NATO: MAY 6, 2008 HLTF MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 USNATO 000171

NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: NATO: MAY 6, 2008 HLTF MEETING

REF: (A) STATE 047325 (GUIDANCE)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard G. Olson, reasons 1.4 (b
and d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: At the May 6 HLTF, Allies agreed that for
now the optimum course for addressing CFE issues with Russia
is to adhere to the positions set out in the March 28 NAC
statement and the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Allies
should remain patient, demonstrating unity and resolve, while
we take stock of Russia,s position and likely challenges
ahead.

-- Many Allies were in listening mode, but those who spoke at
the HLTF (U.S., DE, FR, RO, TU, CA, GR, NO and UK) stressed
that the NAC statement and communiqu, taken together, offer
a thoughtful and unified message on CFE and a sound
proposal--the parallel actions package--to Russia for ending
the current impasse.

-- There was clear consensus (at the HLTF and the preceding
Quad) that Allies should keep that offer on the table,
continue dialogue with Russia, continue to implement the
Treaty, and use key upcoming events--such as the meetings at
NATO of NRC CHODs on May 14-15 and NRC Defense Ministers June
12-13--to reinforce our unified message to Russia.

-- There were two key subtexts of the HLTF discussion. One
was that Allies hoped the U.S.-Russian bilateral dialogue
will continue and bear fruit. The U.S. rep (Look) made clear
that the situation in Georgia greatly complicated setting up
the next U.S.-Russia CFE bilateral meeting. All understood,
but nonetheless, placed their current hopes for saving the
Treaty on the U.S.-Russia channel. The second was the
priority that all Allies attached to adopting unified NATO
positions and approaches: better to take extra time and gain
a unified NATO position on any next step than to allow an
appearance of division.

-- While the U.S. rep and the Chair both noted with concern
President Putin,s statement at the NRC in Bucharest that
Russia would withdraw from CFE if its concerns were not
resolved soon, Allies did not focus at this meeting on how
NATO should respond to such an eventuality. Some Allies did
note that the first window when a notification of Russian
intention to withdraw from the Treaty might be likely would
be mid-July, one year following their announcement of
intended suspension. Allies will return to this issue at the
June HLTF meeting, but it was notable that no Ally appeared
to view this Putin threat as one requiring an immediate
response.

-- France (Grand) suggested, and many Allies welcomed, the
idea of an HLTF "retreat" for NATO Allies to consider next
steps, perhaps in the fall or winter. The U.S. noted the
timing and agenda would need to be carefully considered
especially with regard to the message such a meeting could
send to Russia.

-- The Turkish rep (Gun) announced at the HLTF meeting that
DFM Kislyak will visit Ankara on May 12 for long-awaited CFE
consultations. In the U.S.-Romanian bilateral meeting
Romanian rep Micula provided U.S. rep Look with a paper "for
A/S Fried" regarding the parallel actions package, which
indicates Romania wants specific timeframes and parameters on
Russian withdrawal from Moldova in order to be able to ratify
Adapted CFE. Micula did not mention this paper at the HLTF
nor did he share it with other Allies. (Text of paper
included in para 15.) END SUMMARY.

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Contacts and Bilaterals
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2. (C) Turkey announced that DFM Kislyak will visit Ankara
on May 12 for long-awaited consultations, primarily on CFE
and on other pol-mil issues. The Turks will emphasize they
are open to reviewing the flank regime only after entry into
force of the Adapted CFE Treaty. They intend to underscore
their commitment to CFE, support for the parallel actions
package, and the hope that Russia and the U.S. can find a way
forward in bilateral discussions.


3. (C) Romania (Micula) remarked on bilateral discussions
between Presidents Basescu and Putin on the margins of the

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Bucharest Summit, noting that although half of the discussion
covered CFE it was mainly a repeat of national positions and
did not achieve any progress on reaching a common
understanding.


4. (C) The U.S. HLTF Representative, State/VCI DAS Karin L.
Look, noted that CFE was not a subject of significant
substantive discussion at Sochi as the focus was on
finalizing the U.S.- Russia Strategic Framework Declaration,
which primarily addresses bilateral issues for strategic
cooperation, however it does include a reference to CFE among
areas where we have differences, but on which we will
continue to work together.

