ISAF COMMANDER MCNEILL PRAISES ALLIED UNITY,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000200

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: ISAF COMMANDER MCNEILL PRAISES ALLIED UNITY,
HIGHLIGHTS REMAINING CHALLENGES IN HIS FAREWELL ADDRESS

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Former COMISAF General Dan K. McNeill, who
turned over ISAF command to General David McKiernan on June
3, commended Allied unity and investment in Afghanistan
during his June 4 farewell address to the NAC and ISAF
Partners. Nevertheless, he reminded Allies that NATO's
failure to fill ISAF's force requirements prolong the
mission, and that political support for ISAF both in
contributing nations and in Afghanistan could not be counted
on indefinitely. McNeill cited a 50 percent increase in
insurgent attacks in RC-East in April, and stated that
analysis shows a link between increased violence in
Afghanistan and deals with militants in Pakistan. He called
for NATO to have "unrelenting political dialogue" with the
Pakistani government on the problem of militant sanctuaries
in their border regions. He urged a frank discussion by the
NAC on ISAF's role in counternarcotics, and suggested an
expansion of ISAF's role to allow better support for Afghan
eradication forces and expanded interdiction. In a comment
that garnered close attention from Norway, Italy, and others,
General McNeill suggested an examination of whether NATO's
PRTs should transition to Afghan leadership with
international support sooner rather than later. In response
to questions from Poland and Jordan about the role of Iran,
McNeill noted that weapons continue to flow from Iran
although it is hard for ISAF to judge the extent given ISAF's
light presence in the West and complete lack of presence in
Nimroz province. In response to questions from several
nations, McNeill urged Allies to be ready to surge resources
to support upcoming elections, as NATO did in 2004-2005. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) In his June 4 farewell address to the NAC and ISAF
partners, outgoing COMISAF McNeill praised the individual
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of each contributing
nation. McNeill recalled the dire predictions in the press
at the time he took command of ISAF in February '07 about a
fraying Alliance and Taliban "offensives," neither of which
occurred. Rather than fraying, the Alliance had increased
ISAF force levels and capabilities, General McNeill said in
commending overall Allied unity. He assured PermReps that
ISAF has the initiative, and is a credible force on the
battlefield. He urged Allies and Partners to remain
steadfast in their commitment to the mission, while he
acknowledged the ups and downs of debates in the legislatures
of all contributing nations. He told PermReps it was no
secret that ISAF needed more forces. He reinforced the
message delivered to NAC repeatedly by the Secretary General,
Chairman of the Military Committee, and SACEUR, that while
ISAF will not fail given current force levels, it will take
longer for an under-resourced ISAF to complete its mission.
General McNeill cited the strategic danger of this timeframe
exceeding that of the perishable political will in
Afghanistan and on the domestic front in all ISAF
contributing nations.

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Pakistan: Problems with Sanctuaries, and an Uncertain Pakmil
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3. (S) General McNeill stressed that taming the insurgency
in Afghanistan, and bringing long-term stability, will prove
to be elusive so long as insurgent sanctuaries that enable
the recruitment, training, and refitting of forces remain in
Pakistan. He cited a 50 percent increase in insurgent

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attacks in RC-E in April, and stated that analysis shows a
link between this increased violence in Afghanistan and
decreased Pakistani security operations stemming from
political negotiations with militants in Pakistan. This lack
of pressure on the Pakistani side of the border - underscored
by the recent press conference of Pakistani Taliban leader
Baitullah Mehsud ("the most dangerous insurgent," according
to McNeill) in which he announced his intentions to fight in
Afghanistan -- undermined the solid counterinsurgency
operations conceived and led out by the United States and
implemented by Poland (and soon, France) as well in the east.
General McNeill shared his observation that the Pakistani
government has been less keen on dialogue with Afghanistan
and ISAF in the past sixty days than at any prior time in his
tenure as COMISAF. Citing a dysfunctional Pakistani
government, he urged an "unrelenting" political dialogue in
order to get Pakistan to come to terms with the extent of the
problem, and tackle it effectively.


4. (S) Canada, Germany, Romania, Turkey, and the UK asked
General McNeill about the utility of the Tripartite
Commission (TPC) as a means of addressing border challenges.
(Comment: Canada has been outspoken at NATO for adding a
political element to the TPC, and the Pakistani cancellation
of the last three high-level TPC meetings has alarmed some
Allies. End comment.) McNeill acknowledged that Pakistani
commitment to the TPC has been problematic of late, but urged
Allies not to overlook the fact that although several
high-level meetings had been cancelled, the work of all the
preparatory groups has continued, and the commanders of
RC-East and RC-South meet regularly with Pakistani
counterparts. While expressing confidence in Pakistani Army
Chief of Staff Kayani, he shared an observation based on
talks with him that Kayani is waiting for the political
confusion in Islamabad to clear up before making any decisive
moves on operations in the border regions and devoting part
of the Army's force structure from traditional defense roles
to counterinsurgency work.

