(C) VISEGRAD, BALTIC ALLIES DESIRE INCREASED NATO

S E C R E T USNATO 000348

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR
SUBJECT: (C) VISEGRAD, BALTIC ALLIES DESIRE INCREASED NATO
DEFENSE PLANNING

REF: USNATO 324

Classified By: CDA. W.S. REID III: REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(S/NF) Summary: The expanded Visegrad (V-4 plus Romania
and Bulgaria) and Baltic NATO Ambassadors met September 24
with the Canadian NATO Ambassador, UK NATO DCM and USNATO
A/DCM to discuss ostensibly "NATO-Georgia Commission next
steps." Upon arrival at the meeting, participants were given
copies of attached CZ non-paper on NATO defense planning by
CZ NATO AMB Fule. Two hours of debate on defense planning
ensued with considerably forward-leaning NATO defense
planning initiatives being championed by Expanded Visegrad
and Baltic NATO Ambassadors and moderating efforts by the
Canadian, UK and U.S. representatives. Generally, the
Expanded Visegrad and Baltic NATO missions, to varying
degrees, took discussion at the informal London Defense
Ministerial as at least a springboard upon which to build
formal NATO agreement beginning at the upcoming October
Defense Ministerial in Budapest for "enhancing the visibility
of Article 5." Topics generally endorsed by the Expanded
Visegrad and Baltic NATO missions were: seeking formal NATO
definition of Russia as a defense planning threat through the
MC 161 process; liberalizing NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP) outlays in at least the Baltics and Poland;
development of contingency operations plans for the Baltics
and most Visegrad states; revival of NATO live exercises;
development of a more robust NATO presence in the Black Sea
(Bulgaria was more forward-leaning than Romania and both
expressed dismay at Turkish use of the Montreux Convention to
limit NATO's activities in the Black Sea basin); possible
"High North" regional defense planning (a la a recent
Norwegian non-paper); and seeking a "new NRF meaning for
collective defense." The Expanded Visegrad and Baltic Allies
did not initiate a way forward on air policing and none
responded when the U.S. representative requested their views.
Although not all Expanded Visegrad and Baltic Ambassador
explicitly agreed with the Bulgarian Ambassador's statement
that the collective ambition level for defence planning
"should stop just short of earmarking (Allied) forces for
collective defence," almost all associated themselves with
his remarks in their following statements. Neither the
Slovak and Hungarian Ambassador nor Slovak and Hungarian
Mission NATO representatives were present at the meeting and
several Visegrad Ambassadors made clear that the paper and
its contents at least were not for discussion with the
Slovaks, although it was understood that the proposal was a
Visegrad format-like product. End Summary.

2.(S/NF) TEXT OF CZECH NON-PAPER:

CLOSE HOLD

INFORMAL REMARKS ON FOLLOW-UP TO DEFENCE MINISTERS DINNER IN
LONDON (19.9.2008)


I. More active intra-Alliance discussion to consider
consequences of the Georgian crisis for Alliance
transformation has been suggested. A need to consider
various steps that we should take in the field of defence
policy and planning to (begin bold text) enhance visibility
of Article 5 (end bold text) has been stressed.

II. During discussions at and around the dinner following
areas have been highlighted:

- COPS (contingency Plans) for nations that are more exposed
from security point of view;
- New NRF meaning for collective defence;
- Adequacy/relevance of the current level of (italics begin)
Host Nation Support (italics end) NSIP projects;
- Extension of responsibility of operational commands toward
collective defence;
- Air Policing;
- Common exercises, both "live" and "table top" (CMX 2010
should deal (play) with Article 5);
- In place forces (Comment: Latvia showed the most interest
here. End Comment).

III. The above-mentioned areas could be developed either on
an individual basis or in a form of a comprehensive report
(in the form of a policy paper) that would assess
possibilities to strengthen relevance of allied defence

policy and planning in proposed areas.

IV. Naturally, we should keep bearing on mind the basic
principles we agreed upon in London:

- Deployable capabilities are useful for collective defence,
as well as for expeditionary operations/operations abroad;
- We are not returning back to the cold war, to
revitalisation of the static territorial defence concept.

CLOSE HOLD

END TEXT

3.(C/NF) In the only brief foray into the advertised raison
d'etre for the meeting, the Czech, Polish and Baltic
Ambassadors called for the newly-agreed Budapest Defence
Ministerial NATO-Georgia Commission to have a
"NATO-Ukraine-like Joint Defence Working Group" as a
"deliverable. U.S., Canadian and UK representatives
encouraged the advocating Ambassadors to consider further the
effects of establishing such a group on a country with a
small defence establishment and NATO mission, particularly
given the difficulties that the larger Ukrainian defence
establishment and NATO mission have in meeting the group's
staffing requirements.


REID