UN SRSG EIDE SHARES INITIAL THOUGHTS WITH NAC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000140

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: UN SRSG EIDE SHARES INITIAL THOUGHTS WITH NAC AND
ISAF CONTRIBUTORS

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in Afghanistan Kai Eide told NATO and ISAF

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Ambassadors in a joint NAC meeting April 16 that the June 12
international donors' conference in Paris must leave no doubt
about international commitment to the development and
political sides of the Afghan equation, and he was focused on
making his part of it a success. Cautioning that he had only
spent nine days thus far in Kabul, he shared views on nearly
every aspect of UNAMA's role in Afghanistan, highlighting the
need to improve donor efficiency and align it with the Afghan
National Development Strategy, do more on police training,
improve governance, and ensure successful Presidential and
Parliamentary elections. Eide stressed his commitment to
enhance civil-military coordination and expand UNAMA's
presence nationwide. PermReps were complimentary and
supportive of Eide, with Ambassador Nuland welcoming Eide's
intent to partner with ISAF, encouraging him to help the
Afghans get the most out of the Paris Conference, and urging
him to defend ISAF publicly. Many PermReps called for the
expansion of UNAMA to the south and east, and for
establishing a liaison in each of the ISAF regional commands.

In a dinner the previous night with Eide and his team, Nuland
and US MilRep Sullivan urged him to:

- Assign deputies to each of the RCs to strengthen campaign
planning with ISAF at all levels;
- Help the Afghans set concrete, achievable goals for the
Paris conference and work with the IC to match them with
money;
- Quickly determine his staff and support needs so that
Washington could help him lobby the UN;
- Ensure his aspirations for the UN to play a role in
reconciliation were fully in line with Afghan government
thinking and USG red lines

Eide is very focused on Paris as a vehicle to demonstrate his
leadership in delivering more in Afghan-IC coordination plus
development and good governance results. He knows he needs a
short list of key goals but hasn't yet developed them. This
offers Washington a great target of opportunity to shape his
thinking when he visits next week. END SUMMARY.

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Paris will be the first milestone
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2. (C) SRSG Eide pointed to the upcoming Afghanistan Support
Conference in Paris on June 12, and stated his top priority
is preparing for this conference. Paris must leave no doubt
as to the international community's resolve to tackle
development and political challenges in Afghanistan, he said.
Eide cautioned that he had only spent nine working days thus
far in Kabul, but ran down a long list of issues where he
believed progress in Paris would be important:

a.) Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS): Hailing the
achievement of the Afghans in putting together the ANDS,
which could be approved in Paris, Eide stated that Paris
needed to result both in more resources pledged by nations to
Afghanistan, as well as a commitment by all donors to
increase the effectiveness of their aid. Eide called for
nations to get more of their aid money into Afghan hands, and
make a better effort at aligning these resources behind the
ANDS, in order to reduce duplication.

b.) Donor coordination: Eide said he was working with the
Afghans to reform the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB),which had become too cumbersome and process-oriented,

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into a leaner mechanism more delivery-oriented, and focused
on supporting the ANDS. He urged donors to do a better job
speaking with one voice to the Afghans, citing the fight
against corruption as a policy challenge where his Afghan
interlocutors had often complained about receiving
conflicting advice from the international community.

c.) Afghanistan Compact: Paris would offer the opportunity
to take stock of progress on the Compact, he stated, and we
should not overlook achievements to-date.

d.) Police: Eide pulled no punches in his negative
assessment of progress thus far in building up the Afghan
National Police. He characterized the international effort
as too fragmented, and stated the international community was
still not sure of the type of police force it wished to
create; the "big players" needed to agree to a strategy, he
said. Eide noted the United States was making a "tremendous
effort," and called for a stronger EU effort, stating that
the EU needed to raise its level of ambition and double the
size of its mission, at a minimum.

e.) Governance: The SRSG praised Jolani Popal, Head of
Afghanistan's Independent Directorate for Local Governance,
and the importance for the international community to support
his efforts. Notwithstanding significant challenges at the
national level, Popal's efforts at the local level stand to
result in better administration, better policing, better
services, and to create a populace more politically primed to
welcome reconciliation.

f.) Elections: Eide recognized that the recent compromise to
hold Presidential elections in 2009 and Parliamentary
elections in 2010 was not cost-effective, but stressed that
this Afghan consensus was the only tenable solution, which
the international community must now support. He shared his
view that security will be a real concern for the elections,
and highlighted that unsuccessful or problematic 2009/2010
elections, compared to successful 2004 elections, stood to
demoralize Afghan and international public opinion, and
therefore all must do their utmost to ensure success.

g.) Reconciliation: Eide was clear that the Afghan
government must lead any reconciliation efforts, and the role
of the international community is to support the government
when asked. Reconciliation could not be seen as a sign of
weakness by the Government or international community, and
therefore a continued robust military effort was needed to
ensure a position of strength. Reconciliation must be
politically driven, not intelligence driven, he stated, and
not undermine the constitution.