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Counternarcotics: "When I See Poppies, I See the Insurgency"
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5. (C) The challenge extends beyond sanctuaries, General
McNeill stated, asserting that narcotics pose a greater
challenge in RC-South than does the insurgency, and that "20
to 40 percent" of insurgent funding comes from the drug
business. He commented that when he sees a field of poppy,
he sees the Kalashnikovs and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) that the poppy will fund. McNeill told the NAC that
ISAF was doing all it could at present to tackle narcotics
under the bounds of the present OPLAN, and encouraged a
robust debate in the NAC as to whether ISAF's mandate should
be expanded to increase its provision of force protection for
Afghan-led eradication and permit direct action by ISAF force
against drug labs, storage areas, precursor chemicals, and
key high-value traffickers linked to the insurgency. He was
careful to clarify that he opposed the conduct of eradication
operations by ISAF, and that ISAF should only support Afghan
forces in eradication. Nor should ISAF blur the lines
between policing and the conduct of military operations -
ISAF is a military operation, he stated. General McNeill
made clear, though, that the Afghan government must also take
a stronger stand and do more. He asked why President Karzai
or another high-level Afghan official had not yet made a
clear statement that the government will not tolerate illegal

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poppy cultivation any longer. Germany and France expressed
caution on expanding ISAF's counter narcotics role, citing
the crucial role for Afghan leadership, and suggesting that
the development of the ANA could lead to stronger Afghan
gains again narcotics.

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Pushing the Afghans to Do More
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6. (C) General McNeill praised progress made in the training
of the Afghan National Army and Police under COM CSTC-A MG
Cone's leadership, as well as the delivery of development
assistance and progress in governance by all ISAF Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Noting a tendency of Afghans to
turn to the international community to solve complex
problems, however, he recommended tough love in order to get
the Afghans to perform better. In response to a question
from the Dutch PermRep, he stated that at nearly 4,000 ANA
recruits monthly now, recruitment is not a problem for Afghan
security forces. He then stated that 2011 was a likely date
for ANA self sufficiency, but that the ANA would not be fully
mature until 2013 when the ANA Air Corps is fully
operational. He suggested that it might be useful to set a
firm target completion date, in order to put more pressure on
the Afghans and get them outside their comfort zone. On
PRTs, he expressed the same rationale, recommending debate on
how much longer PRTs should remain in Afghanistan as
presently configured. He suggested shifting the focus of
PRTs away from long-term development projects and
infrastructure, and reconfiguring forces to conduct
operations that permit the space for that type of development
to be delivered by the UN and others, permit governance to
develop, and provide quick impact assistance projects.

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Iran
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7. (S) Poland and Jordan asked about Iran's role in
Afghanistan, with Poland citing reports of Iranian weapons
transfers to specific ethnic groups in western Afghanistan,
potentially fomenting ethnic conflicts. General McNeill
stated that weaponry originating in Iran has been intercepted
by ISAF, and that Iran has been involved particularly in
tribal areas near Shindand in western Afghanistan. Noting
the limits of ISAF intelligence due to a light force presence
overall in RC-West with nothing in Nimroz province, he stated
that not everything crossing the border from Iran had a
negative impact, but that weapons continue to flow into
Afghanistan from Iran, despite the heavy Iranian military
presence on the Iranian side of the border that is aimed at
preventing the flow of narcotics into Iran.

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Elections - Be Ready to Surge
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8. (C) In response to Canadian and British questions about
ISAF's readiness to assist with security for the upcoming
2009/2010 elections, General McNeill reiterated the
importance that more people vote in these elections than
voted in the 2004/2005 elections, in order to enhance
legitimacy. He expressed concern that a feeling of
disenfranchisement may discourage some from voting since
voting in Afghanistan requires a real effort, often to

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include walking for miles over winding mountainous paths to
reach a polling station. He encouraged Allies to keep
perspective that although the elections likely will not be
perfect and some violence will be seen, they must occur, and
they must be a success. Pointing to U.S. leadership and
NATO's effort in surging resources to Afghanistan to assist
with the 2004/2005 elections, he urged Allies and Partners to
begin looking closely at what more they may be able to do for
these elections.


9. (C) In other interventions, the Secretary General warmly
praised General McNeill's service and accomplishments, and
presented him with the NATO Meritorious Service Medal.
Ambassador Nuland expressed pride on behalf of the United
States in General McNeill's service, during which he took
ISAF from a mission that did peacekeeping where possible, to
a peacemaking force comprising 40 nations from four
continents. Spanish PermRep Benavides congratulated General
McNeill, dubbing him "General Comprehensive Approach", for
his accomplishments in integrating ISAF military operations
with civilian reconstruction efforts, a moniker echoed
appreciatively by several other PermReps.


10. (U) General McNeill did not have the opportunity to
clear this cable.
NULAND