PAKISTAN: ALLIES SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSALS TO DEEPEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000231

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR KPAO AF PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: ALLIES SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSALS TO DEEPEN
NATO ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. STATE 70664 (NOTAL)

B. USNATO 221

C. USNATO 212

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Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General
Ambassador James Pardew briefed the NAC on his June 25-26
meetings in Islamabad (Reftels A and B) during a June 30
informal NAC "coffee" meeting. Pardew characterized his
meetings as positive and productive, noting his interlocutors
were keen to develop deeper relations with NATO, but would
expect tangible assistance as part of a partnership. He
stated the Pakistani government welcomes increased high-level
engagement with NATO. Pardew's proposal to form a "Task
Force" among the NATO International Staff and International
Military Staff to develop further ideas for NATO engagement
with Pakistan met with PermReps' broad concurrence. PermReps
were broadly supportive of deepening NATO's political
engagement, with the Netherlands and UK expressing interest
in opening NATO's Partnership for Peace toolbox and Canada
suggesting naming a NATO "Contact Point Embassy" in
Islamabad, Greece emerging as the most skeptical toward any
further engagement, and Belgiu
m laying down a Partner-phobic redline against expanding
cooperation beyond immediate operational needs in
Afghanistan. Charge Olson supported engagement with Pakistan
by the SYG, cautioned against politicizing the Tripartite
Commission while urging its revitalization along existing
military lines, highlighted the need for Pakistan to
reciprocate with Border Coordination Centers on its side, and
expressed skepticism about non-enforceable peace deals with
Pakistani militants that result in increased violence in
Afghanistan. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer committed to
provide Allies a document mapping out the way ahead at NATO
to develop a policy and messages in advance of his autumn
trip to Pakistan. The Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan also
briefed during this meeting, per arrangements made by the
Turkish Delegation to NATO. END SUMMARY.

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AMB Pardew: NATO Can't Afford Not to be Engaged
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2. (C) Ambassador Pardew stated that Pakistan is central to
NATO's effort in Afghanistan, and urged the NAC to consider
NATO's policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a package: NATO
was engaged militarily in Afghanistan, and should consider
becoming more engaged politically in Pakistan. "Can we
afford not to be engaged," he asked, "and risk hostile or
remote relations with a nation key to NATO's success in
Afghanistan?" While appreciative of the Pakistani desire for
a deeper relationship with NATO, he was struck by the poor
state of Afghan-Pakistani relations and the fragile political
and security situation in Pakistan. He noted he had come
away from his stop in Islamabad with a sense of looming
crisis. He had perceived a weak Pakistani government focused
on issues such as energy, education, judges, and President
Musharraf's future, distracted and disinclined to take
meaningful, difficult decisions in the FATA and NWFP.
Pardew shared the highlights of the written trip report
(emailed to EUR/RPM) that h
e had passed to PermReps earlier in the morning. He noted
his interlocutors:

-- Welcomed a visit by the NATO SYG in autumn;

-- Accepted the SYG's written invitation to PM Gilani to
address the NAC, and it was "well received";

-- Suggested that NATO's policy engagement at the Assistant
Secretary General/Deputy Assistant Secretary General level
become regularized via semi-annual meetings rotated between
Islamabad and Brussels;


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-- Committed to participating in the Tripartite Commission
when the next date is set by ISAF;

-- Committed to participation in the Border Coordination
Centers and to provide personnel to the Khyber BCC in
Afghanistan, but expressed "major political difficulty" with
establishing BCCs on the Pakistani side of the border;

-- Remained skeptical on key jurisdictional issues,
particularly Vienna Convention status, related to a
NATO-Pakistani transit agreement long under negotiations, but
welcomed the establishment of a NATO/ISAF liaison office in
Islamabad, and gave "clear indications" that an expansion of
liaison functions to include political representation would
be welcomed;

-- Expressed a desire to participate in NATO schools and
training courses;

-- Expressed interest in enhancing public diplomacy
activities related to NATO, and NATO's role in Afghanistan.


3. (C) Ambassador Pardew recommended that NATO set up a Task
Force of International Military Staff and International Staff
officials to develop ideas for further NATO engagement with
Pakistan. He recommended that NATO military authorities send
an assessment team to Islamabad before the end of July to
develop a detailed proposal for a NATO/ISAF liaison
arrangement to be passed to the Pakistani government for
consideration, and that NATO HQ consider whether a political
representation within that office would be appropriate. He
also recommended that NATO Public Diplomacy officials follow
up with the appropriate Pakistani authorities on possible
joint work in the PD realm.

