RFG: NATO-QATAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

S E C R E T USNATO 000154

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018
TAGS: NATO MOPS MARR PREL AF QA
SUBJECT: RFG: NATO-QATAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REF: 2007 STATE 162364

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (SBU) This is a request for guidance. See para 8.


2. (S/NF) NATO has been unable to conclude a Cooperation
Agreement with Qatar, largely due to significant differences
over the issue of jurisidiction: the Qataris continue to
insist on sole jurisdiction over NATO personnel; the U.S. and
other key Allies need to preserve the rights we have
bilaterally with the Qataris and therefore will not be able
to accept even the NATO IS compromise of concurrent
jurisdiction. Given this apparent impasse, USNATO proposes
that Doha be asked to allow the NATO Cell to continue
operating staffed only with personnel from countries with
existing bilateral agreements with Qatar, while flying a NATO
flag.


3. (S/NF) SUMMARY CONTINUED: As background, the proposed
agreement would provide the legal framework for establishing
an official status for the NATO personnel located at the
Combined Air Operations Center working in support of the
Alliance's Afghanistan operation. Without this agreement,
many Allies--and SACEUR--fear that the NATO Cell may be asked
to leave Qatar. So a solution needs to be found. END SUMMARY

Background
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4. (S/NF) Per reftel instructions, USNATO has ensured that
the NATO International Staff has protected U.S. red lines,
particularly regarding jurisdiction, in the ongoing
negotiations with Doha for a NATO-Qatar Cooperation
Agreement. This proposed agreement would provide the legal
framework to establish official status for the NATO personnel
stationed at the International Security and Assistance Force
(ISAF) Cell at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at
Al-Udeid Airbase, Qatar. Before the latest round of
negotiations, held on April 28-29 in Qatar, NATO had received
indications through several channels that Qatar was becoming
frustrated with the process and might seek to end the
negotiations without significant movement from the NATO side.
A number of Allies had expressed concern that such a result
might lead the Qataris to request the closure of the ISAF
Cell at the CAOC. At the May 5 meeting of NATO's Political
Committee, however, the International Staff reported that the
Qataris had not closed the door to future
negotiations--although significant differences remain. The
Qataris requested that NATO provide them with a complete text
of the agreement as proposed by NATO; the International Staff
is preparing this text. (Note: The U.S. asked that this text
be distributed to Allies before being given to the Qataris.)


5. (C) On April 25, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
GEN Craddock, sent a letter (e-mailed to EUR/RPM) to NATO
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer reiterating the importance
that he places "on the role played by the ISAF personnel at
the CAOC" in NATO's ongoing operation in Afghanistan. Noting
intense inter theater competition for the scarce assets in
CENTCOM's multiple theaters, SACEUR's letter stated that the
ISAF Cell acts "as the CAOC's ISAF 'conscience'" and "ensures
that ISAF troops and commanders are provided with the best
possible air support from the available assets." GEN
Craddock wrote that in order to continue playing this role,
the ISAF Cell needs to continue to be physically located at
the CAOC. As a result, he urged a re-examination of what we
require from Qatar in order to conclude an agreement --
"separating the 'must haves' from the 'nice to haves.'"


6. (C) The Private Office has added a discussion of this item
to the North Atlantic Council's May 7 meeting.

Recommendation
--------------


7. (S/NF) Assuming that neither side is able to move
significantly from their respective red lines, reaching a
multilateral agreement may not be possible -- although
negotiations could continue to stretch out for some time to
come. The possibility that Doha could eventually move to
close down the ISAF Cell in the absence of such an agreement
remains a worry of many Allies. Those concerns will likely
grow in reaction to SACEUR's letter stressing the importance
of the ISAF Cell at the CAOC. Should NATO-Qatar talks arrive
at an impasse, a possible way ahead would be to determine
whether the Qataris would allow the ISAF Cell to continue to
operate without a NATO-Qatar agreement if it were staffed
only with NATO personnel from countries with existing
bilateral agreements with Qatar, such as the U.S., UK, and
France. The bilateral agreements would thus be the vehicle
for providing the necessary legal protections to the NATO
personnel at the CAOC. This option would probably require
the U.S. to contribute an additional six or seven individuals
to the 14-person cell.

Request for Guidance
--------------


8. (S/NF) Unless otherwise directed, Ambassador will propose
the way forward outlined in para 7 at the May 7 North
Atlantic Council meeting.
NULAND