USD/P EDLEMAN, COUNSELOR COHEN UPDATE NATO SECGEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK EZ PL
SUBJECT: USD/P EDLEMAN, COUNSELOR COHEN UPDATE NATO SECGEN
AND PERMREPS ON AFGHANISTAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: USNATO 0006

Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Ambassador Eric Edelman and Counselor of the Department of
State Dr. Eliot Cohen used a January 9 meeting at NATO with
Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to assure him

SIPDIS
that U.S.-led efforts among RC-South Allies to produce a 3-5
year ISAF "vision statement" for endorsement at the April
NATO Summit in Bucharest were on track, and would shortly be
provided to SYG. The SYG expressed concern that a new senior
UN Representative in Afghanistan not usurp the North Atlantic
Council's (NAC) decision-making authority over the ISAF
mission, and urged that not only NATO's, but also the EU's
relationship with a UN Representative be spelled out more
clearly in the formal Terms of Reference. All agreed that
Russian obfuscation on missile defense was regrettable, and
that progress in talks with the Czech Republic and Poland
would play a large role in any movement on the issue at
Bucharest. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) ISAF VISION DOCUMENT. USD/P Edelman addressed
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer's concerns about the

SIPDIS
decision taken by RC-South Defense Ministers in Edinburgh in
December 2007 to have the United States draft a public ISAF
"vision statement" for the Bucharest Summit, arguing that
this was intended to complement, not subsume or subvert the
NATO process of drafting a strategic political military plan
for ISAF. USD/P Edelman stressed that the RC-South nations
felt a strong desire to coordinate a position amongst
themselves, to then work at 26 at NATO. He explained that in
the short term this vision statement would help Allies such
as Canada (he characterized the Harper government's position
as being "on a knife's edge," as it works to maintain
Canada's commitment in the face of strident opposition from
the Liberal party) make the case to publics and Parliaments
to remain deployed, while it would enable all 26 Allies to
understand where ISAF was heading, and make that case for a
long-term commitment. The SYG agreed with USD/P Edelman on
Canada, and appreciated his brief on Edinburgh, but
underscored the need to shift the RC-South work into NATO
channels as quickly as possible, and to work closely with him
and Ambassador Nuland so that they could help push Allies to
consensus. SYG made clear there should be one process for
drafting this document and that he have control over the
process. He informed the Under Secretary that on January 8,
he had invited input from all Allies into the drafting
process, as he intends to have Defense Ministers discuss a
document at their February 7-8 informal meeting in Vilnius.
He said he welcomed the U.S. input and asked for it as soon
as possible. The SYG endorsed the validity of the RC-South
effort, noting that Allies in the south were doing the "heavy
lifting" for ISAF, but noted he has detected misgivings among
the Germans and French. He said that all ISAF nations
needed to resist the tendency to view "their" provinces and
regions through a straw, and rather take a whole of country
approach.


3. (C) NEW SENIOR CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE. The SYG, who had
spoken with UN SYG Ban about the Terms of Reference for a new
senior UN Representative in Afghanistan (reftel),stated that
although he personally favored the idea of "triple-hatting"
this representative as a formal representative of the UN,
NATO, and the EU, UN SG Ban was resolutely opposed. De Hoop
Scheffer shared his own concerns and asked that as the draft
Terms of Reference continued to be worked his concerns be
taken into account. First, de Hoop Scheffer asked that
careful attention be paid to the wording of the UN
Representative's relationship to ISAF; any implication that
the figure had authority over ISAF must be unambiguously
avoided, he stated, as the North Atlantic Council's
decision-making authority must not be compromised. The
January 9 draft TOR were not clear enough, he asserted.
Second, he expressed concern that in the January 9 draft, the
relationship of the new UN Representative with the EU was not
defined in a sufficiently precise manner. One of the primary
aims of enhancing the Representative's role, the SYG stated,
was to enhance coordination of the international civilian
effort, and thus, any TOR that enhanced the NATO-UN
relationship (a good thing, the SYG was clear to stress),yet
did not formally enhance the Representative's relationship

USNATO 00000016 002 OF 004


with EU Commission and Council representatives overlooked a
key part of balancing the international equation in
Afghanistan. USD/P Edelman and Counselor Cohen thanked the
SYG for his views, and noted they would pass them along.