-- Regarding the next U.S.-Russia CFE bilateral
discussions between Assistant Secretary Fried and MFA Deputy
Minister, Director Antonov, Look underscored that the current
situation in Georgia-Russia relations had complicated both
the sequencing and timing of discussions with Georgian
authorities on Gudauta, a prerequisite to the next
U.S.-Russia engagement. Although the timing remains unclear,
Look noted Fried hoped to propose a meeting for late May.

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Way Ahead: HLTF Agrees to Remain Patient
--------------


5. (C) The main theme of the HLTF (and Quad that preceded
it) was consensus that for now the optimum course is to hold
to the recently agreed NAC statement, remain patient, and
demonstrate unity through a common message while we take
stock of Russia,s position and likely challenges ahead. The
NAC statement and communiqu, taken together, offer a
thoughtful and unified message on CFE and a sound proposal
"the parallel actions package" to Russia for ending the
current impasse. Allies should keep that offer on the table,
continue dialogue with Russia, and continue ourselves to
implement the Treaty. The current situation, where Allies
implement CFE while Russia does not, cannot last forever, but
continued Treaty implementation by NATO Allies makes sense
for now, since our goal is to draw Russia into a dialogue
that leads to resolution of the current situation. Allies
think that a decision by NATO to cease implementation will be
momentous and thus must be carefully considered. Some Allies
noted specifically that if NATO stopped implementing, that
would erode the regime, give Russia an easy way out of CFE,
and make it more difficult for Moscow to take a decision to
negotiate seriously with us. Key highlights of the
discussion include:

-- The Netherlands (Kleinjan) initiated discussion on the way
ahead with an intentionally provocative intervention that
outlined a number of options and possible outcomes which were
summarily dismissed by all who spoke afterwards. The Dutch
"options" included: 1) do nothing which would lead to Russian
withdrawal from CFE and Allies receiving the brunt of the
blame; 2) continue with the action-for-action path, but
"resuscitate" the package by initiating ratification which
would amount to capitulation to Russian demands thereby not
making it an attractive option politically; 3) maintain a
public dialogue on resolving the CFE impasse, but also
initiate a separate dialogue with Russia on conventional arms
control after-CFE which would essentially concede that CFE is
dead while sparing the awkwardness of burying it; or 4)
convene - with Russia,s buy in - a "joint" extraordinary
conference during which Allies would act on many of the
elements of the parallel actions package to include exploring
the possibilities of modernizing the Treaty.

-- No Ally supported the substance of the Dutch proposal,
though several welcomed this effort to frame options
comprehensively. Several Allies said or implied that the
Dutch presentation offered a "caricature" (the Germans,
term) of what the real options were. Several, including the
U.S., argued that being patient and waiting for Russia to
respond to the ideas NATO has on the table was not the same
as "doing nothing." Others said that the quickest way to
lose the current Treaty was to hint at discussion of a new
one, and called for keeping the focus on saving CFE. The UK
and France underscored that we should not consider an
Extraordinary Conference unless we knew what we would achieve
by it.

-- The U.S. said that it is prepared to continue bilateral
engagement with Russia on the basis of the parallel actions

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package and underscored the need for Allies to remain firm
and show resolve. The NAC Statement represents a strong and
unified NATO approach endorsed in the Summit Declaration by
Heads of State and Government. It is appropriate to be
patient and give that position time to be considered by
Russia. Look noted Allies will need to consider carefully
how long we can continue our policy of continued
implementation of CFE, which we have said cannot continue
"indefinitely." But she agreed with others who want to
proceed with such consideration in a step by step manner,
taking into account all the potential down-sides of each
choice. Look pushed back on the Dutch options, by
emphasizing that we are not certain of Russia,s ultimate
intentions and our aim should be to find ways to persuade
Russia to return to compliance and negotiate seriously. She
dismissed the notion that waiting for a constructive Russian
response was the equivalent to doing nothing and suggested
that any change in the NATO position on implementation of CFE
could result in Russia walking back rather than returning to
compliance. Look stressed that now is not the time to
rethink what Heads of Government just affirmed in Bucharest.

