.
-- Slovenia: Viewed the document as a "good starting point,"
QQQY0QQQ"Q#QQ." They urged that "no stone remain unturned" and also
advocated reference to principles and values.
-- Slovakia: Appreciated the document's emphasis on Russian
ownership and supported its emphasis on Alliance unity and
consistency with other organizations (in particular the
EU). They also believed strongly that the document should
determine clear limits - that there be no new spheres of
influence and each country is free to choose its own
-- Spain: Supported the document but did not support other
Allies in their call at this stage for long-term thinking.
They believe values are important "but commitments are too"
and the NRC is necessary for both Russia and NATO as a
strategic partner. They supported a narrow document
focusing on the present situation and advocating an end to
the conflict in Georgia.
-- Hungary: Supported a broadening of the document to
include more analysis (extending even to analysis of
Russian military and economic trends) and believed there is
no rush for consensus, as the paper should have a long-term
outlook. They supported the idea of unity and advocated
looking at both the worst and best case scenario in the
-- Czech Rep: Strong advocate of an explicit reference to
guiding principles such as those in the NRC Founding Act and
the August NATO Foreign Ministers' statement.
They expressed hesitancy with parts of the text. In
particular, they expressed caution on references to political
dialogue, which leave
too much room for a return to business as usual. Also, they
did not feel Medvedev's security treaty proposal was relevant
to the paper.
-- Iceland: Supportive of the document but, as others,
advocated reference to principles and values, broader
analysis in the paper and a longer-term perspective.
-- Denmark: Considered the document "not at all bad" but
lacking in a more general analysis of N-R relations as a
point of departure to examine NATO policy aims. They were
supportive of the ideas of selective engagement and unity
but would like to see the analysis in regards to ongoing
N-R activities more developed.
-- Italy: Supporter of the document and strong advocate of a
very narrow scope for the paper. A long-term strategy
beyond the current situation is "not in the mandate" for
the document, they argued. They contend that the issue is not
if the NRC is used but rather how, and the paper already has
for evaluation of the NRC.
-- Turkey: Described its position as 120 percent aligned with
Canada in regards to a need for reflection on the "broader
picture." They acknowledged that we are "living in an
exceptional time," but advocated the need for reflection on
changes in N-R relations.
-- UK: (NOTE: Delegate mentioned before the meeting that
they had not yet received any official instruction from
London. End note.) Considered the document a good initial
effort and, as others, saw need to underscore the
principles and values on which the relationship is based.
They focused attention to remaining issues on the ground in
Georgia and sighted Kouchner as himself recognizing that
compliance thus far has only been partial.
-- Germany: Strongly supported the paper and particularly
supported its emphasis on coordination/consistency with
efforts of other organizations, even going so far as to
call for "synchronization" with the EU efforts. They were
very cautious on "overloading" the paper with references to
principles and values at this "transition moment."
-- Greece: Supported the document and warned Allies not to
be "overly ambitious" by discussing various issues in
depth. (He suggested the EU was going faster on this which
does not look good for the Alliance.) They also advocate
incorporation of Russian perspectives (i.e. Russian foreign
policy principles) into the document.
-- US: A/DCM pointed out that the document needed a "goals"
section to know why we were doing N-R cooperation, as well as
a "yardstick element so we can track whether we are making
of short-term goals were to get Russia out of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. In Medium-to-longer term we needed to
convince Russia to
drop its zero sum security philosophy and buy into
cooperative security. Also suggested we should discuss
other NATO tools and opportunities to shape Russian
conduct, like the EAPC, energy security, relations to
GG/UP, and other NATO polices which Russia follows with
interest. We should also examine our ineffective NATO public
-- Netherlands: Had no criticism of the document but noted
particular support for EU-NATO unity as provided for in the
-- Portugal: Suggested the Allies refer back to paragraph 27
of the Bucharest communique for wording which registers
NATO concerns and principles and has potential for use in
-- Belgium: Supported the document and aligned itself with
the positions of France, Germany and Italy.
-- Luxembourg: Supportive of document; generally aligned
their comments with those of Germany, Italy, Norway and
3. (S/NF) SPC Chairman, Assistant Secretary General Erdmann
also reported on a meeting he had with Russian Ambassador
Rogozin. Erdmann said that Rogozin asserted that Moscow
still was interested in pursuing the NATO-Russia
relationship, wanted to have a NRC Foreign Ministerial in
December, wanted to resume NATO-Russia mil-to-mil contacts
and wanted to discuss NATO-Russia cooperation on
counter-piracy. The Chairman inform Rogozin that the IMS
had tried to confirm with the Russian MoD that Russia was
interested in resuming mil-to-mil contacts after an earlier
Rogozin assertion to that effect and had been unsuccessful.
In reply, Rogozin asserted that resumption was Russia's
policy. The Chairman told Allies to await further IMS