4. (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer made clear he supported greater
EU engagement in Afghanistan. He encouraged the U.S. and
other Allies to engage the European Commission more
aggressively on Afghanistan, noting that the EC controlled
the EU's purse strings. He encouraged the U.S. to use its
influence to draw the EU further into Afghanistan, and
pointed back to the TOR of a new UN Representative as a key
means of accomplishing this. USD/P Edelman and Counselor
Cohen noted the USG is seeking a UN Representative who wears
a "virtual" triple hat should the formal triple hat prove
impossible. They shared with the SYG their disappointment
stemming from a January 8 dinner with Robert Cooper,
Claude-France Arnoud, and other ESDP officials from the
European Union during which one interlocutor explained that
politically, "Chad looms larger" for EU members (whose
bilateral support is needed to field and support EU missions)
than does Afghanistan, and that the security argument
stemming from Afghanistan does not hold as much sway at the
EU as it does in the U.S. The SYG observed that such a
disconnect exists despite the fact that 21 nations are both
NATO Allies and EU members, and expressed disappointment and
disbelief that the European Union had yet to ever discuss
Afghanistan at the level of Heads of State and Government. He
stated that he intended to bring up the issue of EU support
to Afghanistan in his upcoming meeting with French President
Sarkozy and was looking for France to influence EU into
stronger support for Afghanistan.


5. (S) MISSILE DEFENSE. USD/P Edelman offered an update on
engagement with Russia, the Czech Republic, and Poland since
October 2007, when he had last discussed the issue with the
SYG and the NAC. He characterized the December 2007
U.S.-Russia Experts Meeting in Budapest as a continuation of
past sessions, noting a lack of Russian engagement on the
various U.S. offers for cooperation, and a focus by the
Russians more on transparency measures. He told the SYG that
recent talks with the Czechs had eliminated around 50 percent
of the bracketed text, and relayed that in his earlier
meeting that day with NATO PermReps, Czech PermRep Fule had
agreed that concluding an agreement by February or March 2008
was feasible. USD/P Edelman cited increasing U.S. concern
with recent rhetoric from Warsaw, and pointed to upcoming
visits to Washington by FM Sikorski and MOD Klich as key
opportunities to reopen productive dialogue. The SYG said
he would be helpful by reminding Poles this issue has a large
Alliance dimension, and is not only limited to U.S.-Polish
bilateral channels. Finally, he noted that another "2 2"
meeting between the U.S. and Russia at the Secretary level
would likely occur in the spring, but a date was not set, and
was complicated by the Russian leadership succession.


6. (S) The SYG stated he intends to push for qualitative
steps on Missile Defense at Bucharest, but recognized this
would be triggered to a large extent by U.S. achievements
with the Czechs and Poles. He said that the recent NIE
(which he believed was misinterpreted) has caused many Allies
to become "fence sitters," as has the status of U.S. talks
with the Czechs and Poles. It was not all "doom and gloom,"
though, the SYG stated; he was encouraged by the December
2007 Transatlantic Foreign Ministers dinner in Brussels,
during which Allies endorsed Secretary Rice's views that an
Iranian threat existed, and stated that we needed to
capitalize on this.

-------------- --------------
Roundtable brief, discussion with Allied PermReps
-------------- --------------


7. (C) USD/P Edelman provided NATO PermReps with a similar
brief on Missile Defense during a breakfast roundtable
earlier that day, though with less emphasis on recent Polish
comments, noting the status of talks with the Poles were
"less clear" than those with the Czechs. The Polish PermRep
had no comments.


8. (C) On Afghanistan, USD/P Edelman stated that overall
2007 had seen many achievements in Afghanistan, including

USNATO 00000016 003 OF 004


unparalleled tactical success on the battlefield. He stated
that strategic success had proven somewhat elusive, and noted
U.S. support for a new, bolstered UN Representative in
Afghanistan, who could tie together and synchronize the
various strands of international community engagement.
Counselor Cohen noted that whether one called the activity
"counterinsurgency" or "comprehensive approach," there must
be productive civil-military coordination among the
international community, and the U.S. hoped and expected the
new UN Representative would achieve this. He encouraged the
international community to rally behind and support this
individual once named, and to "help him help us."


9. (C) USD/P Edelman told PermReps that NATO's inability to
fill the ISAF mission's Combined Joint Statement of
Requirements (CJSOR) remained a problem, and that all Allies
needed to do better explaining to our publics why NATO's
success in Afghanistan is crucial to our collective security,
and the consequences of potential failure. We cannot let
NATO's current systemic difficulties in strategic
communications and adapting to the challenges of Afghanistan
serve as an excuse for inactivity on a national level, he
pressed PermReps.


