Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO352
2008-09-30 17:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL VISIT TO TBILISI

Tags:  PREL MARR NATO MOPS PREF GG RU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6127
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 5682
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000352 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MOPS PREF GG RU
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL VISIT TO TBILISI

REF: A. TBILISI 1602

B. USNATO 334

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000352

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MOPS PREF GG RU
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL VISIT TO TBILISI

REF: A. TBILISI 1602

B. USNATO 334

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The North Atlantic Council (NAC) visited
Georgia September 15-16 to take stock following Russia's
invasion of Georgia, to reaffirm support for Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to strengthen
NATO-Georgia relations (including by inaugurating the
NATO-Georgia Commission). The NAC held separate formal
meetings with President Saakashvili, Prime Minister
Gurgenidze, and members of the Georgian Parliament.
Representatives of the UN, EU, and OSCE also briefed PermReps
in a special session. The NAC also conducted a number of
outreach activities, as well as visiting a damaged military
base and a refugee camp in Gori. This was not a
paradigm-changing visit. Georgia reaffirmed its commitment to
Euro-Atlantic integration and NAC Ambassadors reaffirmed
their only slightly evolving national positions. End summary.

--------------
Saakashvili Says Same Plans
for Euro-Atlantic integration
--------------


2. (C) President Saakashvili greeted the SYG and PermReps by
professing deep gratitude for this visit. He saw the NAC trip
as a symbol that Georgia does not stand alone, and that NATO
and Georgia share common principles. Saakashvili observed
that the bonds between NATO and Georgia stem from a common
interest in greater security in the South Caucasus, bonds
that should be seen as a threat to no one. The President said
this war was not of Georgia's choosing, nor of Georgia's
initiative. He enthusiastically referred to new evidence
entering the public domain that Russia had initiated a
conflict in an attempt to redraw the map of Europe, and
overthrow a democratic government. Saakashvili thought that
the international community had responded loudly and clearly
to Russia's challenge to international law. He expressed
thanks for NATO's strong statements during the conflict,
saying that Georgia's ability to withstand the Russian
onslaught had been linked to its friends and partners in the

West, including NATO. Saakashvili underlined the Georgian
people had suffered too long under authoritarian regimes to
relinquish the gains of recent years and promised to announce
a new and deeper series of reforms in a speech to parliament
on September 16 (Ref A). The president also said he had
expressed his condolences to all those who had lost
loved-ones in the conflict regardless of which side they were
on.


3. (C) Saakashvili did not hesitate when responding to a
pointed German question on the origins of the war. He
countered the German implication that Georgia was looking for
a fight by saying Georgia had expected aggression for a long
time and had merely been preparing to defend itself. He
claimed to have been trying to downplay tensions and said he
would welcome a fully transparent investigation into the
causes of the war, including plans for the creation of a
parliamentary investigation into the causes of the war.
Saakashvili related a conversation he had with Putin in
November 2006, in which Putin had threatened to damage the
Georgian economy. Saakashvili said Putin had commented that
if economic measures failed then he would turn Georgia into
Cyprus. Saakashvili was deeply grateful to France for
obtaining a ceasefire from Russia when Moscow did not want to
talk, and hoped that the French would stay engaged after the
end of their EU presidency.


4. (C) Saakashvili acknowledged that Russia must be part of
the solution to ongoing tensions. He laid out his priorities
for the October Geneva talks.
-- compliance with the 6-point plan
-- an absolute right of dignified return of IDPs to both
South Ossetia and Abkhazia
-- access for any monitors to all of the disputed areas
He said that under no circumstances would Georgia give up any
territory, but guaranteed that Georgia would pursue its aims
by exclusively peaceful means.


5. (C) Saakashvili asserted that one of the worries for the
other side had been Georgian soft power successes won by
providing ethnically mixed villages with schools and
healthcare. The President said that the Russian interest in
this conflict was control of energy routes and regime change
in Tbilisi. He was grateful to donors for the measures
announced to bolster the Georgian economy, and promised to
continue economic reforms. The President also promised deeper
political reforms and asked PermReps to remember that Georgia
is playing its part in a merit-based process with NATO that
is leading to a decision on the provision of MAP in December.
This, he said, would be a moral decision on the part of the
Alliance.