-- Germany (Biontino) underscored that they could not support
any option that would degrade the current situation, and
especially any option that risks deterioration of the current
arms control system, although not perfect, it is key to
European stability. Biontino noted the parallel actions
package is a strong negotiating position which covers the
range of issues and stressed that we should not add to it nor
capitulate. Allies must exercise patience by maintaining a
unified stance behind the NAC statement which would allow
Russia time to appreciate the serious offer that is on the
table and respond to it accordingly, and not by setting
artificial deadlines or dates that would only serve to
precipitate erosion of the regime.

-- France (Grand) echoed U.S. and German calls for patience
highlighting that it made no sense to even consider an
alternative proposal just one month after Bucharest in light
of Russia,s mixed reaction to the NAC statement and our
uncertainty over Russia,s intentions. Grand was very clear
that in the interest of avoiding further deterioration of the
current situation, Allies should not call an extraordinary
conference without a clear purpose and should not set
artificial deadlines especially prior to upcoming high level
meetings in the fall.

-- Romania (Micula),unusually reticent regarding the way
ahead, responded to the Dutch "options" by stressing that
Allied unity is essential, "to wait is not necessarily doing
nothing," and setting artificial deadlines could be
detrimental to the Allied position by unnecessarily
increasing pressure on Allies rather than on Russia. Micula
noted the NAC statement and Bucharest declaration sent a
strong, unified message to Russia and indicated that for now
Allies should continue observing Russia,s actions. Russia
may not be in compliance, but had not yet crossed any red
lines that merited a response. However, Allies must monitor
the situation in Georgia especially as regards any use of
Gudauta, the increase of Russian troops in Abkhazia, and
implications for Istanbul commitments.

-- Turkey (Gun) along with Canada, Greece, Norway, and the UK
expressed full support for the German, French and U.S.
positions noting the NAC statement fully endorsed by Heads of
State/Government is a solid basis from which to move forward.
All echoed that there was no need for artificial deadlines;
now is not the time for NATO Allies to cease fulfilling
Treaty obligations. Allied solidarity remains key, meaning
there should be no changes to the package, rather Russia
should be given time to respond formally. The UK (Ford)
specified that the Netherlands had mischaracterized the
current situation, which was not doing nothing, but actually
"active patience" with a unified, clear position as outlined
in the NAC statement in support of the bilateral process.

-- Canada (Arpin) questioned what would constitute a CFE red
line, namely regarding Russia,s current actions in Abkhazia,
and specifically in Guadauta. The Chair (Simmons) offered a
recap of recent events that clouded the issue by incorrectly
asserting the Russian fighter had taken off from Gudauta and
implying that Russia,s augmented peace keeping forces were
reinforcing Gudauta. The U.S. clarified the factual errors
and all agreed at this point to continue monitoring further
Russian actions to include assessing the CFE compliance

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implications.

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HLTF Proposals
--------------


6. (C) While Allies agreed to maintain a steady course
holding to the substance of the recently agreed NAC
statement, a number of interim concrete proposals and issues
were raised:

-- France suggested, and many Allies welcomed, the idea of an
HLTF "retreat" to take a full day to analyze the situation in
depth and consider next steps, perhaps in the fall or winter.
The U.S. (supported by Turkey) noted the timing and agenda
would need to be carefully considered to include the
message--intentional or not--such an event may send to
Russia. Romania not only welcomed the NATO-only seminar idea
along with Greece, Norway, and Canada, but also volunteered
to host the event in the fall. This idea will be further
explored and discussed at the next HLTF.

-- Regarding continued dialogue with Russia and reinforcing
the firm Allied message, the Chair mentioned that the May 15
NATO CHODs meeting will include a session in NRC format with
Russia. Simmons noted that Baluyevskiy is likely to attend
and raise CFE, reminding Allies that the last three times
this has happened no Allied CHOD had responded to
Baluyevskiy,s assertions. All agreed it would be useful to
send a clear message at both the CHODs, meeting in May and
the NRC Defense Ministers, meeting in June.

-- The U.S. raised the issue of Russia using the JCG in
Vienna to sow division among Allies and asked others to
consider the costs of continuing to meet on a weekly basis in
the fall in light of the current environment. She noted that
this was not an issue for today but one we need to consider
in the coming months. For example, if in the autumn the JCG
met less frequently, Allies could still register concerns
with non-compliance while minimizing Russia,s ability to
stir trouble. Germany, noting Allies have been successful at
preventing Russia from driving wedges, expressed concern
about reducing the frequency of JCG meetings. Biontino
opined that the JCG should continue to meet regularly, but
acknowledged the need to control the agenda and continue to
rebuff any attempts to discuss general security issues or
accession to CFE by the Baltic states.

