D/NIO BRIEFS NATO ALLIES ON STATE OF PLAY IN

S E C R E T USNATO 000025

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR SCA, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: MARR NATO PINR PREL PTER PK AF
SUBJECT: D/NIO BRIEFS NATO ALLIES ON STATE OF PLAY IN
PAKISTAN


Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: On 18 January, John Dister, the Deputy
National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, briefed NATO
PermReps in a Secretary General's (SYG) Coffee format. Mr.
Dister's presentation focused on three themes requested by
the SYG: Pakistan stability; Pakistan's impact on
Afghanistan; and overall Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
According to Dister, the Pakistani government faces an
unparalleled terrorism threat from Al-Qaida and allied
militant groups, but these groups' increased operational
tempo in Pakistan has not yet had a major impact on the
security situation in Afghanistan. He highlighted recent
positive developments in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
NOTE: Mr. Dister's presentation was cleared for the purpose
of an oral briefing only. END SUMMARY.

PAKISTAN STABILITY
--------------

2. (S) Mr. Dister briefed that Al-Qaida and tribal allies are
more inclined to attack the government and its institutions
than in past. This aggressive posture has become more
noticeable since the Red Mosque siege in July 07. He went on
to say that the role of Baitullah Massoud as an effective
leader in the Taliban is not to be underestimated as he is
expanding his base of support. Although the Pakistani
military has been aggressive in some operations, it needs to
make a commitment to developing a counter-insurgency
capability.

PAKISTAN'S IMPACT ON AFGHANISTAN
--------------

3. (S) Some Afghan militants are now going to Pakistan to
fight there, according to Mr. Dister, while some Pakistan
operations have pushed refugees into Afghanistan, but
overall, the impact of this cross-border movement is not
large. Dister stressed that now is the time to impress upon
Musharraf that the threat from Al-Qaida is a threat to his
vision of a modern Pakistan, and that between political
stability and counterterrorism success, the situation cannot
be viewed in terms of trade-offs. Recent developments, such
as new leadership in the Army, (eg. Chief Of Staff Kayani),
and the fact that the Governor of the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP),who favored accommodation with militants,
has resigned, are positive indications that Pakistan could
adopt a more consistent policy of military pressure.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS
--------------

4. (S) Since the summer, a big improvement has been seen in
overall relations, observed Dister. President Musharraf is
saying the "right things," and COS Kayani recognizes the
importance of military-military relations with Pakistan's
western neighbor.

THEMES IN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WITH PERMREPS
--------------

5. (S) Regarding the loyalty and professionalism of Pakistan
security services, both the Army and the Directorate for
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) follow the President's
orders, Mr. Dister pointed out, citing the example of the
ISI's immediate shutdown of Kashmir operations in 2006. On
Afghanistan, the ISI's policy is different, but its loyalties
are with the government and it's still responsive to the
Government. So, Dister concluded, when the ISI supports the
Taliban, one can assume it is acting on GOP orders. He noted
the huge anxiety in Pakistan leadership circles that US/NATO
will pull out of Afghanistan in the near future, leaving
chaos, thus causing the ISI to maintain links with Taliban as
a hedge. Also, the existential fear of Indian meddling in
Afghanistan makes the ISI reluctant to cut all ties with the
Taliban. Mr. Dister answered one question in stating that
penetration of the security forces is a problem, that the
Pakistanis are aware of it, and are taking countermeasures.

POLITICS
--------------


6. (S) It is very important that elections be perceived as
free and fair, said Dister, though he expects that they will
be violent. The major crises in Pakistan history - 1971 war,
Zia coup ) were triggered by flawed elections, he went on to
say. The opposition needs to also understand the perilous
nature of the situation.

BORDERS
--------------

7. (S) Because of the difficult terrain and its low level of
popular support in the area, it is much more difficult for
security services to operate in North and South Waziristan
than in NWFP areas north of Peshawar. The Pakistan Army is
disciplined, but not good at counter-insurgency; company
grade officers carry out orders, but don't know commanders
intent, and demonstrate no flexibility. Communications
between ground forces and the air force are lacking.

AL-QAIDA VS. TALIBAN
--------------

8. (s) Mr. Dister reported that there are some tensions
between the two groups stemming from fact that the Taliban
have their own &positive8 vision for Afghanistan, whereas
Al-Qaida simply wants a place from which to operate. On
foreign funding for these groups, Dister said that specifics
are not available, but funding does come from the Gulf. The
Saudis have expressed concern about Pakistan, "but we will
see if that translates into action against financing
networks," he said. The Pakistan military is too
overstretched to undertake operations in Quetta, where there
is an extensive concentration of Taliban leaders, for what
would be marginal gain from their perspective, (since they
wish to preserve the Taliban as a hedge, as noted above).

NUCLEAR FORCES
--------------

9. (S) Although security is fairly good, militants are very
determined to get access and the safety of the Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal cannot be taken for granted.

OTHER ISSUES
--------------

10. (S) When asked to hypothesize what the fallout would be
if President Musharraf were to be assassinated, Dister
replied the consequences would be quite dire and serious.
Although there are succession procedures in place, and
Pakistan would not fall apart, such a tragedy would be
perceived as a huge win for Al-Qaida and terrorism. In that
vein, he theorized that the upcoming elections could be a
target for attack, but there are no such indications right
now. He said that it is plausible that militants envision
interrupting the electoral process as another way to erode
confidence in the government.


11. (S) COMMENT: From the number and sophistication of
questions, it is clear that PermReps not only were interested
in the briefing but had solicited input from capitals on key
questions. Many expressed the view that such briefings
should be done on a regular basis. There is clearly a market
here for briefings of this sort, and for intelligence at the
REL NATO level. END COMMENT


12. (SBU) Mission greatly appreciates the NIC making Mr.
Dister available on short notice in response to a request
from Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, (who will meet
President Musharraf on Monday). The briefing went a long to
way toward ensuring that the transatlantic dialogue on
Pakistan is conducted on the basis of solid and shared
information.

NULAND