Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO239
2008-07-10 07:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

RUSSIA OFFERS PESSIMISTIC VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN AND

Tags:  NATO PREL PGOV MOPS AADP RS AF KV UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3475
OO RUEHPW
DE RUEHNO #0239/01 1920737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100737Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2056
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0961
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0124
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6001
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0720
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000239 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV MOPS AADP RS AF KV UP
SUBJECT: RUSSIA OFFERS PESSIMISTIC VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN AND
KOSOVO AT JUNE 25 NRC

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson, Jr. Reasons: 1.4 (b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000239

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL PGOV MOPS AADP RS AF KV UP
SUBJECT: RUSSIA OFFERS PESSIMISTIC VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN AND
KOSOVO AT JUNE 25 NRC

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard G. Olson, Jr. Reasons: 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Zamir
Kabulov informed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) during its
June 25 meeting that although Afghanistan is a more civil
place than in 2001, the mission in Afghanistan was failing
and that much more needed to be done in the areas of
counter-narcotics, government reform, economic development,
and military strategy. Several Allies challenged and
rebuffed his dire predictions and his assertions that Afghans
wanted ISAF to leave. Turning to Kosovo, Russian Ambassador
Rogozin argued that NATO and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
were "improvising" on UNSCR 1244 and especially criticized
NATO for taking on "new responsibilities" in Kosovo. Some
Allies argued that the new tasks were necessary for improving
Kosovo. At the end of the meeting, Rogozin asked the SYG for
his views on the NAC,s trip to Kyiv, characterizing the trip
as NATO "agitating" for Ukrainian NATO accession while also
expressing concern over Ukraine,s movement towards NATO.
The SYG ended the discussion by refuting these assertions,
arguing that the NAC went to Kyiv to listen to Ukrainians.


2. (SBU) Deputy Commander Submarines North Captain David
Dittmer briefed the Council on the successful completion of
the joint NATO-Russia submarine training exercise Operation
Bold Monarch. Charge Olson thanked members of the Council
for sending representatives to the U.S.-hosted peacekeeping
training session in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. END SUMMARY.

--------------
RUSSIA'S IMPRESSIONS OF ISAF'S MISSION
--------------


3. (C) During the June 25 meeting of the NATO-Russia Council,
visiting Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov
acknowledged that Afghanistan is a more humane place than it
was in 2001. He added that he appreciated the opportunity
for an open dialogue between Russia and NATO, noting that

both share common concerns over Afghanistan,s stability.
After offering these few positive comments, Kabulov began his
critique of the current situation in Afghanistan by arguing
that the number of unstable provinces susceptible to Taliban
influence has risen in direct correlation with the increase
of ISAF units in Afghanistan since 2005. At first he
declared that there was a military solution. However,
Kabulov later added that NATO needed to emphasize improving
economic conditions for all Afghans. In his view, this
approach, rather than the "American ideas of aerial
spraying," would help decrease the opium trade.
Additionally, he stressed that ISAF had failed to establish
an open dialogue with Afghans and instead talked to them
"down the barrel of a gun," resulting in increased sympathy
for Taliban. Finally, turning his attention to
Afghanistan,s political environment, Kabulov argued that
Western-style democracy can not work unless it takes into
account Afghanistan,s history and culture. Asserting that
Karzai's NATO-backed government was weak, Kabulov speculated
that if NATO left Afghanistan the government would fall in a
month. Kabulov said that by engaging in the aforementioned
practices, NATO was repeating Soviet mistakes and assessing
the "cold practical realities of Afghanistan" incorrectly.
After this critical assessment, Kabulov claimed that Russia
wanted to be a partner with NATO on Afghanistan. However,
during his intervention Kabulov only suggested that Russia
supply the ANA with Russian-made weapons, such as AK-47s
(while criticizing NATO for purposefully having the ANA adopt
the M-16). Finally, Kabulov argued that NATO needed to
encourage clerics and other groups to work to build a more
unified and religiously moderate Afghanistan.


4. (C) Many Allies thanked Kabulov for his remarks, but some
(Bulgaria and the Netherlands) challenged his assertions that
democracy would not work in Afghanistan and that ISAF was
unpopular and unwanted. While thanking Russia for forgiving
Afghan debt and providing financial assistance to
Afghanistan, Charge Olson pointed out that Kabulov's
characterization of aerial drug eradication as potentially
causing adverse health effects was incorrect. He explained

USNATO 00000239 002 OF 003


that the U.S. was not employing aerial spraying against
poppies and that all US government counternarcotics efforts
were done in accordance with GOA policy. Hungary asked
whether Russia had considered non-military assistance to
Afghanistan, such as repairing or further developing Soviet
occupation-era infrastructure (e.g. dams),a question which
Kabulov did not answer. Finally, several Allies asked
whether Kabulov believed there were viable political
alternatives to Karzai; he responded that he did not see any
at present.