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Meetings on the Margins
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10. (C) U.S. rep Look and team met on the margins of the
HLTF with the UK, France, and Germany and bilaterally with
Turkey, Romania and Norway. At the key Allies (Quad) meeting
discussion, it was quickly apparent that all were on board
with calling for unity, patience and resolve in the HLTF on
the basis of the NAC statement and discouraging any calls for
immediate response. The costs of any step by Allies on CFE
would have to be carefully weighed. Of note, Germany and
France reiterated their interest in holding a Quad plus 1
format meeting with Russia, which France noted had been
agreed to in principle by the political directors and,
together with Germany, claimed would push Antonov to provide
a Russian assessment of the parallel actions package.
Germany also suggested meeting in the NRC (ACE) format to
push for an answer to the NAC statement. The U.S. (supported
by France) expressed concerns about the utility of such a
format if Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Ulyanov was to
be the Russian representative. This idea was trumped by the
French proposal of an HLTF (thus, NATO-only) "retreat"
discussed in para 6. The UK was interested in looking beyond
the fall but agreed the waters were too murky at this point
to consider long-term strategy. The UK, Germany and France
raised the issue of the upcoming U.S. election and noted that
Russia may choose to delay resolution on CFE in order to take
up the issue with the next administration.


11. (C) Turkey. Turkish HLTF rep Gun was also on board
with the message of patience and resolve. Gun reported that
bilateral consultations with DFM Kislyak had finally been set
for May 12 to address CFE and other pol-mil issues. He noted
Turkey would use the opportunity to emphasize that Russia,s
insistence on eliminating flank restrictions for Russia would
cause ratification problems for Turkey. U.S. rep Look and

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State/EUR Laurendeau asked Gun to also use the meeting to
seek any insights on Russia's strategic vision on CFE/arms
control as an element of Russian security, and whether Russia
has a strategy for the endgame on CFE.


12. (C) Romania. U.S. rep Look met bilaterally with
Romanian rep Micula while Laurendeau chaired a bilateral
meeting with Norway. During discussions, it was evident that
Romania supported a steady approach, but Micula took the
opportunity to express some ideas on a strictly bilateral
basis and to provide a paper with input on the parallel
actions package.

-- Micula speculated that it is possible Russia wants
to achieve a "Third CFE Treaty" either by dismantling the
current regime and negotiating something new or by getting
the adapted Treaty in force with modifications. However, he
opined that Russia was not likely concerned about a world
without CFE as NATO was a predictable partner that is not a
rival to Russia. Look noted the U.S. had not reached that
conclusion and remained uncertain of Russia,s overall
intentions.

-- Micula floated the idea of an extraordinary
conference requested by a non-NATO State Party, but quickly
agreed with the U.S. assessment that the timing was not yet
right as, no matter who called it, there needed to be a clear
purpose or it would unnecessarily increase pressure on
Allies. Micula also raised the issue of the upcoming U.S.
election noting concern with Germany trying to use it as
cover for taking the lead on CFE. Look assured him that
Germany wanted to be involved in the process, but we had no
sense of any intention to take the lead.

-- At the end of the meeting, Micula provided the U.S.
del with a paper "for A/S Fried" (see full text in para 15)
which indicates concern that the current version of the
parallel actions package "may open the door for the
legitimization of a long term military presence near the
Romanian/NATO border." Romania cannot live with the
formulation "when possible" regarding the Russian withdrawal
from Moldova. They want specific timeframes for the
withdrawal of munitions and the transformation of the
peacekeeping force in addition to specific parameters as to
the composition of the force to be able to initiate
ratification of Adapted CFE. Micula was clear that these
were issues for bilateral discussions and did not make any of
those points in the HLTF plenary.