--------------
PM to NAC - It's the Economy Stupid
--------------

6. (C) After signing the protocols for the establishment of
the new NATO Georgia Commission (Ref B) Prime Minister Lado
Gurgenidze characterized Georgia as a young liberal democracy
with a vibrant economy which is suffering from a Russian
effort to erode liberty and set a different political
direction for the country. He said the level of international
support for Georgia would determine the direction of
developments for months and years to come. Gurgenidze said
the damage to Georgian economy had been significant,
including damage to private property, deliberate
environmental damage by Russia, and loss of fiscal revenue
for the rest of the year. The PM highlighted the greatest
threat to the Georgian economy would be loss of confidence,
which would have to be restored within weeks or there would
be a risk of severe economic decline. Such decline, he said,
would risk social unrest, and possible regime change, as
Russia desired. Gurgenidze briefed on U.S., IMF, and other
international efforts to bolster the economy and expressed
his deepest thanks. He looked forward to the Georgia donor
conference in October, and underlined his view that possible
free trade agreements with the EU and U.S. would be crucial.


7. (C) The PM promised that Georgia was ready to play its
role in regional energy security. After displaying an
impressive knowledge of the details of Georgia's energy
supplies, Gurgenidze warned of the strategic importance for
Georgia of the Enguri Dam (Note: He indicated that Georgia
plans to diversify supply through the construction of
multiple smaller hydroelectric plants. End note). The Prime
Minister echoed Saakashvili's view that one of the causes of
the conflict had been the success of Georgian soft power in
South Ossetia. He said the population had begun to notice the
real progress in Georgian controlled areas, and this
development had been a real threat to the "kleptocracy of the
separatist regime." Gurgenidze said he was certain Georgia
could win again through soft power. Gurgenidze looked forward
to deepening reforms in Georgia, mentioning that President
Saakashvili would soon announce a new package of reforms to
parliament. He pledged Georgia's commitment to continue its
work towards integration with NATO which, he said, would be
the ultimate guarantor of Georgia's stability and security.


8. (C) Defense Minister Kezerashvili, in a very short
intervention, said Georgia is currently conducting a damage
assessment. He said a strategic defense review would be
accompanied by new defense planning that would encompass the
new realities of a self-defense mission. Kezerashvili said
Georgia's priority remains NATO membership, and NATO
interoperability would remain a core defense priority

--------------
Parliament: Even the Opposition stands
with us (for now)
--------------

9. (C) Speaker Davit Bakradze told the NAC that there was a
danger of losing one of the great achievements of the end of
the cold war: the end of spheres of influence. He warned
that issues such as access for monitors involve the changing
of the borders of Europe, and suggested that the
international community had a key role to play in its
response to ethnic cleansing. He also highlighted the need
for a new conflict resolution mechanism, as all that is in
place is the 6-point plan. The Speaker also emphasized that
whoever controls Georgia would have the power to cut off
energy supply routes.


10. (C)Bakradze referenced James Madison's conclusion that
problems with democracy can only be solved with more
democracy. Reforms would be intensified. He viewed the
conflict as the price for "living outside of the environment
that defends democracies." In response to PermReps questions
on MAP, Bakradze said he would view MAP as a framework for
more robust reforms, rather than a privilege for Georgia. He
indicated his willingness to work with members of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly to build more support for Georgia.


11. (C) Bakradze pledged his continued willingness to work
with all members of the opposition, including those that had
chosen not to take their seats in parliament. He underlined
that election timetables would not be postponed as a result
of the crisis.


12. (C) Assembled Georgian Parliamentarians from the
opposition expressed similar sentiments to Bakradze in
relation to Euro-Atlantic Integration and MAP. Some
underlined that this was a time for national unity and
several referred to a three point charter adopted by the
Parliament that reaffirmed Georgia's NATO aspirations, the
territorial integrity of Georgia, and a national commitment
to act only within the constitutional framework. Opposition
members expressed enthusiasm for election reform, but a
central message to the NAC was that MAP would be a way to
avoid further bloodshed. Several contended a failure by NATO
to grant MAP in December would be a signal to Moscow that
Russia will retain freedom of action in Georgia, and the
region.

--------------
NAC PermReps play familiar tunes
--------------

13. (C) PermReps' comments during the series of meetings
conveyed a sense that national positions were relatively
unchanged, despite the August conflict. The only perceptible
shift was an air of greater caution when MAP was mentioned,
with even strong supporters of Georgia urging them to also
focus on reform.


