OUTGOING KFOR COMMANDER GIVES SOBERING ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000316

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS KV
SUBJECT: OUTGOING KFOR COMMANDER GIVES SOBERING ASSESSMENT
OF EULEX DEPLOYMENT, CALLS FOR KFOR-EULEX-UNMIK COOPERATION

REF: USNATO 000312

Classified By: A/DCM W. Scott Reid for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Outgoing Kosovo Force (KFOR)
commander Lieutenant General de Marnhac on 3 September told
NATO Perm Reps and non-NATO KFOR contributors that KFOR
needed adapted guidance from the NAC and that getting working
arrangements right between KFOR, the EU Rule of Law Mission
in Kosovo (EULEX),and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was
critical. He warned that, in the current ambiguous
environment, KFOR could rapidly find itself in the role of
first responder on primary security. LTG de Marnhac said
Kosovar Serbs are not willing to allow EULEX into northern
Kosovo at present and that KFOR faced a challenge in engaging
Kosovar Albanians, Serbs, and Belgrade and maintaining its
impartiality. The Secretary General seconded LTG de
Marnhac's call for Allies to provide resources for KFOR's new
tasks. De Marnhac's sobering assessment--especially on the
difficulty of EULEX deploying to the north and the
possibility that KFOR may become first responder by
default--contrasted with EULEX Head of Mission de Kermabon's
more optimistic briefing to the NAC the day before (reftel).
END SUMMARY & COMMENT

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LOOKING FOR OPLAN REVISION
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2. (C) Outgoing Kosovo Force (KFOR) commander Lieutenant
General de Marnhac on 3 September briefed NATO Perm Reps and
non-NATO KFOR contributors on KFOR. SACEUR General Craddock
introduced LTG de Marnhac, noting that he has performed ably
over the past year and most recently in engaging on the
transition between the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in the absence of
political guidance. LTG de Marnhac reviewed KFOR's efforts
to ensure a safe and secure environment during his command
and warned that the current environment of political
ambiguity in post-independence Kosovo presents major
challenges for KFOR and the international community. He
advocated that KFOR maintain a pre-emptive posture and for
the NAC to provide adapted guidance to KFOR in the form of an
updated OPLAN that addresses KFOR's relationship with the
EULEX mission.

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KFOR-EULEX-UNMIK COOPERATION CRITICAL
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Volker--along with the British and Italian
Perm Reps--stressed the need for seamless coordination
between KFOR, EULEX, and UNMIK. The French Perm Rep said it
was essential that the Council authorized a revised
Operations Plan (OPLAN) and end the "blockage" to KFOR-EULEX
cooperation. LTG Marnhac stated that getting
KFOR-EULEX-UNMIK working arrangements right was critical
because KFOR had less maneuver space in the current
environment and could easily be forced into the role of first
responder to security incidents.

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TURKEY IRKED BY FRANCE
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4. (C) During the Allies-only NAC meeting that followed, the
Turkish Perm Rep expressed his disappointment at the French
reference to a blockage, which he said he assumed was
directed at Turkey. He said the issue of the OPLAN should
have been "for Allies ears only" and urged EU states to
examine how they could address Turkey's complaints about its
relationship with ESDP rather than criticizing Turkey in
front of non-Allies. (Comment: Whether or not this was a
rookie misstep by a new French NATO team or a calculated EU
Presidency step, it misfired clearly and will not improve the
atmosphere to cajole flexibility out of Ankara. End
Comment.)

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EULEX MOVE INTO NORTH NOT POSSIBLE AT PRESENT
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5. (C) In contrast to EULEX Head of Mission de Kermabon's
brief at NATO yesterday (see reftel),LTG Marnhac was
pessimistic about EULEX's prospects for deploying into
northern Kosovo, saying he saw no willingness by Kosovar
Serbs to accept EULEX. In case EULEX is unable to move into
the north, KFOR will have the additional challenge of working
with UNMIK in the north and EULEX elsewhere, a difficulty
compounded by the fact that EULEX will have a very different
mission than UNMIK. In response to Ambassador Volker's query
about the possibility of a security gap, LTG Marnhac said
UNMIK would remain in force in the north but he was uncertain
how events would transpire at the end of the transition
period. KFOR could find itself placed in a position of first
responder. As much as possible, KFOR must operate outside of
its camps and prevent problems before they arise.

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KFOR NEEDS BALANCED APPROACH AT REGIONAL LEVEL
-------------- -


6. (C) LTG de Marnhac said the conflict between the Kosovo
constitution and the Serbian agenda was a key challenge.
KFOR needs to work with increasingly assertive Kosovar
authorities on issues previously handled by UNMIK and engage
productively with Belgrade and Kosovar Serbs. Responding to a
German question about the extent of Belgrade's influence in
northern Kosovo, LTG Marnhac assessed that the radical
elements that dominate in the north were largely out of the
current Serbian government's control. Belgrade is taking
steps to gain control but LTG Marnhac expected that the
radicals would react strongly and probably violently. He
predicted that his successor "will be tested" in coming weeks
or months. He indicated, however, that success by Belgrade,
should it materialize, would be a very positive development
that could allow NATO to begin reassessing KFOR's force
posture.


7. (C) The Norwegian Perm Rep noted de Marnhac's comment that
KFOR's new tasks of standing up the Kosovo Security Force
(KSF) and demobilizing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
could compromise KFOR's partiality. He then suggested that
KFOR should be proactive in its public diplomacy efforts to
explain its role in these tasks to Belgrade and Kosovar
Serbs. LTG de Marnhac said that NATO and KFOR needed to
stress that the new tasks were another contribution to the
security and stability of Kosovo and to convince Belgrade
that it was in Serbia's interests for the KSF to be under the
strong control of NATO.

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CALLING FOR MORE RESOURCES FOR NEW TASKS
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8. (C) LTG de Marnhac said KFOR has good relations with the
KSF but NATO must deliver the manpower and funds necessary to
stand up the organization. He also said that standing down
the KPC was a sensitive process--particularly with regard to
pensions for KPC members who were not being picked up by the
KSF--that had to be handled wisely. The Secretary General
responded with a plea for Allies to come forward with more
funds for the KSF and KPC Trust Funds. He said the KSF Trust
Fund was currently funded at 200,000 euros, sufficient only
to conduct medical screening of KSF applicants.


VOLKER