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Beyond Paris
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3. (C) Civil-Military Coordination: SRSG Eide assured the
NAC of his commitment to fulfilling the civil-military
coordination role of UNAMA's mandate. He had already spoken
with COMISAF twice, he stated, and hoped to organize regular
meetings. Specifically noting this would help fight the
insurgency, Eide stated that he hopes to develop plans with
the military that will better enable UNAMA to deliver support
to the Afghan people. He sought to sensitize the NAC to the
difficulties he faces in managing the civilian side of the
deal, though, given the aversions of many in the UN
humanitarian and NGO community to working with the military.
The buy-in of the civilian community will be crucial, he
said, and part of getting this was to deftly pitch them
ideas, and not merely tell them to pack up, fall into line,
and move into areas the military had just cleared. Eide

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asked for understanding if at times he had to say things
publicly that "COMISAF or some of you might not like," but
stated he cannot afford to have his relations with the UN
humanitarian community and NGOs fragment. Already, he
conveyed, "too many" NGOs were calling for the UN's Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to split off
from UNAMA.


4. (C) UNAMA Expansion: Eide stated he was committed to
expanding UNAMA's presence in Afghanistan. Citing resource
restraints, he explained that he will need to work with New
York to get more resources and people ("the right people"),
and welcomed any assistance that national governments could
give him on this. He said that he needed to find more
qualified staff from nations around the world, in order not
to employ only "pale white faces." He was receptive to the
idea of establishing a UNAMA presence within the ISAF
regional commands, but admitted he needed to time to work on
establishing this mechanism and staffing it. The U.S., UK,
Polish, Hungarian, Dutch, and Danish PermReps called for
expanding UNAMA's presence, while the U.S., Romanian, Polish,
Dutch, and Canadians welcomed the intent to establish a
presence in the RCs. No PermReps opposed.


5. (C) Counternarcotics: Eide stated he had "no answers you
don't have," at present, but did note the need for ISAF
nations to move beyond the focus on "their" individual
province, and tie in more to a national perspective. Using
the analogy of "immunizing" poppy and insurgency free
provinces before problems developed, he questioned why the
worst performers received the bulk of international
development assistance.


6. (C) Regional Issues and Strategic Communications: The
SRSG stated he intends to travel regularly to Islamabad and
Tehran, and seeks to establish relationships of trust and
confidence. On strategic communications, he explained the
need to move beyond repetition of the number of girls in
school and the number of schools built, and to develop a
narrative backed by facts of real progress on the political
front. We need to develop Afghan capacity, in order to help
us.

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Discussion Period Solidifies NAC Support
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7. (C) Nearly every PermRep spoke and all offered support
for Eide and UNAMA's mission. Ambassador Nuland welcomed
Eide's intent to partner with ISAF, encouraging him to work
with NATO on an integrated, overarching international
civil-military "campaign plan" to bring together all aspects
of the international community's job in Afghanistan. On
police, she said the U.S. did have a concept for what the ANP
should look like, and stressed the need to quadruple the
current number of police mentors now working with ANP. She
agreed that the upcoming Afghan Support Conference in Paris
presented major opportunities, and urged Eide to mentor the
Afghans through the conference and beyond, keeping things
simple in order to get the most out of donors present there.
She assured Eide that the NAC was ready and able to hear
criticism and engage in frank discussions with him, but urged
him to be on the same page with ISAF publicly, and to defend
the mission when unavoidable tragedies in a conflict
occurred, such as civilian casualties.


8. (C) The Canadian PermRep, too, urged Eide to support ISAF
publicly, and asked him for some context on remarks Eide had
made the previous week in Kabul on the UN's "impartiality."
Eide stated he regretted the word choice, and would not use
the term "impartiality" in the future. We are not impartial

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he stated, but we must be independent. The Danish PermRep
announced that pending a Parliamentary decision, his
government planned to send 3-4 light recce helicopters, plus
50-75 crew and maintenance personnel, to Helmand in June.
The UK PermRep urged Eide to work closely with the NGO
community to encourage an "intelligent" NGO attitude toward
the benefits that closer military cooperation would bring.
The French PermRep agreed with Eide's assessment of the Paris
conference, and noted that France would also host on May 24 a
conference among civilian stakeholders, including NGOs, that
could be useful in developing their views. The German
PermRep stated that Germany favored doubling the size of
EUPOL. The Bulgarian PermRep agreed that increasing the
numbers of the EUPOL mission was important, but stressed that
EUPOL needed to increase its reach, to include training at
the district level.
NULAND