14. (C) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer underlined
that this visit came at a "difficult and complex time,"
before highlighting NATO's view that Russia had used
disproportionate force. He repeated that Moscow must live up
to its commitments under the Sarkozy 6-point plan. At the
same time de Hoop Scheffer emphasized that Georgia must stay
the course of reform, which would remain essential on the
path towards further Euro-Atlantic integration.


15. (C) The conflict itself was a central theme in all
discussions. For example, in the meeting with the President,
Belgium condemned the Russian use of force and the subsequent
recognition of the separatist provinces. Czech PermRep Stefan
Fule recalled the 1968 Prague incursion by Soviet forces as a
parallel to the August conflict in Georgia. His Lithuanian
counterpart rejected Russian FM Lavrov's new principles of
defending "Russian citizens," while the Canadian PermRep
asserted that reversal of the Russian action would be
essential to restoring regional peace and security. Spain, by
contrast, stood alone by repeatedly calling for all
communication on the issue to include Russia.


16. (C) French PermRep Andreani often underlined the Sarkozy
peace initiative, which many PermReps explicitly supported.
Lithuania said EU observers must be able to deploy to all
areas of Georgia. Lithuania and Canada led calls for an
independent investigation into the outbreak of violence,
while Norway also cautioned that any credible investigation
would have to look into both sides' actions. All PermReps
underlined their support for Georgian territorial integrity
and sovereignty.


17. (C) Many Allies called on Georgia to continue its
reforms. However, Czech PermRep Fule thought that while
reform is important the MAP decision will be based on more
political considerations. Italy hoped Georgia would look to
the future and not to the past. The Italian asserted that
Georgia needs to develop more economic and social strength
rather than military strength. Bulgaria echoed this theme,
encouraging Georgia to avoid new tensions and develop a modus
vivendi with its northern neighbor.


18. (C) German PermRep Brandenburg,s cynicism stood out,
even though he claimed to be bringing a message of support
for Georgia. He shared that Germany would provide 40
observers for the EU monitoring mission, while calling for
both OSCE and UN observers to continue their missions in the
separatist areas. Brandenburg pointedly insisted that
responsibility for the outbreak of conflict could be shared.
He said there were questions that both Russia and Georgia
should be asked, including the issue of Georgian preparations
for the conflict and the withdrawal of the Georgian
peacekeeping element from Tskhinvali in the month before the
conflict. He reiterated the German call for NATO to have a
"supportive role," and not to be part of the problem (Note:
this in reality is a call for NATO to have the minimum
possible role. End note).


19. (C) Ambassador Volker's interventions complimented the
Georgian people on their courage and resilience in their
commitment to economic and democratic reform. He said the NAC
visit was a symbol that NATO stands with Georgia, that NATO
supports Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty and
that the Alliance wants to see full implementation of the
ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian forces. Ambassador
Volker also saw the creation of the new NGC as a step that
moves beyond the symbolism towards practical action.

--------------
NAC meeting with UN, EU, and OSCE
representatives
--------------


20. (C) While EU Representative for the South Caucasus Peter
Semneby conveyed little new information to the NAC, OSCE
Ambassador Terhi Hakala, and UNOMIG DSRSG Ivo Petrov provided
useful perspectives. Hakala said she had met with Russian FM
Lavrov on September 15 but Lavrov would allow only eight OSCE
observers the right to patrol within the former conflict zone
under the Russian approach to the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan.
Lavrov had said that further deployments must be agreed with
the South Ossetians. Petrov warned that the UNOMIG mandate
would expire on October 15 and said that he had no clarity on
the future of the mission. PermReps expressed strong support
for the work of all three organizations. Germany asked
whether the Georgians had breached their obligations in July
by failing to provide forces to the joint peacekeeping
operation in South Ossetia. The UK PermRep quickly objected,
asking whether it could be said that the Russians have any
legal basis for any of their actions.


21. (C) Breakout sessions offered the following options:

-- Visit to the NATO Information Office and the Georgian Air
Operations Center
-- Roundtable with opposition members
-- Meeting with the Deputy Ombudsman
-- Roundtable with NGO and media representatives

Ambassador Volker attended the NGO and media session, and
found it to be a dynamic and useful exchange of views. The
briefing at the Georgian Air Operations Center was poorly
done, with some of the delegation expressing themselves more
confused after the presentation than before. We understand
from several Allies that the sessions with the Deputy
Ombudsman and with the opposition both injected a new
perspective. Allies heard opinions on the nature of Georgian
democracy that had not been heard in previous sessions with
the government. Again, the significance of this to Allies
seems to depend on pre-existing positions.