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Allies Generally Favor Expanded Military and Political Ties
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4. (C) Allies generally welcomed DASG Pardew's
recommendation to set up a Task Force. Bulgaria, Canada,
Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the UK all spoke
in favor. Canada, joined by the Netherlands and Norway,
proposed establishing a NATO "Contact Point Embassy" in
Islamabad (comment: a CPE is an embassy of a NATO Ally in a
Partner country, which acts as a channel for disseminating
information about the roles and policies of the Alliance. End
comment.) The UK and Netherlands advocated opening select
Partnership for Peace instruments, strategically chosen, in
order to enhance NATO-Pakistan relations and practical
cooperation. Poland offered that the North Atlantic Council
should travel as a group to Islamabad in the fall, for
political talks and public outreach (comment: the NAC
routinely travels to Afghanistan, as well as countries with
which NATO has relations, as it recently did with Ukraine.
End comment.)


5. (C) Belgium supported forming an IMS/IS Task Force, but
took a rigid partner-phobic stance toward expanding any sort
of cooperation beyond short-term, practical efforts that
could be concretely tied to Afghanistan; several nations made
the point in reply that the situation was not as black and
white as the Belgians may prefer. Portugal, joined by
Germany, noted the need to develop a NATO policy in time for
the SYG's autumn visit, and cautioned that India and its
views must be factored in. Greece agreed that NATO must
agree a policy framework prior to the SYG's autumn visit, but
was the most skeptical toward greater engagement, stating
that the most important thing was for Afghanistan and
Pakistan to talk to each other, and questioning the capacity
and authority of any interlocutors with whom the NAC or SY
might meet. The Greek questioned the utility o dialogue,
noting that the FATA and NWFP pose th greatest problems, but
that even if the Pakistan gvernment agreed with every point
NATO made, i doe
s not control those territories and thus cold not act.

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6. (C) Charge Olson drew on guidance sent in Reftel A,
supporting engagement with Pakistan by the SYG, cautioning
against politicizing the Tripartite Commission while urging
its revitalization along current military lines, and
highlighting the need for Pakistan to reciprocate with Border
Coordination Centers on its side. Building on an earlier
Canadian comment about communicating "NATO red lines" to the
Pakistani government about its peace deals in the FATA and
NWFP, he drew Allies' attention back to the June 5 briefing
to Allies by USD/P Edelman, and expressed skepticism about
non-enforceable peace deals with Pakistani militants that
result in increased violence in Afghanistan. He assured that
the United States conveys these concerns to the Pakistani
government. The Charge noted that increased public diplomacy
activities would be beneficial.

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SYG: Will Map out a Way Ahead in Advance of his Fall Trip
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7. (C) The Secretary General agreed that the NAC must
continue the discussion, and devise a policy framework and
messages for him to bring to Pakistan in October. He
committed to map out and share with Allies a way ahead
procedurally at NATO to accomplish this. He drew attention
to the need to "calibrate" any NATO policy with any thinking
and work that UN SRSG Kai Eide is doing toward Pakistan,
though clearly stating the NATO policy would stand on its
own. He also urged prudence in developing a political
relationship, urging the NAC "not to go into overdrive," and
to craft a strategy that would build on the trust and
confidence engendered during NATO's 2006 earthquake relief
effort in Pakistan.

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Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan Provides the View from
Islamabad
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8. (C) Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan Engin Soysal, whose
presence at the meeting had been arranged at the request of
the Turkish Delegation, briefed his view from Islamabad prior
to Pardew's brief. He hailed the February 18 general
election as a momentous achievement, urged patience with
Pakistani efforts to negotiate with militants in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West
Frontier Province (NWFP),and advocated for expanded NATO
political engagement in Islamabad. He urged Allies to move
NATO's relationship with Pakistan beyond the short-term focus
of Afghanistan, and treat Pakistan as a significant regional
power in its own right. Soysal gave a sympathetic view of
the challenges facing the government, and went to very great
lengths to "explain" the motivations of extremists and
terrorists operating in the FATA and NWFP, citing factors
such as the Palestinian situation, the situation in the
Middle East, and their frustration with their lot in life.
Charge Olson thanked the Turk f
or his brief, and commended Turkish efforts at enhancing
Afghan-Pakistan relations.
OLSON