10. (C) During the follow-on discussion period, Italian
PermRep Stefanini noted potential difficulty for a UN Rep to
engage in civil-military coordination if this writ is not
formalized in a Terms of Reference, taking the opportunity to
return to a favored Italian assertion at NATO that even
coordination difficulties between ISAF and OEF exist. He
also queried about a regional role for the new UN
Representative. Counselor Cohen noted that the UN Rep would
most likely have a formal role as the primary civilian
liaison with the military command structures, and would add
value. He envisioned the Rep would necessarily have a
regional role and importantly, perspective, but would not
make policy or have resources.


11. (S) USD/P Edelman used the Italian question to comment
briefly on Pakistan, noting that the Taliban and Al Qaeda
were focusing attention on the Pakistan, namely the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province
but also beyond. Though this was of great concern for
Pakistan, he expressed hope that a recent downward trend in
cross-border activity into Afghanistan could be turned to the
benefit of Afghans. He highlighted the Pakistani
government's two-billion dollar, five-year counter-insurgency
plan, for which the U.S. has given one-billion dollars. He
also briefed U.S. plans to help train and equip the Frontier
Corps. Looking to Pakistani elections, he stated the U.S.
hoped for free, fair, credible elections, which would result
in increased opportunity for productive engagement.


12. (S) In other interventions, Canada and the Netherlands
stressed the need for ISAF's comprehensive political-military
strategy document, as tasked by Defense Ministers in October
2007, to be useful in all the different political contexts
that exist in Allied nations. Canadian PermRep McRae focused
on the need for his government to be able to engage the
Canadian public with substantive information on the document
during the February 7-8 Vilnius Defense Ministerial. Dutch
PermRep Schaper also asked to what extent the U.S. NIE on
Iran weakened the U.S. case with Russia for missile defense,
to which USD/P Edelman, echoed by Counselor Cohen, offered
vigorous rebuttals that the NIE contained much more
information about which to be concerned than about which to
be sanguine, although Russia was certainly not above using
the NIE to score political points.


13. (C) Turkish PermRep Ildem reiterated that on missile
defense, the issue of indivisibility of security was of
crucial importance, to which USD/P Edelman expressed
understanding. German PermRep Brandenberg asked how the U.S.
anticipated a new UN Representative would interact with
Afghan authorities. USD/P Edelman noted that the UN Rep will
certainly be sensitive to sovereignty, but that the
international community needs to realize the Afghan
government will need massive, sustained international help to
continue down the road of progress. Bulgarian PermRep Ivanov
asked for the U.S. assessment of Afghan National Security
Forces, and U.S. views of Afghan MOD Wardak's comments that
in the past have expressed a desire for an Afghan army

USNATO 00000016 004 OF 004


200,000 strong. USD/P Edelman stated that we do not fully
share MOD Wardak's views on the need for the ANA to acquire
more tanks and fighter aircraft, and we have great concern
over sustainability and budgetary issues. On ANA
performance, he praised the ANA's fighting spirit and
performance, but noted its high op tempo places great strain
on kandaks, causing continuing difficulties in areas such as
re-enlistment. In response to a question from Norwegian
PermRep Traavik, USD/P Edelman stated that the U.S. did not
rule out a place for local security structures based on
traditional tribal or customary arrangements, but that an
appropriate role for the Afghan central government would need
to be factored into any arrangement.


14. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.
--------------
USD/P Ambassador Eric Edelman
Counselor Dr. Eliot Cohen
USNATO Charge d'Affaires Richard Olson
SECDEFREP Europe Bruce Weinrod
DASD for NATO Policy Dan Fata
USD/P Military Assistant Col Tracy Warren
SECDEFREP Europe Military Advisor COL John Shapland
C Special Assistant Kelly Magsamen
USNATO Political Officer John Cockrell (notetaker)

NATO
--------------
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

SIPDIS
Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero
ASG Operations Martin Howard
ASG Defense Investment Peter Flory
Private Office Director Henne Schuwer
NATO Spokesman James Appathurai
Private Office Deputy Director Lisa Johnson


15. (U) USD/P Edelman and Counselor Cohen have cleared this
message.
OLSON