22. (C) The final trip activity involved visits to the 1st
Infantry Brigade barracks and to a refugee camp. Conflict
damage at the base was varied, with the vast majority of the
buildings intact, but some lying in ruins, apparently from
aerial bombardment. While we were also briefed on Russian
efforts to degrade the base while occupying it during the
conflict, this was a short visit which seemed to have been
designed more for visual impact than information sharing. The
Refugee camp, run by UNHCR with assistance from Italy and
France, held 2,200 IDPs in 250 tents. Most had fled to
Tbilisi during the fighting, then had returned as far as
Gori, but felt unable to go farther north. Many family
members had made quick trips home to assess the possibility
of return, or to tend to crops, but there seemed to be no
sense that a general return would be possible and the camp
was being winterized. The UNHCR and International Rescue
Committee representatives said that as of September 16 (40
days after the Russian invasion),there were still 66,000
displaced persons in Georgia unable to return to their homes.


23. (U) Georgian media gave extensive positive coverage to
the NAC visit. All major Georgian television companies
dedicated their primetime to the NAC meeting in Tbilisi. The
bottom-line of the Georgian print media reaction to the NAC
meeting was one of NATO's strong support for Georgia and its
territorial integrity, however, a lack of clear message on
Georgia receiving MAP status in December. The Georgians
especially picked up on two specific messages from the
SecGen; one, that no other country would have a veto over
Georgia,s accession to NATO, and two, Georgia must advance
democratic reforms.

--------------
Comment
--------------

24. (C) First reactions from the NAC appear to be that the
Georgians put on a solid trip and said the right things.
Saakashvili was not unreasonable in his meeting, and the PM
gave an exceptional performance. We do know that SYG Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer remains unhappy with Saakashvili and delivered
tough messages in their bilateral meeting. The SYG's staff
says that de Hoop Scheffer felt Saakashvili tried to box him
into saying things he did not want to say in their press
conference, further alienating the SYG toward the President.


25. (C) We do not assess that national positions will change
much as a result of this visit. Skeptics of MAP for Georgia
were keen to encourage further reforms, and it seems that the
GoG intends to call their bluff. Germany remains unhelpful,
and appeared to use the visit more as a fishing expedition
for critical material than an opportunity for an honest
appraisal of the situation on the ground. German calls for
NATO to play a "supportive role" and not become part of the
problem should be seen for what they are: a call for NATO to
have the minimum involvement possible (Indeed, at a PermReps
lunch on September 30, the German PermRep declared that NATO
must 'remain neutral' in the conflict between Georgia and
Russia). The new Spanish PermRep was happy to call for NATO
to talk to Russia, even in meetings with our Georgian hosts.
We conclude from this that Spain will continue to be a
growing problem when dealing with issues involving Russia.


26. (C) The Georgian Mission to NATO has shared Tbilisi's
initial assessment that the PermReps, even the most friendly
to Georgia, sounded more cautious about the possibility of
MAP in December. We believe they are correct, with even some
of the Balts prone to mentioning further reforms in the same
sentence as MAP. Our Georgian contacts in Brussels attribute
this slight change in NATO's tone on the conflict itself.
They echo the fears we heard in Tbilisi about what Russia
will feel free to do if NATO declines to grant MAP at the
December Ministerial.


27. (C) A long road to MAP has become longer as a result of
the conflict. The next challenge is how best to use the
newly-inaugurated NGC. This was conceived in a search for a
political deliverable in the run up to the August 19 NATO
Foreign Ministerial and no nation has yet successfully
defined the paradigm of what the NGC is really supposed to
be. Some of the more helpful Allies have made it explicitly
clear that they do not see the NGC as a substitute for MAP,
but already Italy has described the NGC as an intensification
of NATO's intensified dialogue process. We will have to work
hard with Georgia to ensure that early meetings of the NCG
demonstrate further maturity from the Georgian side, and that
these encounters have enough substance to make concrete
strides in the NATO-Georgia relationship. End comment.


28. (U) This cable has been cleared by Embassy Tbilisi.
VOLKER