Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO228
2008-07-01 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
USNATO RESPONSE TO SURVEYING IRAQ COALITION
how-toVZCZCXRO7392 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHNO #0228 1831548 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 011548Z JUL 08 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2032 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0574 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000228
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR RPM; NEA; EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: USNATO RESPONSE TO SURVEYING IRAQ COALITION
PARTNERS ON POST-UNSCR ARRANGEMENTS
REF: A. STATE 5589
B. STATE 4865
C. STATE 60836
Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000228
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR RPM; NEA; EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: USNATO RESPONSE TO SURVEYING IRAQ COALITION
PARTNERS ON POST-UNSCR ARRANGEMENTS
REF: A. STATE 5589
B. STATE 4865
C. STATE 60836
Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: We expect NATO would need approximately six
months after the signing of a U.S.-Iraq SOFA to finalize its
own legal arrangements that would allow the continuation of
the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Because several
NATO Allies will oppose the Alliance joining the US-Iraq SOFA
as a third party, even if such a provision exists, we
anticipate NATO will have to negotiate a separate exchange of
letters (EOL) with Iraq that would preferably reference the
terms of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA and extend them to NATO forces.
Such an EOL would also require some type of UN political
cover. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) The current legal mandate for the NATO Training
Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) is based upon the invitation of the
Iraqi government, UNSCR 1546 (2004),and the statement on
Iraq delivered by the NATO Heads of State and Government on
June 28, 2004. CPA Order #17 provides the legal framework
(privileges and immunities) for the NTM-I personnel in Iraq.
This structure was codified by an exchange of letters (EOL)
between NATO and the government of Iraq in 2005.
3. (C) The signing of a GOI-USG SOFA is expected to lead to
the rescission of CPA Order #17, the basis for the current
NTM-I legal framework. Since several Allies would find it
politically unfeasible to allow NATO to join the U.S.-Iraq
SOFA as a third party, we expect NATO will have to negotiate
a new exchange of letters with Iraq, hopefully one that
simply agrees to extend identical terms of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA
to NATO forces.
4. (C) It is our estimate that such an EOL would require six
months of negotiation and effort to move the agreement
through the NATO and Iraqi bureaucracies (the amount of time
it took to complete the existing EOL). USNATO encourages the
completion of U.S.-Iraq SOFA negotiations with sufficient
time for NATO's completing an EOL with Iraq. We also seek to
avoid the possible scenario in which NATO legal advisors
determine that if CPA Order #17 is rescinded without a new
legal framework being in place to replace it, NTM-I personnel
would not have the appropriate privileges and immunities to
continue their mission.
5. (C) USNATO believes that almost all NATO Allies will
additionally insist on the political cover of a relevant
UNSCR mandate for NTM-I, though something less than Chapter
VII may be sellable. We could also try selling a reference
to international organizations assisting in the development
of Iraq Security Forces (ISF) in the 2009 renewal of the
United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) resolution.
6. (SBU) The North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend
NTM-I through 2009 and to expand the mission to reflect the
new training requested by PM Maliki in January. According to
reports from NTM-I headquarters, carabinieri trained ISF
acquitted themselves very well during recent operations in
Basrah. NTM-I has a lot of momentum at NATO at the moment.
In such a positive Brussels environment, NATO should be able
to negotiate a new legal framework for NTM-I inside of six
months, barring unforeseen GOI policy terms.
OLSON
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR RPM; NEA; EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: USNATO RESPONSE TO SURVEYING IRAQ COALITION
PARTNERS ON POST-UNSCR ARRANGEMENTS
REF: A. STATE 5589
B. STATE 4865
C. STATE 60836
Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: We expect NATO would need approximately six
months after the signing of a U.S.-Iraq SOFA to finalize its
own legal arrangements that would allow the continuation of
the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Because several
NATO Allies will oppose the Alliance joining the US-Iraq SOFA
as a third party, even if such a provision exists, we
anticipate NATO will have to negotiate a separate exchange of
letters (EOL) with Iraq that would preferably reference the
terms of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA and extend them to NATO forces.
Such an EOL would also require some type of UN political
cover. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) The current legal mandate for the NATO Training
Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) is based upon the invitation of the
Iraqi government, UNSCR 1546 (2004),and the statement on
Iraq delivered by the NATO Heads of State and Government on
June 28, 2004. CPA Order #17 provides the legal framework
(privileges and immunities) for the NTM-I personnel in Iraq.
This structure was codified by an exchange of letters (EOL)
between NATO and the government of Iraq in 2005.
3. (C) The signing of a GOI-USG SOFA is expected to lead to
the rescission of CPA Order #17, the basis for the current
NTM-I legal framework. Since several Allies would find it
politically unfeasible to allow NATO to join the U.S.-Iraq
SOFA as a third party, we expect NATO will have to negotiate
a new exchange of letters with Iraq, hopefully one that
simply agrees to extend identical terms of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA
to NATO forces.
4. (C) It is our estimate that such an EOL would require six
months of negotiation and effort to move the agreement
through the NATO and Iraqi bureaucracies (the amount of time
it took to complete the existing EOL). USNATO encourages the
completion of U.S.-Iraq SOFA negotiations with sufficient
time for NATO's completing an EOL with Iraq. We also seek to
avoid the possible scenario in which NATO legal advisors
determine that if CPA Order #17 is rescinded without a new
legal framework being in place to replace it, NTM-I personnel
would not have the appropriate privileges and immunities to
continue their mission.
5. (C) USNATO believes that almost all NATO Allies will
additionally insist on the political cover of a relevant
UNSCR mandate for NTM-I, though something less than Chapter
VII may be sellable. We could also try selling a reference
to international organizations assisting in the development
of Iraq Security Forces (ISF) in the 2009 renewal of the
United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) resolution.
6. (SBU) The North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend
NTM-I through 2009 and to expand the mission to reflect the
new training requested by PM Maliki in January. According to
reports from NTM-I headquarters, carabinieri trained ISF
acquitted themselves very well during recent operations in
Basrah. NTM-I has a lot of momentum at NATO at the moment.
In such a positive Brussels environment, NATO should be able
to negotiate a new legal framework for NTM-I inside of six
months, barring unforeseen GOI policy terms.
OLSON