13. (C) Norway. EUR/RPM Laurendeau chaired a bilateral
meeting with Norwegian rep Loken while Look met separately
with Romania. Norway requested the meeting in order to
touch base with the U.S. on prospects for progress in
U.S.-Russia bilateral talks on CFE, to underscore core
Norwegian positions on CFE (keep CFE, and keep the flank
regime),and to brainstorm more generally on the way forward.
Loken was visibly relieved when Laurendeau explained that
the U.S. had not come to the HLTF with a proposal to change
course on CFE. Loken made clear that for Norway, maintaining
CFE is a priority, and any steps that might place it in
greater jeopardy would be viewed skeptically in Oslo.
Patience and persistence in promoting our proposals were to
be preferred over changes of course that might have
unintended consequences. Continuing to implement CFE was not
difficult, and it sends the right message. He agreed with
Laurendeau,s assessment that NATO had done well in sending a
unified message to Russia in the NAC statement and at
Bucharest. Laurendeau said the U.S. was ready to continue
discussions with Russia bilaterally, but that the situation
in Georgia had complicated prospects for the next bilateral
meeting. Moreover, it did not appear that Russia was in a
hurry to solve CFE. She added that the U.S. placed the
highest priority on NATO unity: whatever happened to CFE, we
could not allow Russia,s steps against the Treaty to
undermine Alliance solidarity.

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Next HLTF Meeting
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14. (SBU) Next Meeting. Allies agreed to meet again in late
June and the I.S. has proposed that the next meeting be held
on Tuesday, June 24.

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Romanian Paper
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15. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT.

Romania,s perspective on key parameters of the Parallel
Action Package
For US only

Romania attaches great importance to the entering into force
of the Adapted CFE Treaty, as it is designed to further
strengthen the security and stability in Europe.

Therefore, Romania has constructively supported the US
tireless efforts aiming at overcoming the current impasse
caused by the Russian "suspension" of the implementation of
the CFE Treaty and welcomed from the very beginning the
principles of the Parallel Action Package.

Nevertheless, some provisions of the Package, in its current
version, may open the door for the legitimization of a long
term military presence near the Romanian/NATO border.

Consistent with the NATO traditional policy, Romania
continues to attach the highest importance to the fulfillment
of Istanbul commitments, thus paving the way for the
ratification of the Adapted CFE. The core principle of this
policy is to avoid the legitimizing of any illegitimate
military presence near the Romanian borders. This represents
a national security concern. Under no circumstances should a
Kaliningrad-type solution be envisaged near the Eastern
Romanian border--at the same time a NATO border.

As a matter of principle, Romania will not accept a formula
that will just endorse the continuation of the current
Russian military presence, without any clear prospects for
its withdrawal. In the absence of a strict calendar for such
a withdrawal, aiming at the fulfillment of the Istanbul
commitments, Romania will not be in the position to launch
the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Any final
agreement should contain clear indication on the following
issues: the timeframe, with specific deadlines, for the
gradual transformation of the peacekeeping force into a
civilian presence, as well as a clear calendar for the
withdrawal of munitions; the percentage that Russia will
provide in the civilian mission that will replace the
so-called "peacekeepers"; the command and control structure
of the future mission.

In anticipation of a more detailed discussion on the
provisions of the Parallel Action Package, from the Romanian
perspective, any final agreement should envisage the
following optimal key parameters:

-- A timeframe of 3 to 6 months for the complete withdrawal
or destruction of Russian munitions from the Republic of
Moldova, accompanied by the withdrawal of the Russian forces
responsible for the security of the stocks. Prior to this,
within 45 days of the date of the agreement, a joint
OSCE-Russia inventory of the existing munitions stocks would
be conducted. Throughout the process, periodic OSCE
observation visits would take place.

-- A timeframe of 6 to 9 months for the transformation of the
Russian peacekeeping force into a civilian mission, under
OSCE mandate, time-limited and with the possibility of
further extension. The process can be divided into two
phases: 45 days for the agreement on the mandate, including
size, composition and command structure of the future
mission, followed by a two or three stage (each of three
months) withdrawal and corresponding replacement of the
Russian troops with elements of the civilian mission (around
300 soldiers at each stage in case of a three (sic) stage
process or around 200 soldiers in case of a three stage
process). The command of the mission would be assumed by a
civilian. The size of the civilian mission would be around
700, including a multinational component of civilian
observers (150-200) and a multinational component of rapid
reaction forces (400-500 police/gendarmerie). The Russian
participation in the mission would be up to 33 percent. The
entire process would be monitored by OSCE, being correlated
with a process of demilitarization of the Transnistrian
region, and a process of implementation of CSBMs aiming at
facilitating the political settlement of the Transnistrian
conflict.

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NULAND