5. (C) After Kabulov,s presentation, the SYG and Allies
thanked Rogozin for Russia,s unilateral offer to allow
certain ISAF-related cargo to transit Russia via several
ground routes. When Rogozin complained that no one was making
use of the offer, the SYG pointed out that complementary
transit agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
plus Ukraine were being discussed.


6. (C) Rogozin ended his intervention by advocating for more
NATO-Russia counter-narcotics training at the Moscow
facility. The SYG answered this request by explaining that
Afghan bureaucracies did not consider this out of country
training a priority (in part because it is not
cost-efficient),but noted that the NATO staff would continue
to encourage Afghan contacts to attend future NRC training.
(Note: this is now on track for a future training session.
End Note.)

--------------
KFOR,S MANDATE
--------------


7. (C) Rogozin criticized ongoing NATO activities in Kosovo.
He stated that UNSCR 1244 is the only source of authority in
Kosovo because Kosovo,s Constitution is "irrelevant" and its
Ahtisaari plan roots lack any international legitimacy.
Rogozin said that UNSYG Ban Ki-moon,s letters to Belgrade
and Pristina and NATO,s new tasks were "improvising" on
UNSCR 1244 something that neither have the authority to do.
He contended that only the UNSC could amend or modify 1244
and it had not done so. Additionally, Rogozin said NATO was
acting in an irresponsible and de-stabilizing fashion by
ignoring its safe and secure environment mandate and
embarking on these new tasks. Rogozin claimed (without
offering specific evidence) that Serb monasteries were being
robbed, that there was a broad trend of ethnically targeted
Serb property seizures, and that there were indiscriminate
robberies in Kosovo. He also said that KFOR had ended its
impartiality toward Kosovo,s internal politics when it
decided not to recognize local Serb municipal elections in
Mitrovica. However, after making this assertion, Rogozin
referred to balloting elsewhere in Kosovo as legitimate. The
Czech Republic responded to Rogozin,s claims by arguing that
KFOR,s new tasks were in the international community,s
interest because they focused on maintaining a modest force
and channeling existing Kosovo armed elements into a small
professional security force. Finally Rogozin criticized the
U.S. for "arming the Kosovars" and questioned whether U.S.
public statements of "sending aviation gas" to Pristina are
really legitimate. Charge Olson rebutted Rogozin by stating
that our Excess Defense Articles (EDA) agreement is a routine
international agreement we have concluded with many, indeed
most, countries, including Serbia.

--------------
OPERATION BOLD MONARCH/PEACEKEEPING
--------------


8. (SBU) US Navy Captain David Dittmer, in his role as Deputy
Commander Submarines North, briefed the Council on Operation
Bold Monarch. Dittmer informed the Council that this
successful operation included the first mating of a Russian
rescue vehicle with a NATO submarine. Parties broadly
expressed great satisfaction with the level of cooperation
achieved and look forward to the next Bold Monarch exercise
in 2011.


9. (SBU) The SYG noted that cooperation in the NRC

USNATO 00000239 003 OF 003


Peacekeeping Working Group has intensified and has been
characterized by an exchange of views on stability
operations; the organization of visits to centers; and past
and future tabletop exercises. Also, Charge Olson thanked
Council members for sending representatives to the two-day
peacekeeping and security operations lessons learned
conference at the U.S. Army,s Carlisle Military Barracks in
Pennsylvania.

--------------
NAC TRIP TO UKRAINE
--------------


10. (C) Rogozin raised the NAC,s June trip to Kyiv, asking
the SYG about his impressions from the trip while arguing
that Ukraine,s movement toward NATO was an "acutely
sensitive topic in Russia" that could destabilize Russia,s
bordering areas. He stressed that the NAC visit was
unwelcome in Russian eyes because NATO was "agitating for
Ukraine to become a member state." The SYG rebutted the
Rogozin portrayal by stating that no "agitation" had taken
place, describing the visit as an information exchange
between NATO representatives and Ukrainian politicians and
citizens. The Czech Republic told Rogozin that it hoped
Russia would look favorably upon the upcoming similar NAC
trip to Georgia.


11. (C) To end the meeting, Rogozin announced that Russian
MILREP ADM Kuznetsov would depart in July and would be
replaced by General of the Army, former Russian Ground Forces
Commander, Maslov.
OLSON